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(en) Italy, FDCA, Cantiere #47 - Mali: The Sahel Crisis and Transformations of Imperialism - Lino Roveredo (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]
Date
Sun, 15 Nov 2026 08:11:08 +0200
Mali today represents one of the main laboratories of the crisis of the
post-colonial order built by France in West Africa. Behind the rhetoric
of the "fight against terrorism," democratic stabilization, and
humanitarian interventions, a clash between powers is unfolding for the
strategic control of the Sahel, its resources, and its trade routes. To
understand the current situation, it is necessary to begin with the long
historical continuity between French colonialism and neocolonialism.
Mali's formal independence in 1960 did not, in fact, bring true economic
and political emancipation. As in much of French-speaking West Africa,
Paris has retained decisive instruments of control through the so-called
"Françafrique" system: military agreements, monetary dependence through
the CFA franc, support for local elites loyal to French interests, and
control of key strategic economic sectors.
The Sahel occupies a central position for several reasons. It is a key
transit zone between sub-Saharan Africa and the Mediterranean, rich in
mineral resources-gold, uranium, lithium-and traversed by important
trade and energy corridors. France, while presenting its military
presence as a security mission, has historically acted to preserve its
economic and geopolitical influence in the region, amid growing
international competition.
The crisis that has erupted over the past fifteen years cannot be
separated from the 2011 NATO war against Libya. The fall of Gaddafi's
regime destabilized the entire Sahel: thousands of armed fighters
returned to neighboring countries, huge quantities of weapons crossed
borders, and jihadist groups took advantage of the regional collapse to
strengthen themselves. In this context, Mali has gradually descended
into a state of permanent war, marked by armed conflicts, coups, and
growing territorial fragmentation.
The 2013 French intervention, Operation Serval, later transformed into
Operation Barkhane, was presented as necessary to halt the jihadist
advance. However, after years of military presence, the outcome was a
failure: insecurity spread across much of the Sahel, violence against
civilians increased, and the French presence became increasingly
unpopular. In large parts of the region, France is perceived not as a
liberating force but as a neocolonial power intent on maintaining its
dominance.
This progressive weakening of French hegemony has opened up new
opportunities for other powers, particularly Russia. The military juntas
that have come to power in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have gradually
severed relations with Paris, seeking political and military support
from Moscow. The arrival of the mercenaries of the Africa Corps
(formerly Wagner)-now reorganized under the direct control of the
Russian state-has often been welcomed by some in the population as an
alternative to the French presence.
However, interpreting this dynamic as a process of "anti-imperialist
liberation" risks being profoundly misleading. Russia is not acting in
the Sahel to support the self-determination of African peoples, but to
consolidate its geopolitical influence, gain access to mineral
resources, and enter the global competition against Western powers. The
actors may be changing, but the underlying logic remains one of economic
subordination, militarization, and dependence.
Mali thus becomes the terrain of a false alternative between competing
imperialisms: on one side, the Western bloc led by France, the European
Union, and the United States; On the other hand, growing Russian
penetration, coupled with China's economic presence and the activism of
other regional powers. In no case are the interests of local populations
the priority. The popular classes of the Sahel are crushed between war,
poverty, economic exploitation, and political repression.
Permanent war also serves a specific political function. Security
rhetoric allows local governments and foreign powers to justify the
militarization of society, the suspension of political rights, the
strengthening of repressive apparatuses, and the control of strategic
territories. "Terrorism" thus becomes not only a real threat, but also a
tool used to consolidate new balances of power and regulate social conflict.
Azawad, jihadism, and the fragmentation of the conflict.
To understand the Malian crisis, it is also necessary to analyze the
role of the political-military forces operating in the north of the
country, where autonomist claims, ethnic conflicts, control of trade
routes, and jihadist presence are intertwined. The situation in Azawad
represents one of the central elements of the destabilization of
contemporary Mali.
The term Azawad refers to the vast desert region of northern Mali,
inhabited primarily by Tuareg, Arab, and other nomadic and semi-nomadic
communities historically marginalized by the central government in
Bamako. Since Mali's independence, relations between the central
government and the northern populations have been marked by tensions,
military repression, and profound economic and infrastructural inequalities.
