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(en) Italy, FDCA, Cantiere #47 - Mali: The Sahel Crisis and Transformations of Imperialism - Lino Roveredo (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Date Sun, 15 Nov 2026 08:11:08 +0200


Mali today represents one of the main laboratories of the crisis of the post-colonial order built by France in West Africa. Behind the rhetoric of the "fight against terrorism," democratic stabilization, and humanitarian interventions, a clash between powers is unfolding for the strategic control of the Sahel, its resources, and its trade routes. To understand the current situation, it is necessary to begin with the long historical continuity between French colonialism and neocolonialism. Mali's formal independence in 1960 did not, in fact, bring true economic and political emancipation. As in much of French-speaking West Africa, Paris has retained decisive instruments of control through the so-called "Françafrique" system: military agreements, monetary dependence through the CFA franc, support for local elites loyal to French interests, and control of key strategic economic sectors.
The Sahel occupies a central position for several reasons. It is a key transit zone between sub-Saharan Africa and the Mediterranean, rich in mineral resources-gold, uranium, lithium-and traversed by important trade and energy corridors. France, while presenting its military presence as a security mission, has historically acted to preserve its economic and geopolitical influence in the region, amid growing international competition.
The crisis that has erupted over the past fifteen years cannot be separated from the 2011 NATO war against Libya. The fall of Gaddafi's regime destabilized the entire Sahel: thousands of armed fighters returned to neighboring countries, huge quantities of weapons crossed borders, and jihadist groups took advantage of the regional collapse to strengthen themselves. In this context, Mali has gradually descended into a state of permanent war, marked by armed conflicts, coups, and growing territorial fragmentation.
The 2013 French intervention, Operation Serval, later transformed into Operation Barkhane, was presented as necessary to halt the jihadist advance. However, after years of military presence, the outcome was a failure: insecurity spread across much of the Sahel, violence against civilians increased, and the French presence became increasingly unpopular. In large parts of the region, France is perceived not as a liberating force but as a neocolonial power intent on maintaining its dominance.
This progressive weakening of French hegemony has opened up new opportunities for other powers, particularly Russia. The military juntas that have come to power in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have gradually severed relations with Paris, seeking political and military support from Moscow. The arrival of the mercenaries of the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner)-now reorganized under the direct control of the Russian state-has often been welcomed by some in the population as an alternative to the French presence.
However, interpreting this dynamic as a process of "anti-imperialist liberation" risks being profoundly misleading. Russia is not acting in the Sahel to support the self-determination of African peoples, but to consolidate its geopolitical influence, gain access to mineral resources, and enter the global competition against Western powers. The actors may be changing, but the underlying logic remains one of economic subordination, militarization, and dependence.
Mali thus becomes the terrain of a false alternative between competing imperialisms: on one side, the Western bloc led by France, the European Union, and the United States; On the other hand, growing Russian penetration, coupled with China's economic presence and the activism of other regional powers. In no case are the interests of local populations the priority. The popular classes of the Sahel are crushed between war, poverty, economic exploitation, and political repression.
Permanent war also serves a specific political function. Security rhetoric allows local governments and foreign powers to justify the militarization of society, the suspension of political rights, the strengthening of repressive apparatuses, and the control of strategic territories. "Terrorism" thus becomes not only a real threat, but also a tool used to consolidate new balances of power and regulate social conflict.

Azawad, jihadism, and the fragmentation of the conflict.

