A-Infos (en) UK, AFEd, Organise - The Anti-Authoritarian Organisation of the Makhnovist Movement (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Preface ---- The Makhnovist movement (popularly and semi-pejoratively 
referred to as the makhnovshchina) was a relatively short-lived peasant 
and industrial worker anarchist insurgency in Ukraine that existed from 
1917-1921. The popular history of the Makhnovist movement is lacking, 
which has led to the claim that the Makhnovist movement constituted, in 
fact, a centralized state with a centralized military in complete 
contradiction with anarchist theory. This idea serves the defeatist, 
statist narrative that bottom-up control of society by the working 
masses is a pleasant idea, but ultimately impossible. Adherence to this 
narrative justifies the utmost centralization and makes true revolution 
impossible. A deeper look into the organisation of the makhnovskoe 
dvizhenie reveals its flawed, yet deeply libertarian character.

Free Soviets and Communes
The February Revolution established soviets (councils), which delegates 
were elected to by the workers to handle organisational and 
administrative matters. These delegates were recallable, as a mechanism 
to keep them accountable to those they represented. Like the Bolsheviks, 
the Makhnovist movement established soviets as well as communes. 
According to historian Michael Malet, "... the peasants heard about the 
idea as anarchist propagandists spread it into the villages ... They 
respected and admired Makhno, and were quite willing to go along with 
his ideas, which, being based on local units such as the village, made 
sense to them."1 And according to Voline, an influential anarchist 
participant in the Makhnovist movement, "... the communes arose from the 
workers themselves ... The Makhnovist partisans never exerted any 
pressure on the peasants, confining themselves to propagating the idea 
of free communes. The latter were formed on the initiative of the poor 
peasants themselves."2 The Makhnovist soviets differed significantly 
from the Bolshevik soviets. As Malet notes, "... for the insurgents the 
Soviets were the vital base of their ideal society, for the Bolsheviks 
they became increasingly cyphers covering party rule."3 This difference 
can be further seen in Nestor Makhno's account of his meeting with Lenin 
in 1918:

"'... all power, in all areas of life, must be identified with the 
consciousness and will of the working people. The peasants understand 
that the soviets of workers and peasants ... are neither more nor less 
than the means of revolutionary organisation and economic 
self-management of working people in the struggle against the 
bourgeoisie ...'

.... 'Well, then, the peasants of your region are infected with 
anarchism!'"4

Makhno essentially states that power must rest with the toilers, and 
that the soviets are their organ of self-management to make decisions 
and coordinate action on a local level. Lenin's dismisses this; a 
startling admission for someone claiming to represent the workers and 
peasants. The Makhnovists later published a pamphlet articulating their 
conception of the soviets in further detail: "... the Soviets should be 
absolutely independent of all political parties; they should be part of 
a general economic system based on social equality, their members should 
be real workers, should serve the interests of the working masses and 
obey only their will ..."5 Malet notes that the exclusion of parties was 
not the same as banning them;6 It was a given that toilers from 
different political parties were free to participate in and be elected 
to the free soviets. Regarding the communes, Voline states that they 
were created "... for the purpose of providing the necessities of life 
for the working people."7 The communes were to handle labor and 
distribution of resources for and by the people in the commune. Voline 
compared the Bolshevik equivalent unfavorably: "[They]did nothing but 
waste grain and ruin the land ... they lived off the labour of the 
people while pretending to teach them to work."8

The free soviets and communes were intended as the organs of local 
self-governance, but we should appraise how they actually functioned. 
According to historian Colin Darch, as news of Kornilov's 
counter-revolutionary coup spread, Makhno seized "seized deeds and 
certificates of ownership from landowners and kulaki[(rich 
peasants)]..."9 What to do with this was to be determined by the 
peasants: "[a]t a meeting of the local soviet, the peasants decided that 
the listed land and livestock should be divided equally, and kulaki and 
pomeshchiki[(landowners)]should be permitted to keep a share."10 Soon 
thereafter, according to historian Michael Palij, at the recommendation 
of the Petrograd Soviet, the local soviet "... organised a Committee for 
the Defense of the Revolution ... the committee decided to disarm all 
the bourgeoisie ...as well as 'to expropriate its rights to the people's 
wealth ...'"11 This is sufficient to demonstrate the basic idea of the 
free soviet as the organising mechanism of the toilers to drive forward 
the revolution.

