A-Infos (en) France, OCL CA #357 - Iran: Despite Repression, a Revolution Advances (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

The violence of the repression of Iranian protests might suggest that 
the Mullahs' regime is still strong. However, it seems to us that its 
weakening has been ongoing for years. ---- Women Abandon the Veil ---- 
One of the strongest signs of the regime's impotence, on a societal 
level, is the issue of wearing the veil. The massive demonstrations that 
followed the police killing of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, in the 
name of "Women, Life, Freedom!", were met with violent repression. Many 
women continued to demonstrate individually or in small groups via 
videos, while mocking or insulting the leaders of this theocratic 
regime. The obligation to wear the veil dates back to 1979, and the 
regime sought to strengthen it in December 2024. The new law provides 
for prison sentences, flogging for women who do not comply, and even the 
death penalty for propagandists.

Women have not given up and are increasingly numerous, particularly in 
Tehran and other major cities, in no longer wearing the veil. Since June 
2025, the morality police, who used to assault and imprison unveiled 
women, have practically ceased their activities. The "moderate" 
president, Massoud Pezeshkian, who had criticized the law in December 
2024, announced at the end of August 2025(1) that he was abandoning its 
enforcement to avoid provoking a civil war.

Three other signs of declining support for the Islamic regime.

According to an expert on Iranian society(2), "The regime is worried 
about another sign of disintegration: religious disaffection. Mosques 
have been empty for thirty years. Iran is the Muslim country where the 
Ramadan fast is least observed." Today, 22.2% of Iranians admit to never 
praying; 27.4% do not fast during Ramadan, etc.

Like all political leaders, the Iranian regime is concerned with gauging 
public opinion. The government survey from late 2023, from which the 
preceding figures are taken, reveals that 72.9% of Iranians support the 
separation of religion and state. Only 30.7% supported this 
secularization in 2015. (3) For February 11, 2024, the 45th anniversary 
of the Islamic Revolution, the regime attempted to mobilize the 
population en masse for this celebration. It succeeded in gathering its 
supporters, who are still numerous, but it was not a resounding success. 
It could even be considered a failure, but not as massive as the 
National Council of Resistance of Iran (4) claims.

Loss of Political Influence
Given that parliamentary elections are controlled by the regime's 
supporters (5) and that the results are rigged, Iranians are 
increasingly boycotting them. Having a choice between a conservative and 
an ultraconservative candidate does not encourage people to vote. The 
elections of March 1st and May 10th, 2024, were marked by a massive 
boycott, with an official turnout of 40% (and 20% blank and invalid 
ballots) (6).
During the 2021 presidential election, since there were only 
conservative and ultraconservative candidates, Ebrahim Raisi of the 
militant clergy party was elected. He received 72% of the vote, but with 
less than 50% voter turnout. He was widely tipped to become Khamenei's 
successor, but, unfortunately for the regime, he died in a helicopter 
crash. As a result, conservatives and hardliners risked tearing each 
other apart over Khamenei's succession, and, surprisingly, in the 2024 
presidential election, a reformer was elected president. Massoud 
Pezeshkian, a doctor of Kurdish and Azerbaijani origin, was a staunch 
supporter of the Islamic Revolution in his youth, later becoming a 
moderate and then a reformer. The Guardian Council did not see him as a 
dangerous candidate against the conservatives and hardliners. In the 
second round, he obtained nearly 55% of the vote against an 
ultraconservative. It's important not to imagine that Pezeshkian wants 
to abolish the Islamic regime; he simply believes that to save it, its 
excesses must be moderated.

Geostrategic Loss of Weight
The Iranian regime has lost most of its allies, who have been struck by 
massive bombings or targeted attacks. Bashar al-Assad has been 
overthrown, Hezbollah and the Houthis are greatly weakened, as are the 
Shiite militias in Iraq. Iran has been bombed by Israel and the US 
without being able to retaliate. Even Pakistan has dared to bomb Iranian 
territory (against Baloch separatists).
Former President Raisi and his foreign minister Amir Abdullahian(7) had 
skillfully strengthened ties with Putin by supplying him with drones, at 
a time when Russia was lagging behind in this technology. The first 
UAVs(8) supplied were rudimentary. Later, Iran provided several hundred 
Shahed-136 drones(9) and finally granted Russia the right to manufacture 
them itself, renaming them Gerane-2.
Now that Russia is self-sufficient in drone production, and that China 
is supplying it with more copies inspired by the Shahed-136, Putin has 
other priorities than saving the floundering Iranian regime.

