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(en) Italy, FDCA, Cantiere #47 - Who decides what anti-Semitism is? - Totò Caggese (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]
Date
Wed, 18 Nov 2026 08:54:39 +0200
A definition created to recognize and measure antisemitism is entering
legislation, schools, universities, and institutions. The question is
not only what it says, but what it becomes. What is antisemitism? The
question would seem to have an obvious answer. It becomes much less
simple when the answer must be written into a law. As we write, in
mid-September, the Chamber of Deputies is examining the bill to combat
antisemitism, already approved by the Senate on March 4, 2026. By the
time this article is published, the text may have been further amended.
But its very parliamentary journey allows us to observe a problem that
goes far beyond Italian legislative history: who draws the line between
antisemitism and political conflict, and what happens when a definition
born as an operational tool becomes a criterion for state action?
That antisemitism exists, that it has a specific and catastrophic
history in Europe, and that it continues to manifest itself should not
be a matter of debate. Attacks, threats, profanations, stereotypes about
Jewish power, conspiracy theories, Holocaust denial, and attributing
collective responsibility to Jews for the Israeli government's actions
are real phenomena. Combating them does not mean limiting political
freedom: it means defending individuals and communities from
discrimination and violence.
The problem begins when one has to decide where anti-Semitism ends and
where criticism of the State of Israel, anti-Zionism, opposition to
nationalism, or the proposal for a different political order for
Israelis and Palestinians begin.
And it is precisely on that boundary that the controversy over the IHRA
definition focuses.
A definition born to count
In 2016, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance adopted a
"working definition" according to which antisemitism is "a specific
perception of Jews that may be expressed as hatred towards them." The
definition is associated with eleven examples that help to recognize its
manifestations.[2]
Some are hardly controversial: accusing Jews as a people of controlling
governments, the economy, or the media; denying the Holocaust; holding
Jews collectively responsible for the actions of the Israeli state.
Others enter directly into the political conflict over Israel: denying
the Jewish people the right to self-determination, arguing, for example,
that the existence of the State of Israel is a racist undertaking;
applying to Israel standards not required of other democratic states;
comparing contemporary Israeli policy to Nazi policy.
The IHRA itself specifies that criticism of Israel, similar to that
leveled at any other country, cannot be considered antisemitic and that
examples must be evaluated in context. The problem, therefore, isn't a
definition that automatically declares all criticism of Israel
antisemitic. It's more subtle: who interprets the context, and with what
consequences?
To understand this, it is useful to go back to the origins.
Kenneth Stern, one of the main authors of the Working Definition from
which the IHRA definition derives, has repeatedly pointed out that the
text was created in the early 2000s to resolve a very concrete problem.
Different European countries collected data on anti-Semitism according
to different criteria and the results were not comparable. A tool was
needed that would help those collecting the data to decide which
incidents to classify as anti-Semitic.[3]
Not a penal code. Not a university disciplinary regulation. Not a
criterion for determining what opinions could be expressed.
Stern, who has not renounced the definition he helped develop, has
instead challenged its use as a hate speech code , especially in
universities. The question, therefore, is not whether the definition is
"good" or "bad." It is what happens when a tool designed to classify
phenomena changes its function.
From definition to device
This is exactly what makes the Italian case interesting.
The text approved by the Senate does not limit itself to citing the
IHRA. It establishes that the Republic adopts its operational
definition, "including the related indicators, necessary for the
purposes of applying the law itself". In the same article, after the
amendments introduced during the parliamentary examination, it is
specified that "the freedom of political criticism and expression of
thought and the freedom of assembly and association" remain unchanged.[1]
The simultaneous presence of the two formulas explains the problem well.
The law aims to use IHRA indicators and at the same time feels the need
to clarify that political criticism must remain free.
It was not an editorial detail. That guarantee entered the text during
the parliamentary debate. And the Senate discussed and rejected
amendments that proposed replacing the IHRA with the Jerusalem
Declaration on Antisemitism or, at least, excluding examples relating to
historical comparisons, state qualifications and double standards.[5]
The proposal to explicitly state that free criticism of the Israeli
government's political actions does not constitute anti-Semitism was
also rejected in the Chamber. The rapporteur argued that the
clarification was superfluous because the IHRA itself already protects
such criticism and because examples are essential to make the definition
operational.
