A-Infos (en) France, OCL: Points to consider regarding the rightward shift in society (Part One) (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Over the past few decades, many countries have witnessed a rise of the 
far right. In France, the rise of the National Rally (RN) is attracting 
considerable attention as the presidential election approaches, as it 
has in previous elections, and its opponents (and their media 
supporters) frequently blame it for the rightward shift in society. 
However, this rightward shift is not limited to the RN's strong showing, 
particularly among the working class. It manifests itself in much 
different ways - doesn't the party's central theme, namely immigration, 
fuel the strengthening of security policies regardless of who is in power?
We will not delve into the more or less contentious debates surrounding 
the characterization of this rightward shift in society - fascism, 
fascization, new fascism... or not [1]? Drawing on recent studies 
focusing on either the RN vote or working-class communities, we will 
instead examine its connection to work, as the latter continues to have 
a significant impact on political stances and social relations [2]. Then 
- in the next Board meeting - we will try to draw some lessons from this 
with a view to real social change.

Several commonly cited reasons shed light on the rightward shift of 
French society: with deindustrialization, "neoliberalism" has broken 
down work collectives and worker solidarity, destroyed the structures 
that fostered awareness of common interests among the proletariat, and, 
with the privatization of large sectors that belonged to the "public 
service," it has disintegrated the "welfare state"; promises of access 
to the "middle classes" through education have hardly diminished social 
reproduction; the impact that artificial intelligence will have on many 
professions worries the "middle classes"...

These phenomena, against a backdrop of planetary catastrophes (such as 
"climate change" or pandemics), contribute to establishing a climate of 
fear which, as always, translates into a demand for strong and 
repressive powers - when social anger and fear combine, they generate 
more resignation and submission than revolt - and into adherence to 
discourses that designate scapegoats (the National Rally's discourse, 
for example, holds immigrants or their descendants responsible for 
unemployment and insecurity).
Furthermore, the extreme rightward shift of many media outlets (with the 
formation of the Bolloré empire) and the rightward shift of the 
"mainstream" media produce a framing of information heavily biased in 
this direction and a sensationalist approach to current events that 
hinders in-depth reflection on the transformations of the world. and 
they reinforce the government's criminalization of certain opponents 
labeled "ultra-left" or "eco-terrorists", or the demonization of La 
France insoumise (LFI), described as "extreme left" and "violent".

The rightward shift in society is understood as the political dominance 
of ideas labeled as right-wing, but it is often measured against the 
extreme right - or more precisely, the National Rally (RN).
The party's catchy and all-encompassing rhetoric contributes to its 
success. Thomas Ménagé, its spokesperson in the National Assembly, 
states, for example [3]: "People tend to say that Marine Le Pen is a 
left-wing woman[sic!], but she is neither left nor right. Our voters 
want more social justice, security, democracy, and dignity for all the 
people"; the RN wants to "work with everyone"... against Macron and come 
to power through the ballot box, without violence, to "save France."

But the appeal of the National Rally (RN), with its keywords "work" and 
"people," has also been fueled by the ideological drift of the left. In 
the 1980sthe "Mitterrand years" of factory closures and 
relocationssocial democracy, for electoral gain, abandoned the issue of 
labor to focus on the "middle classes," who were more educated and open 
to the globalization of production and trade. The antagonism of "working 
class versus bourgeoisie or capitalism" thus transformed into "popular 
classes versus holigarchy or neoliberalism," with the argument that 
these classes are now heterogeneous (La France Insoumise, for its part, 
speaks of "the people," drawing on the adoption of this term by the 
"Arab Spring," the Yellow Vests, and other contemporary social movements).
Such choices were not unanimously accepted within the left: firstly, the 
working class has never been limited to the factory proletariat (even if 
the place of peasants within it, for example, was a subject of debate 
within the old socialist movement); secondly, it is the antagonism 
between classes that constitutes them as classes, not their homogeneity 
(the working class, or laboring class, therefore always refers to all 
those who live by their labor without owning the means of production or 
who are unemployed). Nevertheless, these choices have determined the 
strategies implemented by the left for several decades, particularly to 
dissuade the "popular classes" or the "middle classes" from protesting 
against the (actual or feared) deterioration of their material 
conditions by voting for the National Rally or by abstaining. Moreover, 
"left-wing people" are for the most part so socially distant from the 
"working classes" that they tend to ignore them, or to support only 
certain components of them - those that are subject to discrimination.

Are cities left-wing and rural areas right-wing?
The foregoing illustrates the complexity of the rightward shift in 
society: it stems from all the factors mentioned above and others 
besides [4]. Changes in the nature of work are one such factor, but they 
are primarily considered in the numerous studies devoted to the RN vote 
- frequently from an electoral perspective or with partisan agendas.
According to the left-leaning geographer Christophe Guilluy, this vote 
is a reaction from "working-class whites" who, faced with globalization 
and "cultural insecurity," have left the major cities where 
professionals and immigrants live side by side to settle in a 
"peripheral France" comprised of suburban and rural areas far removed 
from major employment centers [5].

