A-Infos (en) France, OCL CA #354 - "Fewer stadiums, more hospitals": The GenZ 212 movement grapples with a fractured Morocco (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Following Nepal on September 8, Peru on September 20, and Madagascar 
after September 25, a movement claiming to represent Generation Z (those 
born between the late 1990s and early 2010s) began in Morocco on 
September 27. The call to demonstrate was launched on the GenZ 212 
Discord server, created about ten days earlier, demanding reform of 
public health and education services. The movement exposes the 
contradictions of an economic model based on large-scale projects and 
major events such as the FIFA World Cup. However, it is encountering 
very real limitations and the red lines of an authoritarian regime.

"Note:  This article was written remotely, without direct observation of 
the mobilizations, based on press coverage, previous observations, and 
some discussions with friends, activists, and social science researchers.

The trigger: a health scandal in Agadir, the Prime Minister's stronghold
Last August, at Hassan II Hospital in Agadir, eight women died within 
ten days of giving birth by cesarean section. This hospital, 
under-equipped, understaffed, under-supplied with medicines, and with 
deplorable hygiene, is often compared to a morgue. The university 
hospital intended to take over for the region has been under 
construction for almost ten years, but priority seems to have been given 
to renovating the city's football stadium: Morocco will host the Africa 
Cup of Nations next December-January, and the World Cup in 2030 (jointly 
with Spain and Portugal)... "Health first! We don't want the World Cup," 
could be heard at the demonstrations organized in Agadir during the 
month of September, following a call to action by a YouTuber, Mohamed 
Reda Taoujni (1). Local associations joined the movement, and the affair 
gradually gained national attention. It's worth noting that the mayor of 
Agadir is none other than Aziz Akhannouch, the Prime Minister, who is 
among the wealthiest people in Morocco (worth $1.5 billion). Owner of 
companies in the oil, real estate, tourism, and media sectors, he is 
regularly suspected of favoritism and conflicts of interest in his 
management of local and national affairs, particularly regarding the 
awarding of public contracts. In
this already volatile context, an initial call to hold "peaceful 
marches" on September 27 and 28 for the improvement of health and 
education systems was circulated on Instagram, TikTok, and Telegram 
starting in mid-September by the group Moroccan Youth Voice. This group 
presented itself as a group of relatively inexperienced young people, 
independent of political parties and established organizations. Although 
there was an initial attempt to back down following police intimidation, 
the call to action was taken up on the newly created Discord server 
GenZ212 (2), which quickly gained several thousand members. GenZ212 
administrators also shared it on Facebook, X, Instagram, and YouTube. 
Originally used by gamers, the Discord platform is organized into 
servers that anyone can create and administer, subsequently co-opting 
other members to fill roles such as admin, moderator, etc. It is also 
quite easy to organize polls; in fact, this is how the new Prime 
Minister of Nepal, Sushila Karki, was elected by 200,000 people after 
the government fell in mid-September.

Demonstration in Salé (Rabat's twin city, and more populous) on October 
1st (credit: Majid Bziouat, AFP)
An international Gen Z event?
The succession of mobilizations claiming to represent Gen Z across the 
globe (but especially in countries with young populations, occupying 
relatively dominant positions in global value chains, characterized by a 
concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, etc.) is undeniably 
impressive: we hear talk of a "wave," a "domino effect," even a single 
Gen Z movement that supposedly adopted the pirate flag of Luffy, the 
hero of the manga One Piece, as its emblem. The circulation of symbols, 
organizational methods, and stances across such geographically distant 
countries testifies to the spread of digital communication tools, their 
capacity to influence repertoires of action, and the possibilities for 
mutual inspiration opened up by the flow of information.
However, the leaders of these movements formulate demands in relation to 
issues specific to each country, and national contexts appear to be 
crucial in shaping the modes of action employed, the dynamics of the 
protest movements, and their outcomes. The Nepalese "Gen Z" uprising was 
sparked by the government's decision to ban social media in an attempt 
to silence criticism of the lavish lifestyles of "Nepo kids"-the 
children of politicians-and of corruption. Faced with a bloody 
crackdown, the movement intensified and succeeded in overthrowing the 
government very quickly. The youth groups that took to the streets in 
Peru in September initially protested against a pension reform that was 
unfavorable to self-employed workers, before the demonstrations 
broadened into a more general discontent with the government, the 
economic crisis, and insecurity. On the night of October 9, Parliament 
impeached President Dina Boluarte in an attempt to quell the unrest. In 
Madagascar, the initial mobilization was fueled by water and electricity 
cuts, coupled with challenges to inequality and denunciations of 
corruption within President Rajoelina's administration. He fled his 
country aboard a French military plane on October 13, as Capsat, a 
branch of the army, took power while "letting the National Assembly work".
In Morocco, the GenZ 212 movement is firmly rooted in the Moroccan 
national political trajectory. It represents a certain continuity with 
past movements. It inherited some of the slogans of the February 20, 
2011 Movement (M20F, the Moroccan version of the "Arab Spring"), such as 
"Work, dignity, social justice," and shares commonalities with it, such 
as intensive use of social media and a youthful, national character 
(even though the M20F placed greater emphasis on the issue of democracy 
and more openly brought together members affiliated with parties and 
organizations). The GenZ 212 movement's focus on issues of public 
services and policies and inequalities also recalls more recent 
movements that have unfolded in certain regions, such as the Hirak 
(movement) in the Rif in 2016-2017 (3), or the Jerada movement in the 
Oriental region (2017-2018) (4). The Movement emphasizes the 
deficiencies of public policies - particularly the lack of resources in 
public health and education (given that policies have largely favoured 
the private sector in these areas) - but also implicitly highlights the 
failures of integrating the national economy into globalized capitalism.