The conflict, therefore, was seen by Parliament. It is not an objection
invented subsequently by opponents of the law.
And the original text showed this even more clearly.
The first version of the bill provided that a demonstration could be
prevented in the presence of a "serious potential risk" that symbols,
slogans, messages or behaviors attributable to the IHRA indicators would
appear. During the examination in the Senate that provision was entirely
replaced by a provision concerning the National Coordinator for the
fight against anti-Semitism.[6]
Proposals for new criminal sanctions were also abandoned.
The result is significant: the Senate has toned down the directly
coercive instruments, but has retained the definitional crux.
And perhaps this is precisely the most interesting question.
Prison is not necessary for a definition to produce effects
One might argue that if no new crimes are introduced and if freedom of
criticism is expressly safeguarded, the problem will disappear.
But a law does not operate only through the penal code.
The text approved by the Senate provides for the IHRA to be included in
the national strategy against anti-Semitism and in the activities of
institutions that collect data, fight online hatred, and train teachers,
police forces, prefects, and magistrates. It intervenes in schools and
universities; it provides for prevention, monitoring, and counteraction
activities; and it involves the public radio and television service.[7]
A definition can therefore remain formally distant from the criminal
offense and still become a criterion through which an administration
classifies an incident, a university evaluates an initiative, a school
interprets behavior, and a worker decides what to report.
It is the passage from definition to device.
And this is a point on which there is no consensus even among those who
consider the IHRA useful.
In Italian parliamentary hearings, some supporters explicitly called for
the definition and its eleven examples to move from their previous
status as soft law to a truly "normative effectiveness." Others,
including representatives of Italian Jewry and scholars engaged in
combating anti-Semitism, instead insisted on the operational character
of the definition: an orientation tool, not something to be copied into
the penal code or automatically transformed into a sanction.[8]
This is a far from insignificant difference: even among those who
support the IHRA, there is no full agreement on what adopting it means.
There is not only the IHRA
The controversy would be less relevant if the IHRA represented the only
available way to define contemporary antisemitism.
It is not so.
In 2021, hundreds of scholars developed the Jerusalem Declaration on
Antisemitism. Its definition is much more concise: antisemitism is
"discrimination, prejudice, hostility, or violence against Jews because
they are Jews, or against Jewish institutions because they are Jewish."[9]
The difference becomes especially evident when you get to Israel.
For the Jerusalem Declaration, support for Palestinian rights, criticism
or opposition to Zionism as a form of nationalism, the proposal for a
binational, federal, unitary, or democratic state with equal rights for
all, nor the use of concepts such as settler colonialism or apartheid,
when supported as political and historical arguments, are not in
themselves antisemitic.
The Nexus Document, developed by scholars specifically working on the
relationship between anti-Semitism, Israel and Zionism, also
acknowledges that Israel can become the target through which anti-Jewish
stereotypes are re-proposed, but warns that opposition to Zionism and
criticism of the Israeli state are not, as such, anti-Semitism.[10]
This does not mean that JDA or Nexus have the "true" definition while
IHRA has the false one.
This means something more politically important: the border is the
subject of an ongoing scientific, historical, and political discussion.
And the same dossier prepared by the Italian Chamber presents the
Jerusalem Declaration as "an alternative to the IHRA definition".[4]
The legislator, therefore, is not simply adopting a well-established
concept. It is choosing, among competing definitions, the one that will
guide the institutions' action.
When the definition starts to work
There's no need to imagine what might happen. In other countries, the
IHRA has already become part of government and university practices.
A report by the European Legal Support Center has reconstructed 53
incidents between 2017 and 2022 in the United Kingdom, Germany, and
Austria in which the definition was invoked directly or indirectly
against initiatives related to Palestine. This is a source to be used
with caution: the ELSC provides legal assistance specifically to
individuals and organizations engaged in Palestinian solidarity. But
some of the cases described can be verified through administrative
documents and judicial decisions.[11]
In 2017, at the University of Leeds, former British diplomat Craig
Murray was scheduled to discuss a highly political issue:
Palestine/Israel: A Unitary Secular State or a Bantustan Solution. He
was asked for the text of his speech in advance, and the university
assigned staff to monitor the meeting. The university's protocol on
freedom of expression specifically referred to the IHRA. The meeting
eventually took place.[12]
The point is not whether Murray was right.
