A-Infos (en) Italy, FDCA, Cantiere #45 - Can the ecological catastrophe be solved with ethics? (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

We publish here some excerpts from the latest work by sociologist Alain 
Bihr, L'écocide capitaliste , co-published in February 2026 in three 
volumes by Page 2 (Lausanne) and Syllepse (Paris). ---- The author's aim 
is to take stock of the ongoing ecological catastrophe and show how 
capitalist relations of production are one of its structural causes, 
reminding us that only a revolutionary upheaval can limit its effects. 
The excerpts published here focus on some of the mechanisms of capital's 
self-justification, constantly seeking valorization and accumulation. 
Thus, the authors analyze "small gestures," the invitation to take 
risks, and, finally, the call for resilience.

Here, ethics ends up making a virtue of necessity, that is, teaching 
voluntary submission to the existing order of things-in this case, 
ecocidal capitalism-with the primary effect of justifying it, masking in 
particular its heavy responsibility for the ongoing ecological 
catastrophe. And, just as with the recourse to the supposed virtues of 
the market and technology, the solution is sought in a resource internal 
to capitalism itself, produced and shaped by it.

Specifically, it concerns the subjugated individuality, characterized at 
the same time by its personal independence-by its liberation from 
personal and communal bonds of dependence, by its presumed autonomy of 
thought and life-and by its impersonal dependence: a dependence on the 
set of autonomized and fetishized social relations that characterize 
capitalism, and which require it to be, in all circumstances, 
responsible-and solely responsible-for its own actions and its own 
condition, submitting to their injunctions (Bihr, 2017: 195-208).

Let's make a small gesture!

Nudge is an English term that literally means "nudge," meaning "gentle 
push," a limited and timely assistance. It refers to a technique that 
consists of inducing individuals to adopt a certain behavior by making 
them see it as valuable.

This technique was popularized by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler's 
best-selling book of the same name ( Nudge , 2022). Derived from 
behavioral psychology (Thaler received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 
2017), it is based on the idea that "small changes in the context of 
action can have a huge influence on children and adults, in a positive 
or negative sense (...) small, seemingly insignificant details can have 
a huge impact on people's behavior" (Id.: 19 and 22).

A prime example is the fly drawn on the bottom of urinals to encourage 
men to aim better, thus reducing splashes and the costs of cleaning 
public toilets...

This technique falls within what Sunstein and Thaler define as a 
«libertarian paternalism», which consists in encouraging (but not 
forcing) individuals to make the "right" decisions and to carry out the 
"right" actions, that is, those that will contribute to their 
well-being, behaving like those rational subjects that they are not 
spontaneously, but that the functioning of capitalism requires:

«In the sense in which we understand it, a policy is "paternalistic" if 
it seeks to influence choices in a way that promotes people's interests, 
as they conceive them (...) In short, our goal is to help individuals 
make the decisions they would have made if they had paid full attention, 
had complete information, unlimited cognitive capacity, and total 
self-control» (Id.: 24).

The very expression "libertarian paternalism" reveals the full 
ambivalence of this technique: it involves gently "guiding" individual 
behaviors in the direction of personal or general interest, to the point 
of transformation, while formally respecting freedom of choice. Here, in 
an almost exemplary form, we find the contradiction inherent in 
subjugated individuality.

Designed to influence individual behavior, this technique affects not 
only capitalist enterprises-which initially developed it in 
marketing-but also public administrations, committed to obtaining 
citizen compliance with laws and regulations. The latter are thus 
induced to develop and disseminate incentives ( nudges ) that complement 
or sometimes replace obligations and prohibitions. It is no coincidence 
that Sunstein and Thaler note with satisfaction the growing number of 
states and international organizations that have created actual Nudge 
Units within their own organizations (Id.: 34-35).

This technique can also be applied to ecological catastrophe management 
policies. The underlying idea is that, just as small streams make large 
rivers, a myriad of "small daily gestures"-avoiding waste, turning off 
lights when leaving a room, not letting water run unnecessarily, 
reducing home heating, etc.-can contribute to escaping the current 
catastrophic ecological regime.