GenZ 212 demonstration in Casablanca on September 28 (credit: Yassine Toumi)
A Morocco with two, or even ten, speeds
For the past twenty years or so, construction projects have been booming 
in Morocco: ports, factories (automotive, aerospace, and phosphate 
fertilizer production), giant solar power plants (Noor in Ouarzazate), 
train stations, high-speed rail lines (Tangier-Marrakech in 2 hours and 
40 minutes), and seawater desalination plants are springing up at a 
rapid pace, much to the delight of the major international groups 
involved, the crony capitalists of Morocco, and temporary employment 
agencies. Morocco is pursuing a series of industrial strategies advised 
by firms like McKinsey - plans and programs for "emergence," 
"acceleration," and "industrial revival" - which rely on large 
infrastructure projects and the creation of hubs geared towards foreign 
markets, aiming to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). The most 
emblematic of these is probably the Tangier Med zone, dedicated to the 
automotive, aerospace, logistics, and textile sectors. The most recent 
approaches seek to address certain limitations of previous 
strategies-the weakness of the domestic market and siloed industrial 
development-by proposing, for example, the creation of "industrial 
ecosystems" capable of including more SMEs in these large-scale projects.
However, these structural orientations generate profound contradictions 
with the stated objective of the country's "development." To attract 
international investors, Morocco relies on the "comparative advantage" 
of a cheap, and ideally not overly demanding, workforce. Wages therefore 
remain very low. Precarious employment (whether under legal status or in 
various degrees of informality), as well as the establishment of social 
dialogue with numerous unions, largely helps to suppress labor disputes, 
especially given the existence of several million surplus workers. 
Furthermore, investments and major infrastructure projects are 
concentrated along the coastline, and the gaps with peripheral regions 
are widening at several levels.
In the agricultural sector, the Green Morocco Plan, launched in the late 
2000s, reinforced a productivist model focused on large farms and 
large-scale producers, at the expense of family farming, which 
nevertheless remains dominant in terms of the number of farmers. Water 
reserves that have not been depleted by climate change are used to 
irrigate strawberries, tomatoes, and watermelons destined for export (or 
to fill tourists' swimming pools). This plan did include a second, 
"solidarity" pillar, intended to manage the damage caused by this 
productivist policy to less "competitive" farms. But the consequences 
are clear: the agricultural workforce fell from 39% to 26% between 2014 
and 2024, according to census data from the High Commission for 
Planning. Rural populations are swelling the urban fringes of cities, 
often finding themselves in desperate situations (5).

The call to boycott his companies was published on the GenZ 212 Discord 
server.
Amidst all these projects, King Mohammed VI has continued to enrich 
himself, multiplying his father Hassan II's fortune by at least 1,000 
(6), thanks to the royal holding company Al Mada (banking, insurance, 
telecommunications, distribution, real estate, construction materials, 
mining and energy, agribusiness, etc.). But he has also managed to 
portray himself as an enemy of "poverty" by launching the National 
Initiative for Human Development (INDH) in 2005. This program, whose 
substantial funding has been continuously renewed ever since, is 
supposed to provide basic infrastructure and encourage 
"income-generating activities" for "vulnerable" social groups, all in a 
"participatory" manner and in partnership with the private sector and 
"civil society" (in perfect harmony with neoliberal principles). "Rural 
women" are thus encouraged to organize themselves into cooperatives 
(over which they actually have little decision-making power), and young 
people to become self-employed. Incidentally, the INDH also helps to 
strengthen the authority of provincial governors and local patronage 
networks...