We shall now examine the operation of the free communes. Palij notes 
that soon after, "[s]ome of the idealists among the anarchists formed a 
number of free agricultural communes consisting of volunteer peasants 
and workers where an elected committee of elders would allot the work 
alongside their fellow farmers."12 This supports Voline's general 
characterization of the communes: "They were based on real material 
mutual aid and on the principle of equality. Everyone ... had to work, 
each to the extent of his ability. The organising functions were 
confided to comrades who could fulfil them adequately. Their task 
accomplished, these comrades rejoined the common work ... These, sound, 
serious principles were due to the fact that the communes arose from the 
workers themselves ..."13 For more detail on what the work looked like, 
Darch refers to Makhno's account due to a lack of other sources: "Work 
in the fields, as well as such domestic tasks as preparing and cooking 
meals, was undertaken communally, but Makhno claims that individuals 
could absent themselves whenever they wanted, provided that they 
informed their 'nearest workmates'."14 Ultimately, the communes were 
self-organised: members delegated the task of organising to those they 
trusted, and all members worked together in service to the collective 
good. The attitude of the communes can be summed up by the resolution of 
one peasant congress: "... land belongs to no one, and only those who 
work it may use it."15

Now that we understand how the free soviets and communes operated in 
more detail, it is necessary to establish how prevalent they were. These 
organs could only be fully implemented during "periods of relative peace 
and territorial stability, as in the spring of 1919."16Voline offers us 
a more specific time frame: "... from December 1918 to June 1919, the 
peasants of Gulai-Polya lived without any political power ... they 
created new forms of social organisation: free workers' communes and 
Soviets."17 Anarchist historian Alexandre Skirda gives us an idea of the 
scale involved: "The largest of these communes ... housed 40 families as 
of May 1919. By May 1st it was to boast a population of 285 (adults and 
children) and would have 125 hectares under crops."18 After the free 
soviets had been destroyed by the Red Army, Malet notes that "[t]here 
was a brief revival of free Soviets in the short peace of 
October-November 1920."19

The Regional Congress of Peasants, Workers, and Insurgents
The Regional Congress gives off the impression of statism, not helped by 
how historians tend to characterise it: Skirda stated it was the 
"supreme authority of the movement",20 and Darch claims it was the 
"highest form of democratic authority in the political system of the 
Makhno movement".21 Already anarchists reading this may be instinctively 
wincing at the mention of "authority" being involved in an anarchist 
movement.

Malet also provides a general description of the Regional Congress: 
"...[it]was the most democratic and representative way of deciding the 
questions of the day. Where the local people would directly elect their 
delegates to the local free soviet to deal with local matters, equally 
would they elect delegates to the larger bodies. The possible conflict 
between the federation of Soviets and such congresses did not arise."22 
The decisions made at the congress would be returned to local assemblies 
for implementation.23 The Regional Congress can be thought of as a 
"Regional Soviet": essentially a free soviet on a larger scale, complete 
with the election of delegates at general assemblies24 to represent the 
local toilers' positions and concerns. At the congress, these delegates 
would deliberate and make decisions, much like the free soviets. The key 
difference was in scale: the congress made decisions for the whole of 
the movement. However, scale does not factor into how authoritarian an 
organ is. Rather, the crucial factor is where any given organ's power 
derives from: the party center, or the working masses?

Like with the free soviets, there existed the concern that the bottom-up 
nature of the congress could be undermined by party politics. Voline 
made clear that "[i]t was important, above all, that this congress 
should be different from those called by the authorities of a political 
party ..., who would submit to the congress ready-made resolutions, 
destined to be adopted docilely ... and imposed on the so-called 
delegates ..."25 The Makhnovists aimed to make the congresses the 
genuine expression of the working masses' chosen delegates (to the 
extent possible under the conditions of war). Voline expands on the 
specific measures taken:

"1. ... The Makhnovists confined themselves to notifying the villages, 
organisations, etc. that they should elect and send a delegate or 
delegates, to a workers' congress ... Thus the population could 
designate and instruct their delegates in complete freedom.

2. ... a representative ... would explain to the delegates that 
the[congress's]... deliberations and decisions would be absolutely free 
from all pressure ...