Added to these are other practices: reducing or eliminating meat 
consumption, choosing organic products, separating waste, favoring 
public transportation over private cars, avoiding flying, and sharing 
consumer goods (cars, washing machines, books, etc.). More generally, 
it's about promoting a "revolution" in individual behavior, holding 
individuals accountable-and often blaming them-for presenting them as 
the primary, if not sole, culprits of the ecological crisis.

But this approach is highly problematic. The number of nudges needed 
would be so inconsistent that it would be inconsistent and, above all, 
provoke rejection by individuals who would ultimately reject permanent 
manipulation. And, above all, there is no guarantee that these measures 
will be sufficient: a few billion small incentives will not be enough to 
pull us out of the ecological impasse into which the current mode of 
production has led us (Rotillon, 2020: 88-97).

Sunstein and Thaler themselves acknowledge this in the 
chapter-significantly titled "Saving the Planet"-dedicated to the topic. 
They warn right from the start: "If you're reading this chapter hoping 
to discover that there's no need to worry because a few low-cost nudges 
will solve the problem, we're sorry to disappoint you" (Id.: 263).

After mentioning instruments such as carbon taxes or emissions markets, 
they acknowledge the superiority of binding measures over simple 
incentives: "We must at least recognize that rules and obligations 
likely offer consumers the opportunity to make significant savings while 
simultaneously protecting the planet" (Id.: 275). Nudges are thus 
relegated to complementary instruments: "Targeted legislation, going 
beyond the 'soft' approach, may be necessary in several areas. 
Interventions similar to nudges could complete the range of instruments" 
(Id.: 276).

The proposed examples, however, remain limited: publishing a list of the 
most polluting companies ( name and shame ), automatically setting 
"green" options for consumers, comparing energy consumption between 
neighbors, etc.

The main limitation of the "small gestures" strategy lies in its 
assumptions. On the one hand, it assumes that it is possible to 
transform consumption patterns without interfering with the production 
process that drives them, ignoring the structural link between 
productivism and consumerism. Using a household appliance to its full 
potential clashes with planned obsolescence; waste sorting has no impact 
on excessive packaging practices; giving up the car is often impossible 
without adequate public transportation; and turning down the heating is 
of little use in poorly insulated homes.

In other words, before asking consumers to "do their part," producers 
should set an example.

On the other hand, this strategy places the responsibility on 
individuals-isolated, atomized-to correct an ecocidal dynamic that stems 
from capitalist production relations themselves, without questioning 
them. This contradiction can only be overcome through collective action, 
capable of transforming or replacing these relations.

This inevitably implies a high level of political conflict, a far cry 
from the reassuring world in which everyone is invited to "do something 
to save the planet" in good conscience... and unawareness.

Let's take the risk!

Faced with risks of all kinds, constantly increasing (in intensity and 
frequency) under the impact of ecological catastrophe-but also of some 
of its supposed market or technical solutions-voices have been raised, 
trying to convince us that these risks are the price we must pay for 
continuing on the path of "progress," "development," or "modernity." 
These vague and ambiguous terms, through their euphemism, veil and 
legitimize what accompanies the world's becoming-capitalism: namely, 
capital's growing destructive grip on the natural and social world, as 
it gradually subjugates it to the demands of its own reproduction. It is 
in this sense that I understand them below.

Among these voices, the most influential was that of the German 
sociologist Ulrich Beck (1944-2015), author of another bestseller, Risk 
Society . According to Beck, the second half of the 20th century saw "a 
rupture within a modernity that emancipated itself from the confines of 
classical industrial society to assume a new form-which we call here the 
'industrial risk society'" (Beck, 2001: 20), forcing us to abandon "the 
religion of progress," that is, the naive belief in the intrinsic 
virtues of modernity.

The latter, in fact, has not kept its promises: poverty persists, social 
inequalities are growing again, and the world's peripheries remain 
underdeveloped. Furthermore, where there has been an increase in wealth, 
it has been accompanied by a series of new ills, which Beck groups under 
the concept of risk: pollution, industrial disasters, nuclear risk, 
threats to health and safety, etc.