The Tuareg uprisings, therefore, did not arise out of nowhere, nor can
they be reduced simply to separatist phenomena. They also reflect a long
history of political exclusion, impoverishment, and territorial
marginalization. In this context, in 2011-2012, following the NATO war
in Libya and the return to the Sahel of numerous Tuareg fighters
previously enlisted in the Libyan army, the National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) gained strength, launching a new armed
offensive against the Malian state, demanding Azawad's independence.
The MNLA's rapid advance in northern Mali, however, is part of an
extremely complex framework, marked by the simultaneous growth of armed
jihadist groups such as Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), and subsequently JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), an
Al-Qaeda-affiliated organization formed in 2017 from the unification of
several jihadist groups operating in the Sahel.
Initially, the MNLA and jihadist groups temporarily shared some military
objectives against the Malian state. However, profound political and
strategic differences quickly emerged. While the MNLA presented itself
as a Tuareg nationalist movement with territorial and autonomist goals,
the jihadist groups pursued a transnational politico-religious project
based on the expansion of their armed influence and the imposition of an
Islamist order.
Throughout 2012, jihadist groups gradually succeeded in militarily
marginalizing the MNLA, taking control of major cities in the north such
as Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. It was precisely this jihadist advance
toward the south of the country that provided France with the pretext
for its 2013 military intervention, Operation Serval.
However, the Western narrative that reduces the conflict to a clash
between "terrorism" and "democratic stability" profoundly simplifies the
reality. Jihadism in the Sahel cannot be explained solely through
religious or ideological factors. The growth of JNIM and other armed
organizations is also fueled by social crisis, the lack of public
services, state corruption, military violence, and community tensions
over access to land and resources.
In many rural areas of central and northern Mali, jihadist groups manage
to gain a foothold by exploiting the vacuum left by the state, sometimes
presenting themselves as a force capable of ensuring order, arbitrating
local conflicts, or protecting against abuses by government forces and
allied militias. This does not mean ignoring the profoundly
authoritarian and repressive nature of these organizations, but rather
understanding the material and political conditions that favor their
expansion.
At the same time, ongoing war and the militarization of the territory
tend to produce new social fragmentations. Operations by the Malian
army, French forces, and Russian mercenaries have often been accompanied
by massacres, arbitrary arrests, and violence against the civilian
population, contributing to further distrust of the central state and
new dynamics of radicalization.
The Tuareg question also remains unresolved. Peace agreements signed in
recent years have failed to address the structural causes of the
conflict: underdevelopment in the North, political exclusion, control of
resources, and territorial autonomy. The very redefinition of
imperialist balances in the Sahel risks further exacerbating these
tensions, transforming Northern Mali into a space of permanent armed
competition between state armies, jihadist groups, local militias, and
foreign powers.
From an anti-imperialist and anarchist communist perspective, it is
essential to avoid both the indiscriminate criminalization of the
populations of the North and any idealization of the armed forces
present in the conflict. Neither the nationalist projects of local
elites nor jihadism offer a prospect of social emancipation for the
exploited classes of the Sahel. Rather, the Azawad crisis reflects the
disintegration produced by decades of colonialism, neocolonialism,
militarization, and economic devastation.
Self-determination and social conflict
One of the elements most removed from the dominant narrative on Mali and
the Sahel is the existence of a profound social issue, which precedes
and runs through the very military dimension of the conflict. Reducing
the crisis solely to the presence of jihadists or to geopolitical
competition between powers prevents us from understanding the material
conditions fueling instability, rebellions, and social tensions.
Structural poverty, rising food prices, youth unemployment,
privatization, international debt, and the devastation of rural
economies are the foundations of the Sahel crisis. Mali is one of the
poorest countries in the world despite its enormous mineral wealth.
Gold, lithium, and other strategic resources continue to be extracted
primarily for the benefit of foreign multinationals and local elites,
while much of the population lives in extremely precarious conditions.
In this context, popular and social movements have played a central
role, though often overshadowed by the centrality attributed to the
military dimension. In recent years, Mali has been rocked by protests
against corruption, the high cost of living, the foreign military
presence, and the state's inability to guarantee basic living standards.
The mobilizations that preceded the overthrow of President Ibrahim
Boubacar Keita in 2020 cannot be interpreted solely as the result of
military maneuvers: they also expressed strong social anger that had
accumulated over time.