3. ... the delegates should themselves elect the board of the congress, 
and modify to suit themselves the agenda which was proposed to them ..."26

The concern regarding the stifling nature of party politics was not 
unfounded. As Voline recounted, "...[the delegates]expected to see on 
the platform men with revolvers in their belts who would manoeuvre the 
delegates and make them vote for resolutions which had been prepared in 
advance ..."27 The Makhnovists' policies mentioned above improved the 
ability of the elected delegates to freely participate in the congress 
and fulfill their role as true representatives of the toilers who 
elected them. In this way, the makhnovtsy established non-party 
congresses in the same vein as the non-party soviets.

However, the Regional Congress was not without flaw. Malet states that 
"[f]or the fourth congress, the scale of representation was to have 
been: one peasant or worker delegate per 3000 people, insurgents and Red 
Army men one delegate per unit, regiment, division, &c: plus staff and 
political party delegates. This was biased in favour of the military, 
most of whose units were less than 3000."28 Ideally, the proportion of 
the delegates would be on an equal basis, or even weighted towards the 
purely civilian population to counterbalance the military's obvious power.

Let us look to the Fourth Congress for examples of the type of decisions 
the congresses made: "The congress resolved to strengthen, organise, and 
prepare supplies for the army ... Each new regiment was to include a 
staff and an economic-judicial organ .... the congress resolved to 
organise local free social-economic organisations and commissions ... to 
obtain "contributions" from the bourgeoisie .... The congress 
recommended that the Revolutionary Military Council take strong measures 
against drinking, including the execution of offenders ..." The Regional 
Congress's decision-making scope was virtually unlimited. It could 
reorganise the army, decide policy and discipline, create new 
organisations, and more.29 But remember that the congress was made up of 
delegates chosen by working people. As far as these delegates could 
effectively represent those who had elected them, the congress was the 
self-organisation of the working masses in the same vein as the free 
soviets. This was an institution structured from the bottom-up on the 
basis of entrusted commission. The congress was hardly an "authority" in 
the anarchist sense of the term, with a self-legitimising mandate to 
rule over the populace, but rather, an attempt at the total inverse: the 
working people managing their own affairs.

Voluntary Mobilization
The Regional Congress' policy of "voluntary mobilisation" is 
controversial; there remains historical debate over whether this 
constituted conscription. Skirda, likely the historian most favourable 
to the Makhnovist movement, supports the view that this was not 
conscription: "... it meant that an appeal was issued to the 
revolutionary consciences of all concerned so that they might defend 
their rights and freedom by force of arms, without their being obliged 
to do so, as was the systematic practice among the Bolsheviks, Whites 
and Petliurists."30 Palij provides a relevant proclamation from Makhno: 
"Why are you not in our ranks? Are you waiting for a Commissar to come 
with a punitive detachment to take you by compulsory mobilisation? Do 
not deceive yourself that he will not find you, that you could hide, 
escape. The Bolshevik regime already proved it would stop at nothing 
..."31 Malet argues the mobilisation was not voluntary, but he provides 
contradictory evidence, the first of which comes from the Makhnovist 
newspaper The Road to Freedom: "Some groups have understood voluntary 
mobilisation as mobilisation only for those who wish to enter the 
Insurrectionary Army ... This is not correct .... The voluntary 
mobilisation has been called because the peasants, workers, and 
insurgents themselves decided to mobilise themselves ..."32 This excerpt 
appears damning, but Malet immediately offers evidence to the contrary: 
"Surviving leaflets of 1920 are in the nature of appeals to join up, not 
instructions ... Trotski had a go at the Makhnovists on this score also: 
Makhno does not have general mobilisations, and indeed these would be 
impossible, as he lacks the necessary apparatus: but the partisan who 
enters the detachment is not at all free to leave. Anyone leaving 
voluntarily is considered a traitor and threatened with bloody vengeance 
..."33 1920 was a desperate year for the Makhnovists, a time when one 
might expect conscription to ramp up; but surviving evidence from that 
time was in the form of appeals. Additionally, Trotsky, then commander 
of the Red Army, presents a middle view: the Makhnovists did not 
practice conscription, because they lacked the "apparatus," but that 
insurgents could not voluntarily leave. His view is likely the most 
accurate; there is no record of a specific mobilisation organ. Voline 
supports this, claiming that, "[o]nce the resolutions of this Second 
Congress were made known to the peasants of the region, each new town 
and village began to send to Gulai-Polya, en masse, new volunteers 
..."34 According to this, the mobilising apparatus was the local towns 
and villages themselves.