Economic Collapse
The Mullahs' regime has never been particularly successful economically, 
its priority being adherence to its interpretation of Islam. The Iranian 
economy was essentially based on the sale of oil and gas. It is divided 
into three sectors: the state sector (hydrocarbons, heavy industry, 
public utilities, banking, and insurance); the Islamic cooperative 
sector, fueled by oil revenues and intended to redistribute a portion of 
this wealth to the poor (on the condition of supporting the regime, of 
course); and the private sector (agriculture, small industry, crafts, 
and commerce).

In September 2025, the UN reinstated sanctions related to the nuclear 
program, limiting oil exports and reducing foreign exchange earnings. 
This did not create the current crisis, but it exacerbated a 
deterioration that was already underway. The value of the rial has 
plummeted to its lowest point, causing prices to soar, especially for 
imported goods. Inflation has reached 52% in a single year, severely 
eroding purchasing power, causing budget and banking imbalances, and 
also impacting pension funds.
President Pezeshkian's attempt to provide Iranians with an allowance to 
compensate for this crisis is ludicrous: it amounts to the equivalent of 
EUR6 per month. His request for the security forces not to crack down 
too hard on the people is equally absurd. There are already thousands 
dead and imprisoned. It's pointless to count them today; the tally will 
be surpassed tomorrow.

What does the future hold? Even though the intensity of the protests 
decreased during the most intense period of repression (under the 
internet blackout), it is unlikely they will end permanently. Iran's 
Islamic regime is on its last legs. It now clings to power only through 
the patronage system it has established, but how can it survive if it no 
longer even has the means to distribute crumbs? One might wonder which 
opposition will have the capacity to replace the current regime.
Some Westerners and Iranian exiles are putting forward Reza Pahlavi, son 
of the last shah. His name has also been mentioned by some protesters in 
Iran, fostering the illusion of a period of economic prosperity and 
forgetting that this pretender's father was also a bloodthirsty 
dictator. It is unlikely that members of the former Iranian oligarchy 
would want to follow him in the adventure of returning to the country. 
"He's an empty shell, an image created by the media, which is looking 
for a default leader to present against the mullahs' regime," explains 
the Franco-Iranian sociologist Azadeh Khan, who teaches at Paris Cité 
University. "Reza Pahlavi left Iran more than 47 years ago: he has no 
structure, no organization in Iran; he is not on the ground. All of this 
is not very serious." (10) He is also heavily criticized for his 
complicity with the Israelis.
The People's Mujahedin of Iran and the NCRI have a fine republican, 
secular, and social program. The Mujahedin have sometimes been 
considered leftists, when in fact they are simply proponents of a 
"modern Islam." Only certain associated groups are Marxist. They, too, 
have been in exile for a long time. They are quite condemned in Iran for 
having chosen to fight alongside Saddam Hussein's troops in the 
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). They may have some contacts and 
correspondents in Iran, but no significant presence.
The only possible transition can only come from within Iran. It will 
emerge from popular demonstrations and the release of currently 
imprisoned leaders, possibly along with a few reformers who have 
definitively broken with the Islamic Republic. Anarchist criticism of 
the state also exists in Iran; it represents only a handful of 
individuals. The most interesting aspect of the current revolt is 
certainly that the critique of the theocratic power is linked to the 
critique of the economic organization of society. It is impossible today 
to predict what will emerge from this movement.

Al-d-Ali-Bald, January 23, 2026

Notes
1 Information published in Africanews on September 1, 2025
2 Le Canard Enchaîné, January 14, 2026
3 According to an article by Siavash Shahabi published in The 
Freethinker in February 2025. The other data from this survey were 
published in Imprécor.
4 The NCRI federates five Iranian opposition organizations in exile, 
with the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) being the 
largest group. Its headquarters are in Paris.
5 The Guardian Council, whose members are appointed by the "Supreme 
Leader" Ali Khamenei, eliminates almost all "reformist" candidates and a 
good number of "moderates."

6 The NCRI gives much lower rates, but it still tends to exaggerate...
7 He also died in the helicopter crash.

8 Unmanned aerial vehicles
9 Nothing to do with the small drones that monitor our demonstrations. 
These 240kg suicide vehicles travel at a speed of 185km/h and can carry 
up to 90kg of explosives over several thousand kilometers.

10 Quotes taken from an article in Le Devoir, a Quebec newspaper.

http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4641
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