The point is that discussing what form of statehood should exist between
the Jordan River and the Mediterranean can fall within the scope of an
instrument created to recognize anti-Semitism.
For an anarchist, the paradox is even more evident. We can challenge the
French, Italian, Russian, or Palestinian nation-state. We can imagine
federations, confederations, and stateless communities. Why should the
discussion of Israel's political form have a different status?
Of course, there is a crucial limit: denying Jews security, equality,
collective rights, or even the possibility of living in that land
because they are Jewish is not an anarchic critique of the state. It is
discrimination. But challenging a national or ethnonational order is not
necessarily equivalent to challenging the existence of a people.
It is precisely this distinction that a definition used by institutions
must be able to preserve.
The opposite risk
Finally, there is one objection that a libertarian critic of the IHRA
cannot afford to ignore.
Anti-Zionism can be used as the language of anti-Semitism.
It happens when "Zionist" simply becomes a substitute for "Jew"; when
Italian Jews are held accountable for the Israeli bombings of Gaza; when
images of Jewish financial power, global conspiracy, and dual loyalty
reappear in a different guise; when a synagogue is treated as a
representation of the Israeli state.
To call all this simply "criticism of Israel" would be as misleading as
calling all criticism of Israel anti-Semitic.
And this is probably where the IHRA hits a real problem: contemporary
antisemitism does not necessarily present itself with the vocabulary of
twentieth-century antisemitism.
But acknowledging this transformation does not automatically solve the
problem of how the boundary should be drawn.
In fact, it makes it more difficult.
Who guards the border?
The Italian question, therefore, is not whether the state should fight
anti-Semitism. It must do so, just as it must combat racism,
discrimination, and violence against any minority.
The question is different.
Who decides what constitutes anti-Semitism? A historian? A Jewish
community? A parliamentary majority? A police officer? The rector of a
university? An algorithm tasked with searching for hate speech?
And above all: should a definition constructed to help recognize a
phenomenon become the criterion by which institutions classify political
discourse?
Over the years, Kenneth Stern has raised a paradoxical concern: overly
broadening the accusation of antisemitism can end up weakening the fight
against antisemitism itself. If the same word is used for a graffiti
against a synagogue, a theory about a Jewish financial conspiracy, and a
discussion of the possibility of a binational state in Palestine, we
risk losing the ability to distinguish profoundly different phenomena.
Precision, in this field, is not indulgence. It is a political necessity.
Combating antisemitism means acknowledging it, even when it hides behind
the language of anti-Zionism. But it also means refusing to allow the
accusation of antisemitism to become a tool to exclude nationalism,
Zionism, the policies of the Israeli state, or the very form of the
state from political discussion.
For this reason, the question posed by the Italian debate will remain
open, regardless of the text that emerges from the Chamber. Not only
what anti-Semitism is, but who has the power to define it-and what they
can do, once they have that power.
Note
1. Senate of the Republic, 19th Legislature, Bill S. 1004, Provisions
for the Adoption of the Working Definition of Anti-Semitism and for
Countering Anti-Semitic Acts, introduced on January 30, 2024; approved
by the Senate, with amendments, on March 4, 2026, and transmitted to the
Chamber as AC 2830. The approved text establishes in Article 1 the
adoption of the IHRA definition, "including the related indicators
necessary for the purposes of applying the law itself," without
prejudice to freedom of political criticism, expression, assembly, and
association.
2. International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), Working
Definition of Antisemitism, adopted in 2016. The definition is
accompanied by eleven illustrative examples; those referring to Israel
include the denial of the Jewish people's right to self-determination,
the application of double standards, and comparisons between
contemporary Israeli policies and those of Nazi Germany. The IHRA itself
specifies that criticism of Israel similar to that leveled at any other
country cannot be considered antisemitic.
3. Kenneth S. Stern, the principal drafter of the previous Working
Definition developed within the EUMC in the early 2000s, traced its
origins as a tool primarily intended to facilitate the comparison of the
collection and classification of antisemitic incidents. Stern
subsequently criticized the definition's use as a disciplinary code or
instrument for regulating freedom of expression, particularly in
universities. See Kenneth S. Stern, A Bad Deal: By Adopting the IHRA
Definition of Antisemitism, Universities are Sacrificing Academic
Freedom, Knight First Amendment Institute, 2025.