Furthermore, as Trotsky states, desertion was punished harshly, but 
these desertions were of a different character from the mass desertion 
of conscripts. From the book Kontrrazvedka, by Vyacheslav Azarov, 
punishment of desertion is only mentioned a few times: "After the 
Starobelsky Soviet-Makhnovist agreement ... Makhno's staff sent an order 
to all Makhnovist units in Ukraine to cease military activity against 
RKKA ... Many local detachments refused to carry out this order ... 
Desertion started from ... the Special Group of the SRPU(m) ... But its 
commander, the old insurgent Matyazh, was arrested and shot on October 
16 by order of KAD .... Yatsenko and Savchenko, who issued appeals on 
behalf of Wrangel, were shot by order of KAD."35 In these examples, it's 
the commanders being punished; contrast this with the widespread 
desertion endemic to the conscript armies fielded by nearly all other 
forces in the civil war. Malet notes that in general, the Makhnovists 
tended to receive deserters from the conscript armies.36

What definitive conclusion can we draw from all this? It's clear that 
the makhnovtsy strongly implored people to join the military. The local 
peasants most likely took on the task of mobilisation themselves, but 
leaving the army without permission was not allowed. The point was 
largely rendered moot by the fact that "... arms were scarce in the 
region ... They had to turn away ninety per cent, of the volunteers who 
came to enlist."37

Military Revolutionary Soviet
The Military Revolutionary Soviet (VRS or RVS) is another organ that 
appears authoritarian on its face. Historian Paul Avrich described it as 
such: "... the Military Revolutionary Council, acting in conjunction 
with the Regional Congresses and the local Soviets, in effect formed a 
loose-knit government ..."38 However, it was similar to the Regional 
Congress and the free soviets as an organ made up of elected delegates, 
according to Skirda: "The congress finally elected a regional Military 
Revolutionary Soviet which became its executive organ in the interval 
between its sittings."39 Later, when discussing the RVS's "famous reply" 
to Dybenko, he writes: "The authors of this reply then set out how and 
why the Military Revolutionary Soviet with its 32 members, one delegate 
from each district ... had come into being ..."40

Voline explains its origin and purpose in detail: "As a kind of general 
directing body for the fight against Petlura and Denikin, to maintain 
and support ... the economic and social relations among the workers 
themselves and also between them and the partisans, to take care of the 
needs for information and control .... It was supposed to carry out all 
the economic, political, social and military decisions made at the 
congress. It was thus, in a certain sense, the supreme executive of the 
whole movement. But it was not at all an authoritarian organ ...It 
confined itself to carrying out the instructions and decisions of the 
congress. At any moment, it could be dissolved by the congress and cease 
to exist."41 While the Regional Congress was the supreme decision-making 
body, the RVS was the supreme decision-executing body. This is what 
Voline means by "supreme executive," which today carries the implication 
of unilateral decision-making. The particularities of the RVS can be 
further seen in its message to Dybenko: "The congress ... was convened 
in order to lay down the future policy line for activities of the 
Military Revolutionary Soviet ..."42 Furthermore, the agenda for the 
Fourth Congress read: "(a) Reports from the executive committee of the 
military revolutionary soviet ... (d) reorganisation of the regional 
Military Revolutionary Soviet ..." The Regional Congress created the 
RVS, limited its activities, had it report to the congress, re-organised 
it, and could dissolve it. The RVS made decisions on how to implement 
policy, which is why the congress needed to hold the RVS accountable. 
The RVS was undoubtedly powerful, but it could only be considered 
authoritarian if it strayed from the mandate of the Regional Congress.