A Stroll Through Rabat, the "City of Lights" with a Cracked Veneer:
It's hard to take water stress seriously when you admire the verdant 
lawns lining Rabat's main roads, the ones most frequented by executive 
SUVs and tourist buses (admittedly few in number compared to Marrakech 
and Agadir). Men in work clothes bearing the logos of the contracting 
companies water them continuously, even at midday in the blazing sun. 
Garbage from the affluent neighborhoods is collected by trucks 
emblazoned with "Rabat, City of Lights," a slogan also found on the 
signs of the capital's numerous construction sites. In these same 
neighborhoods, street sweepers hunt down every cigarette butt, every 
dead leaf. They are part of the scenery for the upper-class executives 
in suits and ties who patrol their playground like cowboys. Attention to 
cleanliness is heightened when a royal outing is on the horizon. So, 
along the procession route, facades are repainted white and Moroccan 
flags are hoisted on their posts, and the police presence is even 
greater than usual.
But this image of a successful Morocco has the air of a cardboard 
cutout. Overlooking the Bouregreg Valley, the Mohammed VI Tower, with 
its 55 stories, is meant to embody the image of a modern city. It is 
still waiting to be inaugurated. Completed in 2021, the Grand Theatre, 
designed by the "starchitect" Zaha Hadid, was finally inaugurated by 
Princess Lalla Hasna and Brigitte Macron at the end of 2024 (1), but the 
building has still not hosted a performance. A short distance away, the 
artificial stone facades of the Salé marina, which faces the Kasbah of 
the Udayas, are peeling off.

Subliminal photograph depicting the Grand Theatre and the Mohammed VI 
Tower overlooking the Bouregreg Valley
Never mind that! Urban redevelopment operations continue. In the Ocean 
and El Akkari districts on the Atlantic coast, bulldozers have already 
demolished numerous buildings previously inhabited by middle and 
working-class residents. For the state, which acquired the land, the aim 
is to redesign the waterfront in preparation for the 2030 World Cup and 
to allow for the construction of luxury buildings. The residents who 
agreed to be relocated will be sent to Tamesna, a "city[not so]new" 20 
kilometers from Rabat, a grid of residential buildings, under-equipped, 
poorly served by public transport, where one lives a "ghost life" (2). 
Given the stratospheric prices of real estate for purchase and rental 
(3) in Rabat, living in the capital itself is becoming increasingly 
inaccessible; moreover, it has lost 11% of its population between the 
2014 and 2024 censuses.
Box notes:
1. The inauguration took place on the occasion of Macron's visit, which 
staged the reconciliation between the two states after a long period of 
estrangement, resulting in particular in the signing of lucrative 
contracts in Western Sahara, whose "Moroccanness" Macron had just 
recognized, for French institutions (AFD, Bpifrance) and companies 
(Engie, HDF Energy).
2. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/arti...
3. The monthly rent for a studio in one of the central districts (Agdal, 
Hassan, etc.) easily exceeds 5,000 dirhams (a little less than 500 
euros) when the guaranteed minimum interprofessional wage (SMIG) does 
not exceed 2,800 dirhams.

The dynamics of the mobilization, between repression, the desire for 
legitimacy, class division, and attempts at co-optation
Let's return to the GenZ 212 movement. In a national context marked by a 
high level of propaganda, it faced virulent attacks even before its 
emergence in the public sphere. This prompted its organizers to 
emphasize, from the outset, their pacifism, their patriotism, and their 
non-opposition to the king and the monarchical system "which guarantees 
the stability of Morocco," while also offering a few invocations to 
divine protection. The call for the first demonstration on Saturday, 
September 27, circulated on the Discord server, reiterated, in addition 
to the demands for healthcare and education reform and an end to 
corruption, the demonstration guidelines: respect for the law, respect 
for private property, and no acts of vandalism. It announced 
demonstration locations in most of Morocco's major cities.
From that first evening, the police dispersed the gatherings, and 
dozens of protesters were taken into custody, with even more detainees 
the following day (7)... These attempts to stifle the protests actually 
fueled them, leading to a wider spread of the affected cities. From 
September 30th onward, the demonstrations escalated into open 
confrontations with the police, even resulting in the burning of banks 
and supermarkets, in the neglected cities of the South (Inezgane, 
Guelmim, Aït Amira), the Rif region, and the East (Errachidia, Oujda), 
as well as in the working-class neighborhoods of major cities. In Oujda, 
a police van drove into a crowd, seriously injuring two young men on 
September 30th. The following night, during an attempted assault on a 
gendarmerie station in Lqliâa near Agadir, the gendarmes fired live 
ammunition, killing three men, and subsequently claimed "self-defense." 
But this version seems unlikely: a young film graduate who, according to 
reports, was simply filming the scene was among the victims (8). While 
most of the young people arrested during the peaceful gatherings in city 
centers were released without charge, some adult young men arrested 
during the riots (9) received heavy prison sentences, up to 15 years 
(and many judgments are still pending).