To understand the Malian crisis, it is also necessary to analyze the role of the political-military forces operating in the north of the country, where autonomist claims, ethnic conflicts, control of trade routes, and jihadist presence are intertwined. The situation in Azawad represents one of the central elements of the destabilization of contemporary Mali.
The term Azawad refers to the vast desert region of northern Mali, inhabited primarily by Tuareg, Arab, and other nomadic and semi-nomadic communities historically marginalized by the central government in Bamako. Since Mali's independence, relations between the central government and the northern populations have been marked by tensions, military repression, and profound economic and infrastructural inequalities.
The Tuareg uprisings, therefore, did not arise out of nowhere, nor can they be reduced simply to separatist phenomena. They also reflect a long history of political exclusion, impoverishment, and territorial marginalization. In this context, in 2011-2012, following the NATO war in Libya and the return to the Sahel of numerous Tuareg fighters previously enlisted in the Libyan army, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) gained strength, launching a new armed offensive against the Malian state, demanding Azawad's independence.
The MNLA's rapid advance in northern Mali, however, is part of an extremely complex framework, marked by the simultaneous growth of armed jihadist groups such as Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and subsequently JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), an Al-Qaeda-affiliated organization formed in 2017 from the unification of several jihadist groups operating in the Sahel.
Initially, the MNLA and jihadist groups temporarily shared some military objectives against the Malian state. However, profound political and strategic differences quickly emerged. While the MNLA presented itself as a Tuareg nationalist movement with territorial and autonomist goals, the jihadist groups pursued a transnational politico-religious project based on the expansion of their armed influence and the imposition of an Islamist order.
Throughout 2012, jihadist groups gradually succeeded in militarily marginalizing the MNLA, taking control of major cities in the north such as Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. It was precisely this jihadist advance toward the south of the country that provided France with the pretext for its 2013 military intervention, Operation Serval.
However, the Western narrative that reduces the conflict to a clash between "terrorism" and "democratic stability" profoundly simplifies the reality. Jihadism in the Sahel cannot be explained solely through religious or ideological factors. The growth of JNIM and other armed organizations is also fueled by social crisis, the lack of public services, state corruption, military violence, and community tensions over access to land and resources.
In many rural areas of central and northern Mali, jihadist groups manage to gain a foothold by exploiting the vacuum left by the state, sometimes presenting themselves as a force capable of ensuring order, arbitrating local conflicts, or protecting against abuses by government forces and allied militias. This does not mean ignoring the profoundly authoritarian and repressive nature of these organizations, but rather understanding the material and political conditions that favor their expansion.
At the same time, ongoing war and the militarization of the territory tend to produce new social fragmentations. Operations by the Malian army, French forces, and Russian mercenaries have often been accompanied by massacres, arbitrary arrests, and violence against the civilian population, contributing to further distrust of the central state and new dynamics of radicalization.
The Tuareg question also remains unresolved. Peace agreements signed in recent years have failed to address the structural causes of the conflict: underdevelopment in the North, political exclusion, control of resources, and territorial autonomy. The very redefinition of imperialist balances in the Sahel risks further exacerbating these tensions, transforming Northern Mali into a space of permanent armed competition between state armies, jihadist groups, local militias, and foreign powers.
From an anti-imperialist and anarchist communist perspective, it is essential to avoid both the indiscriminate criminalization of the populations of the North and any idealization of the armed forces present in the conflict. Neither the nationalist projects of local elites nor jihadism offer a prospect of social emancipation for the exploited classes of the Sahel. Rather, the Azawad crisis reflects the disintegration produced by decades of colonialism, neocolonialism, militarization, and economic devastation.