This idea was taken up by Marine Le Pen with her "France of the 
Forgotten," in order to praise the "traditional" way of life in the 
countryside and criticize the supposedly "globalized" and "bourgeois 
bohemian" urban model. It is contested, notably by sociologist Benoît 
Coquard, who spent about ten years studying people aged 25-35 living in 
rural cantons of the Grand Est region, where he is from. Admittedly, the 
traditionally right-wing vote in these cantons has shifted towards the 
far right since 1995; but their working-class populations, largely 
immigrants, have been established there since the first two industrial 
revolutions and do not feel threatened by the "great replacement" 
predicted by far-right conspiracy theorists.

In his book Those Who Remain - Making a Life in Declining Rural Areas 
[6]and in articles and broadcasts [7], Coquard thus takes issue with the 
conflation of cities (left) and rural areas (right). First, social 
inequalities exist in rural areas as elsewhere. Second, the French 
countryside is heterogeneous: the wealthy, who live near large urban 
areas, tourist coastlines, or vineyards, tend to be "left-leaning" and 
dynamic; in the poor, on the other hand, people only protest when there 
is an attempt to prevent them from living as they choose in their own 
territory - for example, the 80 km/h speed limit imposed by the 
government in 2018 mobilized the groups of La France en colère (Angry 
France), which gave rise to the Yellow Vests (with their desire for 
self-organization, their rejection of any leader and any negotiation...).

The declining cantons of the Grand Est region are now predominantly 
inhabited by the "working class" - precisely those who are either 
idealized as the "real" people or dismissed as racist and ignorant 
"rednecks." This is why we will focus on the words of those interviewed 
by Coquard (or on his analyses) to identify certain characteristics in 
their ways of thinking and operating.

Limited solidarity as a mode of survival
These areas of eastern France were highly industrialized and densely 
populated at the end of the 19th century. However, during the 1980s and 
1990s, factory closures or relocations triggered a significant exodus, 
which continues to this day; unions declined; and, apart from fishing 
and hunting clubs or the local football club, places for socializing 
(bistros, dances, associations, etc.) disappeared. Nevertheless, 
informal get-togethers at each other's homes have become more common.
The emergence of these informal bars, frequented by groups of friends, 
is due to changes in the job market and lifestyles. Whereas previously 
one could build a career from generation to generation within the same 
company and eventually become a foreman, the few remaining jobs now pit 
people with similar qualifications against each other. The idea that 
"we, the working class, have an interest in uniting to get a pay raise," 
for example, has thus transformed into "we, our families, need to 
organize ourselves to share tips about work." Furthermore, the hours 
spent in the car (all family activities necessitate it) hardly make one 
want to venture far out again at the end of the day...

In these "groups of friends," the men work as skilled laborers, either 
self-employed or in small construction companies. Many rejected school 
(for them, it was a place of social humiliation [8]), hence their 
attachment to their territory: defending it is vital for them, as it is 
where they have resources, and the same is true for their way of life. 
The measure of success in their eyes is a detached house (which they 
were able to build themselves thanks to the low price of land and help 
from their "friends") and a car (essential for daily life, but also a 
mark of respectability).

The women in these groups, for their part, work in places that render 
their activity "invisible" (retirement homes, homes of retirees, etc.), 
or they are employed on short-term contracts in large retail stores, 
call centers, or in parcel preparation or delivery. Their precarious 
situation makes them more dependent on their partnerswhere male 
dominance remains structurally pronounced, both in the division of 
domestic tasks and in conversations (men talk amongst themselves about 
cars or sports, women amongst themselves about health or children's 
education). While in these rural areas female employment was once 
widespread and fairly well-paid (but, as usual, less so than male 
employment), female unemployment among those under 35 is very high (up 
to twice the rate of male unemployment). Hence the strong presence of 
women in yellow vests at the roundabouts.

"Profiteers" who are no longer the proponents of capitalism,
but the "welfare recipients"
In a bar, it is formally possible to confront points of view and 
worldviews [9]. This is much less obvious in drinks between "mates" who 
are of the same opinion on various subjects (politics, family, 
taxes...); their homogeneity has favoured the racist discourse on 
immigration put forward by the RN, notes Coquard.