A Bolshevik official named Yefimov weighed in on the nature of the RVS's 
power: "There was no central organ of government: there was only the 
Military Revolutionary Soviet which was at once a sort of parliament and 
central military agency dealing with both military and civil matters. 
This agency had a wide range of functions, but in performing these, it 
presented itself only as steering body and had no rights of its own, all 
power being vested in the local organs. Everything boiled down to each 
village and each district directing itself with complete independence. 
Nevertheless, the structure of this illusory power was along soviet 
lines: there were executive committees, soviets of deputies, where 
elected individuals would come together and grapple with various, though 
not fundamental issues."43 Yefimov appears perturbed by the idea that 
the toiling masses should attempt to realise the slogan, "All power to 
the soviets!" This can be seen in practice around November 1919, where 
the RVS rendered financial assistance to the impoverished. The following 
testimony of an Ekaterinoslav resident was printed in a magazine: 
"'We're only an insurgent army,' said the Military Revolutionary 
Soviet's secretary ... 'We only came to defend you against violence from 
any authorities, be they Bolshevik or Denikinist. The rest is up to 
yourselves, up to your own actions. Organise yourselves as you wish!' 
The Military Revolutionary Soviet expressed the same viewpoint in an 
appeal to the populace to summon a conference that would take charge of 
the running of the city."44 While the RVS and the makhnovtsy in general 
understood that they would need to organise defense and provide the 
basis for self-organisation, they invited the toilers to take over local 
affairs as soon as possible. We can see that the RVS was more than a 
mere advisory board, but it also attempted to reduce itself to that 
position as soon as possible to allow workers' self-governance to flourish.

Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine
The Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (RIAU), numbering around 
40,000 insurgents at its peak,45 is the most obviously centralised 
organ, with commanders and a chain of command. It was also fundamentally 
a federal democratic peasant ("rural proletarian"46) army. Despite the 
tribulations of war, the Insurgent Army never lost its class character, 
according to Malet: "We should not forget the bond of common origin 
between rank and file and leadership ... They greatly lessened the need 
for the iron discipline necessary to weld together the disparate 
elements of the Red Army ...[The RIAU]was a proletarian army at all 
levels, unlike the Red Army, where it can hardly be said that the 
proletarian element predominated at a senior level."47 Voline describes 
its federative formation: "... Makhno became the rallying point for all 
the insurgents[in his region]... Many detachments of partisans ... 
joined his groups seeking co-ordinated action. The need for unity and 
activity on a general scale was recognised by all the revolutionary 
partisans ... In this way the unification of the detached units of 
partisans in the southern Ukraine into a single insurrectionary army 
under Makhno's supreme command came about naturally, through the force 
of events and the will of the masses."48 This federal union was still a 
hierarchical one: "Although the commanders had local initiative, in 
over-all operations they were subordinated to the main staff of the 
partisan detachments of Bat'ko Makhno and to Makhno directly."49

Peter Arshinov, influential anarchist and Makhno's mentor, laid out the 
following principles the Insurgent Army operated on:"... voluntary 
enlistment, the electoral principle, and self-discipline. Voluntary 
enlistment meant that the army was composed only of revolutionary 
fighters who entered it of their own free will. The electoral principle 
meant that the commanders of all the units of the army ... were either 
elected or accepted by the insurgents ... Self-discipline meant that all 
the rules of discipline were drawn up by commissions of insurgents, then 
approved by general assemblies of the various units; once approved, they 
had to be rigorously observed on the individual responsibility of each 
insurgent and each commander."50

Each of these principles is worthy of examination. The volunteer nature 
of the army, at least early on, is well-documented by historians. We 
have also already made the argument that "voluntary mobilisation" 
entailed the self-mobilisation of the peasantry, but that insurgents 
were not free to leave the army whenever they wished. The volunteer 
principle of the army was made possible by the popular support the 
makhnovtsy enjoyed.51 This popularity allowed them to use unique 
tactics: "[Makhno's]cavalry could cover from eighty to one hundred 
versts a day ... This speed was maintained by exchanging horses with 
peasants .... he would strengthen his lines by summoning peasants from 
the villages, on foot and mounted, carrying sticks and scythes to create 
panic among the enemy by their number .... the partisans would disband, 
bury their weapons, and mingle in the villages as peaceful peasants, 
only to reassemble again when the enemy had passed ..."52 In general, 
the presence of the makhnovtsy did not inspire peasant rebellions 
against them, as with the Red Army. In fact, the Insurgent Army was the 
peasant rebellion.