Scene from the film Deserts (2023), by Faouzi Bensaïdi, which follows 
two agents from a debt collection agency as they work to recover 
repayments from over-indebted families in southern Morocco
In their quest for respectability, the organizers of GenZ 212 have 
tended to distance themselves from the use of riotous rhetoric by some 
of the popular youth, by "regretting the occurrence of acts of 
vandalism" (10), by limiting themselves in several announcements to 
demanding the release of people who demonstrated "peacefully", by 
organizing campaigns to clean up the damage from the riots (11). Even 
though they called for people to wear black as a sign of mourning after 
the three deaths in Lqliâa, this distancing reflects the weight of the 
class divide in Moroccan society, including within Gen Z...
The repression of peaceful gatherings has shifted the demands of the 
GenZ 212 collective, highlighting the issues of freedom of expression 
and assembly, the accountability of corrupt politicians, and the 
dismissal of Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch and calls for a boycott of 
his companies, especially after he stated blandly on September 2nd that 
his government was ready for dialogue, but "within the framework of 
institutions and public spaces." That day, the announcement of the three 
deaths in Lqliâa and Akhannouch's weak response marked a turning point 
in the media coverage of the movement. The media unleashed their fury 
against the Prime Minister and his record, and began inviting 
representatives of "youth" onto their programs.

Open questions
Although the GenZ 212 movement claims to be separate from political 
organizations, it is nonetheless a space for politicization where young 
people experience deliberation, conflict, confrontation with the police 
and the justice system, etc. Regarding the political leanings 
potentially represented, the list of guests scheduled to speak live on 
the Discord server, which is predominantly male, offers some clues: 
aside from the enigmatic influencer Rachid Achachi and the president of 
the Moroccan Association of Islamic Economics, Talal Lahlou, most of 
them express positions critical of authoritarianism, in favor of 
individual freedoms, democracy, and, to varying degrees, greater social 
redistribution. Several journalists have been imprisoned or are in exile 
- Omar Radi (former member of Attac Morocco, 4 years in prison, 
officially for "undermining the external and internal security of the 
State, rape, and indecent assault"[12]), Tawfik Bouachrine (5 years in 
prison, officially for "sexual assault"), Ahmed Benchemsi (founder of 
the weekly magazine Tel Quel and currently advocacy director for the 
Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch), Aboubakr 
Jamaï (founder of several media, residing abroad) -, the socialist Omar 
Balafrej, the left-wing economist Najib Akesbi (13), etc. These choices 
of guests caused division within the movement and led to departures, 
especially since some of the remarks made were deemed hostile to the 
Amazigh cause. But it is difficult, under the circumstances of writing 
this article, to see things clearly...

Demolition of buildings at the Ocean, on the Corniche
Another question that arises concerns the relationship with the 
monarchy. In its denunciation of collusion between politicians and the 
business world, the GenZ 212 movement focuses all its grievances on the 
Prime Minister, but the fortune the royal family has amassed by 
capturing various privileges is far more colossal. It is also at the 
palace that major economic policies are defined... In anticipation of 
the speech the King usually gives at the opening of the parliamentary 
session, the movement's leaders sent him an open letter - in which they 
declare their loss of confidence in the government and political 
parties, demand the government's resignation, and reaffirm the 
movement's demands, along with a call to "involve young people in 
political decision-making." Is this an obsequious ritual or a way of 
holding the King accountable? The King's highly anticipated speech of 
October 10 (14), with its incantatory pronouncements - "There should be 
neither conflict nor rivalry between major national projects and social 
programs, as long as the goal is to develop the country and improve the 
living conditions of citizens, wherever they may be" - seems to have 
generated some disappointment, judging by the discussions (under the 
cover of anonymity) on the server. Nevertheless, the momentum has 
struggled to recover since this event. The daily meetings have been 
suspended, replaced by more sporadic calls. It is clear that criticism 
of the monarchy remains one of the regime's red lines, alongside 
criticism of Islam (15) and challenges to Moroccan sovereignty over 
Western Sahara. And the grid system of the national territory via the 
moqaddem system, a relay between the power and the local populations - 
which was reinforced during the French colonization - allows information 
to be sent up to the central power and the division or defusing of many 
mobilizations.

Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch is under attack! The front page of Tel 
Quel (week of October 3-9)
Even if the movement were to lose momentum, and despite all its 
limitations, it will at least have had the merit of tarnishing the 
postcard image and providing a space for expression and discussion, 
which is not negligible in a context where traditional activist networks 
are weakened under the weight of repression, and where the memory of 
past struggles is transmitted only in a fragmentary way.

D., October 20, 2025

Notes
1. Since judicial repression often takes the form of underhanded 
tactics, Prince Hicham, the king's cousin, has just filed a defamation 
lawsuit against him: 
https://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/177031/moulay-hicham-annonce-poursuites-judiciaires.html
2. +212 is the country code for Morocco.
3. The Hirak movement began in October 2016 in El Hoceima with the death 
of Mohcine Friki, a fishmonger who was crushed in a garbage truck that 
was supposed to destroy his merchandise, which had been illegally caught 
and confiscated by the police. He had climbed into the truck to prevent 
the destruction of his catch. The police then allegedly started the 
machine... This was followed by demonstrations against police violence 
and injustice, in which residents of El Hoceima and surrounding 
villages, both men and women, participated. In this region, brutalized, 
marginalized, and discriminated against since the colonial period, the 
demands emphasized cultural issues-giving greater prominence to 
Tamazight-and socio-economic concerns-calls for government investment in 
local infrastructure and the economy. Repression by government forces 
intensified starting in May 2017, and the movement's leading figures 
were imprisoned-the most prominent, Nasser Zefzafi, received a 20-year 
prison sentence.

4. Jerada is a former mining town that grew up around coal extraction. 
The closure of the industrial mines in 1998 left 9,000 workers 
unemployed, and mining continued on a small, artisanal, and clandestine 
basis, in the absence of a plan to restructure the local economy. The 
"coal barons," local elected officials who obtained mining permits when 
the mines closed, pocket the profits and give only a minimal share to 
the clandestine miners. The deaths of two miners, who drowned in a mine 
shaft in late 2017, reignited protests against electricity and water 
prices. Authorities responded to the movement with announcements of an 
emergency plan for the city, including the organization of artisanal 
miners into cooperatives.

https://www.lemonde.fr/series-d-ete/article/2025/08/26/mohammed-vi-le-monarque-des-reformes-inachevees_6635772_3451060.html
5. Some resort to self-immolation when they cannot find enough to 
provide for their families, or when they are evicted from their homes.

6. From $500,000 upon assuming power, the royal fortune reportedly rose 
to $5.7 billion in 2015 (the latest known figure): 
https://www.lemonde.fr/series-d-ete/article/2025/08/26/mohammed-vi-le-monarque-des-reformes-inachevees_6635772_3451060.html
7. The Moroccan Association for Human Rights attempted to monitor the 
arrests using information from each of its branches.

8. 
https://telquel.ma/instant-t/2025/10/09/genz212-58-realisateurs-artistes-et-citoyens-rendent-hommage-a-abdessamad-oubalat-jeune-cineaste-tue-a-lqliaa_1954982/
9. Notably, a particularly large number of minors, including children, 
were arrested during these protests.

10. Announcement of September 30 on the Discord server.

11. Announcement of October 3.

12. After a year of pretrial detention, he was sentenced to 6 years in 
prison in 2021, most likely to silence him and make an example of him, 
as he was investigating too closely related to royal affairs.

13. 
https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/10/12/au-maroc-il-n-y-a-pas-eu-le-ruissellement-attendu_6645931_3212.html
14. Every year, the king gives a speech at the opening of the 
parliamentary session. Hundreds of buses are brought in from the 
surrounding countryside to create a spectacle of crowds coming to hear 
him...
15. For example, Ibtissame Lachgar was sentenced to thirty months in 
prison for a social media post in which she posed wearing a T-shirt that 
read "Allah is lesbian." 
https://www.france24.com/fr/afrique/20251006-maroc-peine-de-prison-confirmee-militante-feministe-ibtissame-lachgar-blaspheme

http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4558
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