These risks are no longer external or natural, but generated by 
industrial development itself and its technical-scientific apparatus; 
they are not occasional but widespread risks, affecting both humans and 
non-humans, and are particularly denounced by environmental movements; 
they fuel anti-modern tendencies (critiques of science, technology, 
economic growth, etc.).

In short, we have moved from a "progressive society," confident in 
science and technology, to a "risk society," aware of their ambivalence 
and the "harms of progress," and therefore experiencing a growing loss 
of faith in scientific and technological rationality-all the more so 
since, being part of the problem, it is incapable of either preventing 
these risks or protecting us from them.

The growth of wealth has thus been accompanied by a growth of risks, to 
the point that their distribution has replaced that of wealth as the 
primary area of political conflict. In the "risk society," the central 
focus is no longer the class struggle for the appropriation of 
resources, but rather the relationship to risks and their distribution. 
A society in which sensitivity to risk grows, and, along with it, the 
demand for security directed at the state-which is often unable to respond.

A second factor further exacerbates this dynamic: what Beck calls "a 
social push toward individualization" (ibid.: 158). This is driven by 
the development of the welfare state, increased life expectancy, reduced 
working hours, the diffusion of cultural goods, and the transformation 
of labor markets (increased mobility, precariousness, and flexibility).

This assertion of the individual destabilizes the structures of 
industrial society, starting with class solidarity, giving rise to "a 
classless capitalism, which nevertheless retains all its structures and 
the inequalities that derive from them" (Id.: 160). It also affects the 
family, challenging traditional roles and contributing to women's 
emancipation, but introducing new risks, such as economic and relational 
precariousness.

Thus, "it is the individual himself (...) who becomes the unit of 
reproduction of the social sphere" (Id.: 162). This does not prevent, 
but rather encourages, the birth of new communities and social movements 
(ecologists, pacifists, feminists) mobilized against the risks of 
industrial society.

However, Beck doesn't go so far as to speak of a "post-industrial" 
society. Rather, he proposes a new phase of modernity: a "reflexive 
modernity." In this phase, societies would continue to modernize, but 
more consciously, questioning the exclusive role of governments, 
experts, and scientists.

This reflexive modernity would entail a new relationship with 
science-more self-critical and open to social needs-and with politics, 
through a democratization of decisions even outside representative 
institutions, through widespread counter-powers (media, associations, 
citizens, etc.).

In essence, Beck proposes a new "grand narrative" of modernity, divided 
into two phases: the second would correct the first through reflexivity. 
But this narrative does not stand up to rigorous historical analysis.

As Jean-Baptiste Fressoz and Dominique Pestre (2013) show, modernity has 
always been reflexive: it has always been aware of the risks it 
produced-but it has nevertheless chosen to run them. More than 
reflexivity, it is characterized by a true disinhibition with respect to 
risk:

"The term disinhibition has the advantage of uniting two moments: that 
of reflexivity, but also that of the transition to action, of the 
normalization of danger. Modernity has been a process of 
disinhibition-always, however, already restless" (Id.: 24).

Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, risk management has 
aimed not at eliminating them, but at making them acceptable: through 
regulations, permits, insurance, and tolerance thresholds. In the 
postwar period, with Fordism and the welfare state, this logic became 
widespread, while radical criticisms of environmental damage also emerged.

Since the 1980s, neoliberalism has tended to individualize risk 
management, placing it on individuals, while the demand for state 
protection has grown. It is in this context that Beck develops his theories.

But it is precisely here that the limits of his analysis emerge. 
Modernity hasn't become reflexive today: it has always been so-without 
renouncing risks. What matters, rather, is that these risks have been 
systematically passed on to others: workers, local populations, consumers.

Risk is intrinsic to capitalist industrialization because the use of 
productive forces escapes the control of producers and is subordinated 
to the valorization of capital. Therefore, the problem is not science 
and technology per se, but the social relations that govern them.