Voline corroborates Arshinov's explanation of the army's principles, but 
regarding the electoral principle, he adds the caveat that positions 
were either elected or "... accepted without reservation (if they 
happened to be appointed in urgent situations by the commander himself) 
..."53 Malet acknowledges that "[t]his reflects not only anarchist 
ideals, but the practice of soldiers' and sailors' committees in 1917 
..."54 However, Trotsky rebuked this as a mere pretense: "The command 
staff and its closest associates are chosen by Makhno himself. It is 
true that commanders from platoon to regimental level are put up for the 
approval of the units concerned, but this is a mere formality. In case 
of disagreement, the final say rests with the senior command, who can 
appoint whom they see fit. One should add to this that the men have to 
accept the commanders Makhno gives them."55 Palij expands on this 
criticism: "Like the commanders,[RVS]members were elected, but some were 
appointed by Makhno ... Makhno and his top commanders made decisions 
without taking account of the council's opinion, while other problems 
were decided by the top commanders themselves."56 Voline, a harsh 
anarchist critic of Makhno in the wake of the Makhnovist movement's 
defeat, pointed to the formation of a "warrior clique" around Makhno: 
"It lost its sense of proportion, showed contempt towards all those who 
were outside it, and detached itself more and more from the mass of the 
combatants and the working population."57

However, Skirda defends the democratic nature of the Insurgent Army, 
ironically citing the Soviet historian Kubanin and Bolshevik official 
Yefimov: "... according to Kubanin ... 'Neither the overall command of 
the army nor Makhno himself truly ran the movement; they merely 
reflected the aspirations of the mass, acting as its ideological and 
technical agents.' Yefimov is of much the same opinion; the detachments 
as a rule had every confidence in their elected commanders who ... '... 
never reached any decision without consideration of the advice or 
position of the detachments ... All military matters were debated in 
common ...' The highest positions of responsibility ... were subject to 
rotation and were filled on a rota basis by the most capable and 
renowned of the insurgents."58 We have at least one direct example of 
the insurgents being directly consulted on a major decision, regarding 
the final military alliance with the Bolsheviks: "A general assembly of 
insurgents was called and after lengthy deliberations came out in favor 
of a compact."59 It is difficult to discern exactly how democratic the 
army was among these competing narratives, but it gives us something of 
an upper bound for its rank-and-file character. One thing is for 
certain, in Malet's words: "It is difficult to see how deterioration in 
the operation of democracy could be avoided, given the worsening of the 
military situation ... and, in consequence, the rarer opportunities for 
exercising the rights of election and control."60

Regarding the principle of self-discipline, Malet paints a strict image: 
"Exhortation played a large part in discipline, self-discipline being 
emphasised. Where this failed, shooting was common, and was carried out 
without fear or favour ... Such decisions leave little room for 
democracy, but do show a measure of rather severe discipline."61 Malet 
misunderstands the Insurgent Army's conception of "self-discipline" to 
some degree. In this context, self-discipline means the self-discipline 
of the army. As established earlier, the army collectively decided upon 
the disciplinary rules, and then strictly enforced them. The rules the 
insurgents agreed upon arose out of the army's class character: "Another 
commentator, Lebeds, took the line that: ' ... Makhno and the Military 
Revolutionary Soviet strove to preserve the army's 'popular insurgent 
saintliness'; insurgents were shot for looting; and it was forbidden to 
'seize goods, seize flour from mills or change horses in the absence of 
the peasants ...'"62