Indeed, since these "buddies" highly value work (it's associated with 
courage and competence, and therefore self-esteem and the esteem of 
others stem from it), the unemployed person is not, in their eyes, a 
victim of deindustrialization, but a "welfare recipient" or a 
"lazybones" who is "worthless"or even a "loser" (social case). There's 
no question of showing solidarity with such a "loser" or being 
associated with them by associating with them, because having a good 
reputation is a prerequisite for finding work and starting a family. 
However, on another level, this rejection has become "France first!" or 
"No to welfare!" Because the National Rally (RN) presented immigrants or 
residents of housing projects as the "losers" of the citiesthis "bad 
France" to which it contrasted the "real France," whose rural "gangs of 
friends" supposedly constituted the youth (although this includes 
descendants of North African immigrants, as long as they consume alcohol 
and cannabis and do not openly display their Muslim identity). By 
asserting such claims in the media, the RN leaders lent them legitimacy.

The National Rally's political hegemony in these rural areas was thus 
built on the rejection of those on welfare (see box). Voting for the 
party is perceived by its members as a way to promote themselves, with 
the guarantee that others will remain lower in social standing. It 
doesn't imply an improvement in their own situation, but rather a 
transfer of social shame onto those who have less access to 
respectability (the local "losers") or onto other segments of the 
population (without these groups even being labeled "undocumented" or 
"foreign").
For Coquard, these young rural people adopted the conflict-ridden 
picture of society painted by the National Rally because it resonated 
with their own experiences... and because there was no alternative. 
After the Second World War, left-wing parties used a conflict-based 
vocabulary: by contrasting the proletariat with the bourgeoisie, they 
provided a framework for understanding the social world. But when, in 
1995, the National Front (FN, renamed RN in 2018) came in second place 
behind the right in Haute-Marne, the left had already abandoned the "us 
versus them" narrativesocial conflictand was adopting a moralistic 
stance: stigmatizing certain groups (foreigners, homosexuals, etc.) was 
wrong. Following this, the RN began to talk about social conflict, 
urging people to stop seeing employers as the enemy and instead ally 
with them against a "welfare recipient" who was inevitably an immigrant 
and therefore not respectable, asserting: "It's because of them that you 
have lower wages, and that soon you might pay even more taxes or lose 
your job..." And adhering to the RN's rhetoric became the easiest 
political position to claim publicly (without necessarily voting for 
them, as abstention is also high).

A small, well-liked business.
a state that is not really contested
Coquard also emphasizes the role played by social circles in both voting 
patterns and worldviews.
In the suburbs of large cities, the "working class" (many of whom are 
precarious and employed in the gig economy) may be in contact with more 
educated circles who generally vote for left-wing parties and encourage 
others to do the same.
In the rural cantons of the Grand Est region, opinion leaders were once 
union members (outside of the factory, they interacted with young 
people, for example, by coaching them in soccer), and the Communist 
Party held sway among the workers - even though "a good third were on 
the side of the bosses." People voted for the Party and joined a union 
"without giving it much thought: it was simply a given." Now, opinion 
leaders are small business owners and tradespeople whom his "friends" 
interact with daily and who relay the National Rally's message in their 
own way. They are considered to have "made it" in life: they have a 
certain economic stability and, above all, they are "hard-working." 
Their tastes, consumption habits, and aspirations are very close to 
those of the "working class" (to which they often belonged), and they 
hold jobs quite similar to theirs (and considered "useful"). They were 
at the Yellow Vest roundabouts until local discussions turned it into a 
"movement of lazy people."

The "groups of friends" don't see local employers as exploiters since 
they don't run multinationals and aren't "proud" (you can have drinks 
with them); and, above all, they are likely to provide work and accept 
"arrangements" (using a truck for personal use, for example, in exchange 
for unpaid overtime).
The state, on the other hand, is criticized, but mainly for the taxes it 
levies and for the unequal access to rights resulting from the closure 
of public services. With digital technology, not only is social control 
tighter, but the dematerialization of administrative procedures makes 
people who aren't computer literate feel incompetent. Going to the 
sub-prefecture was already difficult for the poorest; the disappearance 
of all direct human contact makes it even harder.

Furthermore, "doing without" the state is a way of demonstrating 
resourcefulness: repairing a machine, renovating a house, growing one's 
own vegetables... or working off the books, and thus cheating the 
taxman, constitutes (as with small farmers) a source of both savings and 
pride. Similarly, distrusting politicians or journalists demonstrates 
independent judgment and an awareness that they are "all corrupt."

Social proximity
populations of the cities and working-class districts
The values and behaviors of young rural workers are those of 
working-class suburbs, Coquard points out. Contrary to the discourse on 
the supposed "territorial divide" between the urban and rural "working 
classes," they share many commonalities: they live in areas shaped by 
industrialization; they are characterized by strong interconnectedness, 
significant issues of respectability, and a fairly pronounced gender 
divide in their social interactions; for them, social success is linked 
to economic capital, self-reliance (often through manual labor), or at 
least getting by through autonomy and resourcefulness; both groups 
include those who work and those who rely on assistance... but 
everything is done to pit them against each other. Coquard concludes 
that to combat racism and rebuild solidarity among these divided 
populations, it is necessary to emphasize their commonalities rather 
than their differences. But he adds: "It's very complicated" - and we 
believe him without difficulty.