This aspect completely escapes Beck, who goes so far as to argue that 
the monopolies of industrial society are dissolving. In reality, one of 
them has strengthened: the capitalist monopoly on the means of production.

If humanity today is unable to control the risks of technological and 
scientific development, it is because the majority of individuals have 
been dispossessed of control over production. Even Beck's proposals 
remain superficial: for example, when he hopes that technicians can 
freely express the risks they observe.

The radical solution would be another: abolish wage dependency and 
restore control of the means of production to producers. Without this 
transformation, any idea of countervailing power remains illusory.

The promise of a "reflexive modernity" capable of mastering risks is 
therefore an illusion. It amounts to inviting us to continue submitting 
to the capitalist logic of risk-the logic that imposed fertilizers and 
pesticides yesterday, GMOs today, and geoengineering tomorrow.

Ultimately, as the entire history of modernity demonstrates, reflexivity 
has never eliminated this disinhibition: it has been an integral part of 
it. Only an exit from modernity-that is, from the world's becoming 
capitalism-could liberate us.

We are resilient!

Since risk is inevitable in modernity, we must learn to manage it, if 
not tame it. This requires us to become resilient.

The term resilience originally referred to a material's ability to 
resist an impact or to return to its original structure after being 
deformed, like a spring or a plastic. By extension, it later came to 
indicate the ability of a body, organism, species, system, etc., to 
overcome an alteration in its state due to a change in the environment, 
returning to its previous state or evolving toward a new stable state 
without fundamentally changing its structure.

It is in psychology that the concept of resilience received its academic 
baptism in the field of human sciences. Beginning in the 1950s, it was 
developed by Anglo-Saxon psychologists-primarily Emmy Werner, Michael 
Rutter, and Norman Garmezy-who worked with people who had experienced 
traumatic childhood situations: abuse, neglect, abandonment, physical or 
sexual assault, families dispersed or destroyed by poverty, hunger, 
epidemics, war, etc. Against all odds, they noted that some of these 
people had nevertheless managed to become seemingly fulfilled adults. 
Since then, the concept has commonly referred to the ability some people 
develop to somehow "bounce back" after a traumatic experience, or simply 
to build themselves in an unfavorable environment.

In France, this concept was introduced in particular by Boris Cyrulnik, 
a neuropsychiatrist, who popularized it through several successful, yet 
largely repetitive, books. He essentially reduces resilience to a simple 
idea: "Life is still possible after the wound of trauma" (Cyrulnik, 
2001: 79). But for this to happen, certain conditions must be met.

First, a solid prior psychological structure, which allows the 
individual to gain self-confidence through a certain emotional 
stability. This will allow them, at the time of trauma, to deploy 
defense mechanisms such as refuge in daydreaming, intellectualization, 
denial, or splitting, to protect themselves from the psychological 
wounds they have suffered. They will then need to find "a new 
ecological, emotional, behavioral, and institutional niche," capable of 
offering them new guardians of development: people who guide and support 
them with help, affection, and esteem.

Finally, this "new niche" must also offer him the possibility of 
"expressing his wound", thus allowing him to abandon "costly defense 
mechanisms such as denial, splitting or shameful secrecy" and to rebuild 
a "finally pacified narrative identity", through words, writing, 
drawing, humor, theater, altruism, etc., until "transforming suffering 
into a work of art" (Id.: 80-81).

Even in psychology, resilience has given rise to countless works that, 
while clarifying its process, conditions, and outcomes, but also its 
limits and risks, have sparked controversies that have multiplied its 
meanings and, in part, confused its significance. To the point that "by 
the mid-2000s, the meanings attributed to this word had become so 
numerous that some researchers who used it were careful to specify that 
they were speaking of 'true resilience'-or even 'authentic' 
resilience-as if to distinguish themselves from counterfeits!", thus 
transforming the notion into a sort of "all-purpose container" 
(Tisseron, 2014: 16).