Self-determination and social conflict

One of the elements most removed from the dominant narrative on Mali and the Sahel is the existence of a profound social issue, which precedes and runs through the very military dimension of the conflict. Reducing the crisis solely to the presence of jihadists or to geopolitical competition between powers prevents us from understanding the material conditions fueling instability, rebellions, and social tensions.
Structural poverty, rising food prices, youth unemployment, privatization, international debt, and the devastation of rural economies are the foundations of the Sahel crisis. Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world despite its enormous mineral wealth. Gold, lithium, and other strategic resources continue to be extracted primarily for the benefit of foreign multinationals and local elites, while much of the population lives in extremely precarious conditions.
In this context, popular and social movements have played a central role, though often overshadowed by the centrality attributed to the military dimension. In recent years, Mali has been rocked by protests against corruption, the high cost of living, the foreign military presence, and the state's inability to guarantee basic living standards. The mobilizations that preceded the overthrow of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in 2020 cannot be interpreted solely as the result of military maneuvers: they also expressed strong social anger that had accumulated over time.
Alongside urban protests, there is a long tradition of trade union and peasant organizing. Malian unions, despite repression and internal divisions, have repeatedly called for strikes against austerity policies, wage delays, and privatizations imposed by international financial institutions. Likewise, conflicts over access to land, water, and natural resources are escalating in the countryside, exacerbated by the effects of the climate crisis and the growing pressure from mining and agro-industrial multinationals.
The militarization of the Sahel, however, tends to stifle these social dynamics. In a situation dominated by permanent emergency, every form of conflict is reduced to the issue of security. Social demands are subordinated to military priorities, while governments and foreign powers use the fight against terrorism to strengthen repressive apparatuses and limit spaces for dissent.
This process has a dual effect. On the one hand, it fuels consensus for military juntas, which present themselves as forces breaking with the old elites compromised by French neocolonialism. On the other, it risks erasing any prospect of autonomous social transformation, reducing the Sahel crisis to a simple redefinition of the geopolitical balance between states and imperialist blocs.
The self-determination of the Sahel's peoples, however, cannot coincide with the simple shift of influence from one power to another. The replacement of the French with a Russian presence does not automatically alter the material conditions of the popular classes, nor does it put an end to the extractive and authoritarian logics that characterize the regional economic system.
The central issue, therefore, remains the ability of local populations to build autonomous paths of social and political organization, independent of both Western interests and the new emerging powers. This means putting social needs, access to resources, wealth redistribution, land rights, and the possibility of escaping permanent militarization back at the center.
In this context, social conflict is a crucial element. Behind the war and the rhetoric of security, concrete struggles continue to erupt against exploitation, the plundering of resources, and the inequalities produced by global capitalism. Ignoring this dimension means accepting the imperialist powers' view that the Sahel is merely a space to be militarily controlled, not a territory inhabited by people demanding dignity, social justice, and self-determination.

Conclusions

The crisis in Mali and the Sahel clearly demonstrates how contemporary capitalism continues to produce war, exploitation, and domination through old and new forms of imperialism. Behind the rhetoric of security, the fight against terrorism, or international cooperation, lie economic interests, geopolitical strategies, and processes of social control that primarily affect the working classes.
From an anarchist-communist perspective, there is no emancipatory perspective within the competition between imperialist powers. Neither the West nor the new emerging powers represent an alternative for the peoples of the Sahel. Replacing French influence with Russian or Chinese influence does not challenge relations of exploitation, the militarization of territories, and the subordination of local communities to the interests of states and capital.
The only truly liberating prospect can arise from the self-organization of the exploited classes, from social, labor, and peasant struggles, and from the construction of paths to self-determination independent of any imperialist bloc. Against militarism, nationalism, and all state domination, the response can only be internationalist: solidarity among peoples, collective management of resources, social justice, and the construction of grassroots forms of organization capable of breaking with the logic of global capitalism.
In this sense, Mali represents not only a regional crisis, but one of the fronts of the broader crisis of the contemporary world order. And it is precisely within this crisis that the need for a revolutionary alternative based on social equality, self-management, and the abolition of all forms of exploitation and oppression becomes central.

Sources:
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/africa-francafrique-davvero-al-capolinea-124075
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/lalleanza-degli-stati-del-sahel-tra-tensioni-politiche-e-ricomposizioni-223039
https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/neil-munshi/2021/09/17/gheddafi-morte-sahel
https://www.retedeicomunisti.net/2023/01/15/da-serval-a-barkhane-dieci-anni-di-intervento-militare-la-storia-di-una-sconfitta/
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/linfluenza-russa-nella-fascia-del-sahel-190234
https://thesentry.org/reports/doubling-down-russia-west-africa/
https://www.africanews.it/tuareg/
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/mali-alleanza-inedita-jihadisti-indipendentisti-spallata-a-bamako-236525
https://www.nigrizia.it/notizia/attacchi-terroristi-mali-protettorato-russo-sahel
https://www.nigrizia.it/notizia/mali-risorse-nella-morsa-jnim-terrorismo-miniere-litio-carburante-sahel-goita
https://www.goafrica.it/economia-e-politica-in-mali/
https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/mali#tab-economy
https://www.collettiva.it/copertine/internazionale/la-cgil-al-fianco-dei-sindacati-africani-xdbmkotu
https://www.internazionale.it/reportage/andrea-de-georgio/2018/02/01/mali-giovani-diritti

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