To return to the question of work, its valorization by the "groups of 
friends" described by Benoît Coquard is actually nothing exceptional: 
work retains a significant place in society in general, both because it 
is a means of subsistence and because it is a tool for social 
recognition. Despite the degradation and precariousness of jobs in most 
sectors, it remains valued in education and healthcare, culture and the 
liberal professions... and in manual labor in industry, agriculture, 
crafts, and fishing.
The "groups of friends" Coquard mentions are not a new phenomenon 
either: in the era of large factories, they already existed and 
functioned in this way in working-class circles in general. The novelty 
that deindustrialization has brought everywhereaside from the 
precariousness that has replaced a certain job securityis what 
disappeared with the factories. They were places of exploitation and 
alienation, but also places where it was possible to organize the 
struggle and wage it together (through strikes, occupations, the holding 
of bosses hostage, etc.). It was therefore there that a class carrying a 
project of social change could assert itself as such and that class 
solidarity could exist.

(To be continued in the next issue.)

Vanina

Work, racism and electoral choice
In *Ordinary Voters* (published by Seuil in 2024), sociologist Félicien 
Faury observed that the National Rally (RN) electorate in southeastern 
France shared a common trait: racism. He conducted research among 
"stable" blue-collar workers (neither poor nor precariously employed), 
tradespeople, and small business owners. These individuals, most of whom 
have limited formal education and short educational paths, are 
categorized by their incomes as "lower middle class" and fear downward 
mobility, Faury notes. Racism is linked to the continuous rise in 
inequality, the concentration of wealth and assets, and the weakening 
and competition among public services. It stems from "common dynamics": 
an uncertain and precarious economic and social experience, or one 
perceived as such, which generates dissatisfaction with the system of 
distributing collective resources; an attachment to their place of 
residence and anxiety about its future; strong Islamophobia; a desire to 
assert their belonging to the majority group; and a negative view of 
politicians (including Marine Le Pen).

In the article "How Work Influences Our Political Convictions," 
published by Frustration Magazine on March 19, 2026, sociologist and 
farmer Nicolas Framont cites two studies demonstrating the effects of 
work (through its content or modalities) on voting for the National 
Rally (RN):
* "The Long Arm of Work - Working Conditions and Electoral Behavior" 
(IRES, February 2024), by economist Thomas Coutrot, highlights the 
strong link between autonomy at work and electoral behavior. By 
comparing working conditions and voting attitudes in the 2017 
presidential and 2019 European elections, it appears that a lack of 
autonomy at work significantly increases abstention, and that atypical 
working hours and physically demanding jobs encourage voting for the RN 
and adherence to its interpretation of the social world (particularly 
the association of welfare dependency with immigration).
* "Politics at Work - Experiences in the Workplace and Political Divides 
Among Employees in France," by Yann Algan, Antonin Bergeaud, and Camille 
Frouard (HEC Paris, March 2026), also highlights the strong link between 
negative experiences at work and voting for the far right. Of the 3,900 
private-sector employees surveyed in 2024 and 2025, 33% stated they had 
no partisan preference; those who voted for the National Rally (RN) and 
La France Insoumise (LFI) were angry, but did not express it in the same 
way: RN voters felt rejected by their colleagues and distrusted them; 
LFI voters worked well with their colleagues, and their distrust was 
directed at company management. The major divide between the two groups 
was on the issue of immigration.

Notes
[1] See our positions on this subject on the website 
oclibertaire.lautre.net (for example, in the Board meetings of November 
and December 2025).

[2] The photos of the yellow vest movement that illustrate this article 
were taken in various locations in France.

[3] "Political questions" on France Inter, March 29, 2026.

[4] In "The new clothes of fascism", Réfractions no. 54 (January 2026) 
points out, on a global scale, the empowerment of rulers in relation to 
the rules of law, the decline of Western neo-colonial hegemony or the 
reactionary configuration of cyberspace.

[5] See, among others, La France périphérique - Comment on a sacrifié 
les classes populaires (Flammarion, 2014)

[6] La Découverte, 2019; published in paperback in 2022.

[7] See in particular, on LVSL: "Benoît Coquard: "The rural working 
classes and left-wing sympathizers tend to drift away"" (January 14, 
2025); and, on Mediapart, "The social anchoring of the RN vote" 
(February 26, 2026).

[8] Women on average perform better in their studies than men and are 
more likely than men to leave rural areas

[9] According to the note "When bars and tobacconists close - The 
erosion of local social ties and the rise of the far-right vote in 
France" (Cepremap, February 2026), the closure of bars and tobacconists 
leads to an increase in the far-right vote, and vice versa.

https://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4714
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