4. Chamber of Deputies, Research Service, Provisions for the
Counteracting Antisemitism. AA.C. 2376, 2383, and 2830, Reading Sheets
no. 603, April 15, 2026. The dossier defines the IHRA as a "non-legally
binding" definition and dedicates a specific section to the Jerusalem
Declaration on Antisemitism as "an alternative to the IHRA definition."
5. During the Senate's examination by the Constitutional Affairs
Committee, amendments were introduced both to replace the reference to
the IHRA with the Jerusalem Declaration and, secondarily, to exclude
some of the most controversial indicators relating to Israel. The
amendments were rejected. During the same process, however, the clause
safeguarding the freedoms of political criticism, expression, assembly,
and association was approved, based on an initial proposal by De
Cristofaro, Cucchi, and Magni and after a rewording agreed upon with the
rapporteur and the Government.
6. The original text of S.1004 provided in Article 3 the possibility of
preventing a demonstration in the presence of a "serious potential risk"
of anti-Semitic symbols, slogans, messages, or behavior attributable to
the adopted definition. During the committee's examination, amendments
were presented to delete it and proposals were made to at least replace
the "potential risk" with a "concrete and present" risk. On February 25,
2026, the article was finally replaced entirely, through the approval of
Amendment 3.4, Text 2, with a provision regarding the National
Coordinator for the Fight against Anti-Semitism.
7. The text approved by the Senate provides, among other things, a
three-year national strategy, data collection and classification
activities, countering online hate speech, training in schools,
interventions in universities, training of the armed forces and police,
prefects and magistrates, as well as campaigns by the public radio and
television service.
8. The Senate hearings revealed differing positions even among
supporters of the IHRA. The Union of Italy-Israel Associations called
for a transition from soft law to a definition with "normative force."
UCEI, on the other hand, emphasized the operational and illustrative
nature of the definition, specifying that it was not intended to be
simply copied and pasted into the penal code or to directly sanction
behavior. Gadi Luzzatto Voghera, director of the CDEC Foundation, while
considering the reference to the IHRA necessary, acknowledged its
academic criticism and noted that existing repressive norms could be
sufficient if properly applied.
9. The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (2021) defines antisemitism
as "discrimination, prejudice, hostility, or violence against Jews as
Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jews)." Its guidelines distinguish
antisemitism from criticism or opposition to Zionism as a form of
nationalism and consider the proposal for different constitutional
systems-two states, a binational state, a federal state, a democratic
unitary state, etc.-not antisemitic as such, as long as full equality
and rights are guaranteed. See also Chamber of Deputies, dossier cited
in note 4.
10. The Nexus Document, Understanding Antisemitism at Its Nexus with
Israel and Zionism, Nexus Project, ed. 2024. The document considers the
application of anti-Jewish stereotypes and myths to Israel or Zionism
and the attribution of collective responsibility to Jews to be
antisemitic, but clarifies that criticism of Israel, opposition to its
policies, and opposition to Zionism are not, as such, antisemitic. It
also emphasizes that using the accusation of antisemitism to suppress
criticism of Israel can harm both freedom of expression and the fight
against genuine antisemitism.
11. European Legal Support Center (ELSC), Suppressing Palestinian Rights
Advocacy through the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism, June 2023.
The report claims to have documented 53 incidents between 2017 and 2022
in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Austria in which the IHRA was
allegedly used against individuals or organizations working for
Palestinian rights. The ELSC is directly involved in legal assistance
for Palestinian solidarity: the data and interpretations in the report
must therefore be distinguished from the individual facts verifiable
through the primary sources cited in the report's footnotes.
12. Regarding the 2017 University of Leeds case, regarding Craig
Murray's lecture "Palestine/Israel: A Unitary Secular State or a
Bantustan Solution," the ELSC report documents the advance request for
the text of the speech and the presence of university staff to monitor
the event; the university's protocol on freedom of expression referred
to the IHRA definition. The meeting took place.
13. For an overview of the effects that may arise from the institutional
use of non-legally binding definitions, see also E. Tendayi Achiume,
United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism,
Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that
contribute to fueling contemporary forms of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, A/77/512, 7 October
2022, especially pp. 15-16. The report pays attention to the IHRA
definition and its possible effects on the rights to freedom of
expression, assembly and political participation.
https://alternativalibertaria.org/
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