This polysemy, the price of his success, probably contributed to his 
success itself. But Tisseron identifies above all, among the reasons for 
this success, some concerns typical of our age: attention to human life, 
the desire to define oneself more through the present and future 
projects than through the past, the desire to "positivize"-that is, to 
see the positive side of things rather than the negative: every cloud 
has a silver lining; what doesn't kill me makes me stronger, etc. (Id.: 
67-69).

These concerns are far from alien to the contemporary evolution of the 
subjugated individuality, which, in addition to its aspiration to 
individual autonomy, increasingly asserts itself as a self-referential 
individuality, with a particularly marked narcissistic dimension.

At the same time, a further sign of its success, the notion has migrated 
from the field of psychology to the broader field of social sciences and 
then political action. After "resilient families," we began to talk 
about "resilient cities," "resilient banks," "resilient economies," and 
so on. In this context, resilience is no longer conceived-at least not 
immediately-as an individual, psychological process, but as a collective 
one that influences the preceding one. To explain such a migration of 
the notion, we must invoke even more general psychosocial transformations.

Tisseron observes that the emergence of the concept of resilience in the 
United States in the 1950s coincided with two significant developments 
in American society: on the one hand, "the distressing growth of 
precariousness in a society that traditionally values it" (Id.: 9); on 
the other, a new conception of psychic trauma: "psychic trauma would not 
be an abnormal reaction to a difficult situation-a reaction that could 
be related to a pre-existing personal fragility-but a normal reaction to 
an abnormal situation" (Id.: 10).

From that moment on, it is no longer just a question of treating 
particularly fragile individuals, but of bringing out resilience in 
everyone: «In a society where precariousness is the rule, resilience can 
appear as a sort of psychic immunology, capable of protecting against 
trauma a bit like a vaccination protects against the risk of infection» 
(Id.: 11).

On this basis, one can hypothesize that the success of the concept of 
resilience in Europe-and particularly in France-since the 2000s stems 
from the widespread application of the conditions that had allowed its 
emergence in the United States half a century earlier. This context is 
precisely marked by the spread of apprehension, fear, and anxiety in the 
face of potentially traumatic situations of various kinds: persistent 
mass unemployment, the precariousness of professional situations and 
personal relationships, the injunction to intensely mobilize individuals 
as "self-entrepreneurs" in the midst of the market, the destabilization 
of collective identities-professional, regional, national-produced by 
"globalization," and, of course, the increasingly acute perception of 
the effects of a planetary ecological catastrophe that continues to worsen.

But, at the same time, in the course of its transposition from the 
psychological to the social and political realm, the term has also 
undergone a semantic shift. From a descriptive and analytical concept, 
it has transformed into a desirable norm, then rapidly prescriptive and 
imperative: a mutation that partly escapes Tisseron. However, it is 
already germinating in the project of bringing out resilience for all 
and in each individual: from the idea that everyone can get by, one 
easily moves to the idea that everyone should be able to get by, and 
then to the idea that everyone must get by.

The adoption of the resilience paradigm in collective risk management 
fully confirms this shift, also leading to the broadening of the 
resilience process Tisseron evokes at the end of his essay. In this context:

«Resilience is today conceived as a four-step phenomenon: the 
anticipation of disaster and its prevention, particularly through the 
memory of good practices; the ability to resist it; the reconstruction 
of capacities and the implementation of new attitudes designed to ensure 
a fresh start; the reduction of the physical, but also psychological, 
consequences that may arise, and the consolidation of new attitudes» 
(Id.: 115-116).

In essence, the benefits of resilience in some should be able to be 
converted into precepts, if not recipes, capable of enabling others to 
prepare to face and, when the time is right, overcome the test of a 
traumatic experience.

Resilience here clearly fits into a perspective of political disaster 
management: disasters whose risk and threat are increasing, which 
governments consider inevitable and to which we are asked to react as such.

This management involves the preventive preparation of relief, aid, and 
assistance structures for victims, not only materially and medically, 
but also psychologically. It involves local associations and political 
leaders, who enjoy the trust of the population, as well as centralized 
state bodies and specialized personnel. Thus, when specific disasters 
occur-rail accidents, terrorist attacks, etc.-we hear about 
"psychological units" or "support units" deployed to the field.