What should we make of the Insurgent Army? It was definitely an army 
made up of the working masses at every level; one that maintained a 
mostly respectful relationship with local civilians. There was a 
libertarian element, though it was likely eventually compromised due to 
the needs of warfare. It could be compared to the early worker militias 
of the Red Army, before the latter was centralised. By comparison, the 
Insurgent Army's insistence on voluntary enlistment, elective command, 
and self-discipline, appears almost shocking. Taken altogether, we have 
a picture of an army with democratic aspirations; but still, it was an 
army, with all the power and possibility for abuse that implies. The 
authors of the "Organisational Platform of the General Union of 
Anarchists" addressed the concept of an "anarchist army" well: "While 
the revolutionary army must of necessity be structured in accordance 
with specifically anarchist principles, it should not be regarded as a 
point of principle. It is merely the consequence of military strategy in 
the revolution, a strategic measure which the process of civil war will 
inevitably force the workers to take."63 Though an army may be 
necessary, it is necessarily evil, a point which Voline articulated 
well: "... even a free and popular army, composed of volunteers and 
dedicated to the defence of a noble cause, is by its very nature a 
danger. Once it becomes permanent, it inevitably detaches itself from 
the people and the world of labour ... it becomes a collection of idlers 
... who acquire also a taste ... for the use of brute force even in 
cases where recourse to such means is contrary to the very cause it 
purports to defend ... It is in this way that all armies which have 
become permanent have tended in the last resort to become instruments of 
injustice and oppression. They end by forgetting their original purposes 
and come to feel that they are ends in themselves."64 A workers' army 
inevitably poses a contradiction between accountability to those it 
serves and military effectiveness. Defending the revolution requires 
walking a fine line between both. Fail to be an effective fighting 
force, and the revolution will be snuffed out. But should the army 
become sufficiently detached from the working masses, it will then be 
counter-revolutionary. We don't need to speculate on how this might 
occur. We need only look to the historical practice of all who have 
claimed the mantle of Lenin.

Ideinye

1. Michael Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, Palgrave 
Macmillan UK eBooks, 1982, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04469-6, 107.
2. Voline, Unknown Revolution: 1917-1921 (PM Press, 2019), 647.
3. Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 107.
4. Nestor Makhno, My Visit to the Kremlin (Black Cat Press, 1979).
5. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 646.
6. Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 107.
7. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 647.
8. Ibid.
9. Colin Darch, Nestor Makhno and Rural Anarchism in Ukraine, 1917-1921 
(Pluto Books, 2020), 14.
10. Ibid.
11. Michael Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918-9121. An Aspect 
of the Ukrainian Revolution.[Nestor Ivanovic Machno]., 1976, 71.
12. Ibid.
13. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 647.
14. Darch, Nestor Makhno and Rural Anarchism in Ukraine, 18.
15. Alexandre Skirda, Nestor Makhno-Anarchy's Cossack: The Struggle for 
Free Soviets in the Ukraine 1917-1921 (AK Press, 2004), 86.
16. Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 107.
17. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 646.
18. Skirda, Nestor Makhno-Anarchy's Cossack, 86.
19. Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 108.
20. Skirda, Nestor Makhno-Anarchy's Cossack, 299.
21. Darch, Nestor Makhno and Rural Anarchism in Ukraine, 18.
22. Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 108-109.
23. Darch, Nestor Makhno and Rural Anarchism in Ukraine, 40.
24. Skirda, Nestor Makhno-Anarchy's Cossack, 112.
25. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 710.
26. Ibid., 710-711.
27. Ibid., 713.
28. Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 109.
29. Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 196-198.
30. Skirda, Nestor Makhno-Anarchy's Cossack, 154.
31. Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 197.
32. Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 105.
33. Ibid., 105-106.
34. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 717.
35. Vyacheslav Azarov and Malcolm Archibald, Kontrrazvedka: The Story of 
the Makhnovist Intelligence Service (2008), 43.
36. Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 94.
37. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 650.
38. Paul Avrich, Anarchist Portraits (Princeton University Press, 1988), 
114.
39. Skirda, Nestor Makhno-Anarchy's Cossack, 87.
40. Ibid., 94.
41. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 649-650.
42. Skirda, Nestor Makhno-Anarchy's Cossack, 94.
43. Ibid., 333.
44. Ibid., 157-158.
45. Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 112.
46. Skirda, Nestor Makhno-Anarchy's Cossack, 310.
47. Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 102-103.
48. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 634.
49. Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 106.
50. Petr Arshinov, History of the Makhnovist Movement, (1918-1921) 
(Freedom Press (CA), 1987), 70.
51. Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 115.
52. Ibid., 113.
53. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 656.
54. Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 101.
55. Ibid.
56. Palij, The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 109.
57. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 789.
58. Skirda, Nestor Makhno-Anarchy's Cossack, 314.
59. Ibid., 194.
60. Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, 101-102.
61. Ibid., 102.
62. Skirda, Nestor Makhno-Anarchy's Cossack, 336.
63. Dielo Trouda Group, Organisational Platform of the General Union of 
Anarchists (Draft), 2015.
64. Voline, Unknown Revolution, 785-786.

https://organisemagazine.org.uk/2026/07/01/the-anti-authoritarian-organization-of-the-makhnovist-movement/
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