Alongside urban protests, there is a long tradition of trade union and
peasant organizing. Malian unions, despite repression and internal
divisions, have repeatedly called for strikes against austerity
policies, wage delays, and privatizations imposed by international
financial institutions. Likewise, conflicts over access to land, water,
and natural resources are escalating in the countryside, exacerbated by
the effects of the climate crisis and the growing pressure from mining
and agro-industrial multinationals.
The militarization of the Sahel, however, tends to stifle these social
dynamics. In a situation dominated by permanent emergency, every form of
conflict is reduced to the issue of security. Social demands are
subordinated to military priorities, while governments and foreign
powers use the fight against terrorism to strengthen repressive
apparatuses and limit spaces for dissent.
This process has a dual effect. On the one hand, it fuels consensus for
military juntas, which present themselves as forces breaking with the
old elites compromised by French neocolonialism. On the other, it risks
erasing any prospect of autonomous social transformation, reducing the
Sahel crisis to a simple redefinition of the geopolitical balance
between states and imperialist blocs.
The self-determination of the Sahel's peoples, however, cannot coincide
with the simple shift of influence from one power to another. The
replacement of the French with a Russian presence does not automatically
alter the material conditions of the popular classes, nor does it put an
end to the extractive and authoritarian logics that characterize the
regional economic system.
The central issue, therefore, remains the ability of local populations
to build autonomous paths of social and political organization,
independent of both Western interests and the new emerging powers. This
means putting social needs, access to resources, wealth redistribution,
land rights, and the possibility of escaping permanent militarization
back at the center.
In this context, social conflict is a crucial element. Behind the war
and the rhetoric of security, concrete struggles continue to erupt
against exploitation, the plundering of resources, and the inequalities
produced by global capitalism. Ignoring this dimension means accepting
the imperialist powers' view that the Sahel is merely a space to be
militarily controlled, not a territory inhabited by people demanding
dignity, social justice, and self-determination.
Conclusions
The crisis in Mali and the Sahel clearly demonstrates how contemporary
capitalism continues to produce war, exploitation, and domination
through old and new forms of imperialism. Behind the rhetoric of
security, the fight against terrorism, or international cooperation, lie
economic interests, geopolitical strategies, and processes of social
control that primarily affect the working classes.
From an anarchist-communist perspective, there is no emancipatory
perspective within the competition between imperialist powers. Neither
the West nor the new emerging powers represent an alternative for the
peoples of the Sahel. Replacing French influence with Russian or Chinese
influence does not challenge relations of exploitation, the
militarization of territories, and the subordination of local
communities to the interests of states and capital.
The only truly liberating prospect can arise from the self-organization
of the exploited classes, from social, labor, and peasant struggles, and
from the construction of paths to self-determination independent of any
imperialist bloc. Against militarism, nationalism, and all state
domination, the response can only be internationalist: solidarity among
peoples, collective management of resources, social justice, and the
construction of grassroots forms of organization capable of breaking
with the logic of global capitalism.
In this sense, Mali represents not only a regional crisis, but one of
the fronts of the broader crisis of the contemporary world order. And it
is precisely within this crisis that the need for a revolutionary
alternative based on social equality, self-management, and the abolition
of all forms of exploitation and oppression becomes central.
Sources:
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/africa-francafrique-davvero-al-capolinea-124075
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/lalleanza-degli-stati-del-sahel-tra-tensioni-politiche-e-ricomposizioni-223039
https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/neil-munshi/2021/09/17/gheddafi-morte-sahel
https://www.retedeicomunisti.net/2023/01/15/da-serval-a-barkhane-dieci-anni-di-intervento-militare-la-storia-di-una-sconfitta/
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/linfluenza-russa-nella-fascia-del-sahel-190234
https://thesentry.org/reports/doubling-down-russia-west-africa/
https://www.africanews.it/tuareg/
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/mali-alleanza-inedita-jihadisti-indipendentisti-spallata-a-bamako-236525
https://www.nigrizia.it/notizia/attacchi-terroristi-mali-protettorato-russo-sahel
https://www.nigrizia.it/notizia/mali-risorse-nella-morsa-jnim-terrorismo-miniere-litio-carburante-sahel-goita
https://www.goafrica.it/economia-e-politica-in-mali/
https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/mali#tab-economy
https://www.collettiva.it/copertine/internazionale/la-cgil-al-fianco-dei-sindacati-africani-xdbmkotu
https://www.internazionale.it/reportage/andrea-de-georgio/2018/02/01/mali-giovani-diritti
https://alternativalibertaria.org/
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