This management also involves preventively preparing populations to face 
catastrophes: information campaigns, educational programs that teach 
both the virtues of solidarity and basic rescue practices, networks of 
testimonies from survivors of previous catastrophes, capable of coming 
to the aid of victims of new catastrophes, etc. And Tisseron concludes: 
"If the word 'resilience' applied to people poses more problems than it 
solves, it is undoubtedly destined for a great future in the fields of 
public health and collective prevention" (Id.: 118).

Among the disasters slated for such treatment, ecological disasters 
clearly occupy a prominent place. The concept of resilience, thus 
reworked, quickly took center stage in managing the risks associated 
with these disasters. Indeed, it is at the heart of the Hyogo Framework 
for Action, entitled " Building the Resilience of Nations and 
Communities to Disasters ," adopted in 2007 by 168 states as part of the 
UNISDR ( United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction ), 
as well as at the heart of the concerns of the Stockholm Resilience 
Centre, opened that same year.

Similarly, for the past twenty years, it has been widely mobilized in 
projects and practices for adapting urban systems to climate change, 
despite its limited operationalization in this field (Quenault, 2013). 
Again, at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, the French armed 
forces' commitment to providing medical and logistical support to an 
overwhelmed hospital system was called Operation Resilience .

So, in the coming years, when you suffocate in overheated cities during 
the summer, when you run out of drinking water, when, on the 
contrary-after exceptional rainfall-water invades your home, when a 
tornado blows away the roof, when you have to flee from an 
uncontrollable forest fire, or when you are faced with the next 
zoonosis, expect to hear it repeated, in different tones and from many 
quarters: be re-si-lient!

Without questioning too much about the nature of the risks you will be 
asked to adapt to, nor about their causes or those responsible.

*) Source. Published in French at 
https://plateformecl.org/la-catastrophe-ecologique-est-elle-soluble-dans-lethique/

Bibliography

- Ulrich Beck (2001), Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity , Paris, Aubier.

- Alain Bihr (2017), Neoliberal Newspeak. The Rhetoric of Capitalist 
Fetishism , Lausanne/Paris, Page 2 / Syllepse.

- Boris Cyrulnik (2001), "Manifesto for Resilience", Spirale , no. 18.

- Boris Cyrulnik (2012), "Why resilience?", in Cyrulnik Boris and 
Jorland Gérard (eds.), Resilience. Basic knowledge , Paris, Odile Jacob.

- Boris Cyrulnik (2014), "Why resilience?", in Anaut Marie and Cyrulnik 
Boris (eds.), Resilience. From research to practice. 1st World Congress 
on Resilience , Paris, Odile Jacob.

- Jean-Baptiste Fressoz and Dominique Pestre (2013), "Risk and risk 
society over two centuries", in Bourg Dominique, Joly Pierre-Benoît and 
Kaufmann Alain (eds.), Reflections on the risk society. Thinking about 
catastrophe , Paris, Presses universitaires de France.

- Béatrice Quenault (2013), "Critical review of the mobilization of the 
concept of resilience in relation to the adaptation of urban systems to 
climate change", EchoGéo , n. 24.

- Gilles Rotillon (2020), Climate AND the end of the month , Paris, 
Éditions Maïa.

- Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2022), Nudge. Last edition , Paris, 
Vuibert.

- Serge Tisseron (2014), Resilience , Paris, Presses universitaires de 
France, 5th edizione.

Note

1. The term resilience derives from the Latin verb resilire , which 
means both "to jump back" and "to return with a leap": in other words, 
to bounce back, or to retreat in order to better relaunch oneself.

2. Boris Cyrulnik defines himself as a "resilient." Born into a Jewish 
family shortly before the Second World War, he was a victim of 
anti-Semitic persecution and managed to survive after being separated 
from his parents, deported, and killed in Nazi extermination camps. This 
experience profoundly influenced his theoretical reflections on resilience.

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