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(en) Italy, FDCA, Cantiere #47 - On the situation in Rojava and Syria - Internationalist Commune of Rojava* (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Date Fri, 13 Nov 2026 08:23:47 +0200


Since the signing of the January 29, 2026, agreement between the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the jihadist Syrian Transitional Government, Syria and Rojava have been undergoing profound political, military, and social changes. Misleading media reports, combined with the rapid pace of events, have created confusion in international understanding of the situation. In this document, we outline the fundamental changes currently underway and their consequences.

What does the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army mean?

Reports have circulated in the media claiming the SDF has been disbanded. However, in an official SDF statement on August 20, 2026, SDF Commander Mazlum Abdi draws a subtle but significant distinction: rather than speaking of dissolution, Abdi describes the process as the SDF's integration into the Syrian Army. What does this mean? The fighters who were formerly part of the SDF and who organized themselves into local units will continue to serve as the local defense force for the Kurdish regions of Syria. So far, the integration includes four different divisions: Heseke, Qamishlo, Derik, and Kobane. From now on, these divisions no longer constitute an independent military force, unlike the SDF's previous status. More broadly, they are linked to the Syrian Army. However, the local commanders are all former SDF commanders and retain the initiative on the ground. This means that the Kurdish and Arab fighters in these divisions can continue their own organization and the defense of their cities as before. The extent to which their ties to the Syrian army will impact local structures will depend primarily on our political and social strength. What the Syrian army has so far refused to accept is the integration of the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), formerly part of the SDF.

Naturally, this integration reduces the initiative and mobility that the SDF previously enjoyed. On the other hand, it opens up the possibility of exerting significant influence over the Syrian army. In recent weeks, several radical Islamist commanders in the Syrian army have already been relieved of their duties. The influence of the new Deputy Minister of Defense for Eastern Syria, SDF commander Sipan Hemo, cannot be denied.

The military situation in Syria is generally extremely unstable. Even the Syrian army lacks real control over all areas of the country and its population. Syrian society is multiethnic and educated. An army like the HTS, supported by America and composed largely of foreign jihadists, which in just one year has carried out devastating massacres against Druze, Alevis, and Kurds across the country, will never earn the population's trust. Therefore, it should never be forgotten that Syria is still in a period of transformation. The stronger the political and organizational power of democratic and socialist forces, the greater the likelihood of transforming the military situation in the country.

What will happen to the YPJ?

For over a year, the integration of the SDF as an autonomous division into the Syrian Army has been on the agenda of negotiations with Damascus. From the outset, the Syrian transitional government has attempted to exclude the female YPJ units from these discussions. The transitional government immediately attempted to ensure that YPJ members would only be integrated individually into the local security forces of the Kurdish-majority regions, the so-called Asayish. In response, the "We Are All YPJ" campaign was launched with the support of women from around the world. During several diplomatic meetings with the transitional government, the need to ensure the continued existence of the YPJ was repeatedly reiterated.

In a press conference on August 4, 2026, YPJ Commander Ruken Cemal stated that the YPJ would be ready to integrate as an "autonomous counter-terrorism unit within the Ministry of the Interior." This would mean that the YPJ units would remain intact, although they would not become part of the Syrian Army. The Ministry of the Interior in Heseke is led by former SDF commander Siamend Afrin and former YPJ commander Nesrin Abdullah. As a counter-terrorism unit, the YPJ would therefore retain a certain degree of independence and initiative.

A disadvantage of this proposal would be the inability to actively participate in higher-level military units and the fact that only individual women would be able to join the autonomous Syrian Army divisions in the Kurdish regions. The advantage would be that, by organizing themselves as a local counterterrorism unit within the Ministry of the Interior, the YPJ would enjoy greater autonomy from the Syrian Army and, as a local security force, would remain closer to society and women. However, it is unclear whether this proposal will be accepted. The results of the most recent meeting between YPJ commander Newroz Ehmed and President Ahmed Shaara, which took place on August 25, have not yet been made public.

Kurdish language: accepted or banned?

The second issue that has given rise to repeated discussions during the implementation of the January 29 agreement concerns the Kurdish language. For 15 years, Kurdish children have been educated in their native language from primary school to university. This is a cultural revolution in itself and one of the greatest achievements of the Rojava Revolution.

However, in the name of "country unification," the Syrian transitional government is placing obstacles to Kurdish-language education. Turkey plays a key role in this, exerting immense political influence over Syria. Turkey is actively preventing Kurdish from being recognized as the primary language of instruction in the Kurdish regions, as this would have enormous repercussions on the struggle for the Kurdish language in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan.

Following lengthy discussions between representatives of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the Syrian transitional government, an agreement was signed on August 27. Kurdish was recognized as the official language of instruction. In the future, Kurdish language classes will be offered three hours per week and one hour of cultural education in the Kurdish regions. For a transitional year, starting in the next fall school year, social sciences, history, geography, and philosophy will also be taught in Kurdish. Although representatives of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria insisted during the discussions that Kurdish be recognized as the primary language of instruction, the transitional government applied enormous pressure, and the agreement for four hours per week of instruction in Kurdish was ultimately accepted.

However, dozens of civil organizations-including the women's organization KongraStar, Rojava University, as well as schools and teachers' unions-have called protests. The goal is to exert civil pressure during the transition year to expand the right to Kurdish-language instruction in schools. The long-term goal is also to guarantee the right to Kurdish-language schools before the new Syrian constitution is adopted.

The critical situation in Heseke

Heseke is a multiethnic city on the edge of Rojava. The Arab population in Heseke outnumbers the Kurdish population. Since the end of the war, the Syrian transitional government has been trying to gain significant influence in Heseke, particularly to gain favor with Arab society. A psychological warfare ("special warfare") is underway to manipulate the population.

This was evident, for example, when the displaced population of Serekaniye was attacked by jihadist militias upon returning to their hometown, sparking protests across Rojava. Although these were civil protests, the situation escalated in several towns, including Heseke. The municipality of Heseke, still administered by the local population, was attacked by groups of youths. It was publicly claimed that the provocateurs belonged to the "Revolutionary Youth," linked to the Kurdish Freedom Movement. However, investigations revealed that the attacks were carried out by supporters of the Kurdish nationalist party KDP from Southern Kurdistan. Rather than fighting for Kurdish rights, their main strategy is to spread propaganda against the Kurdish Freedom Movement and the integration process, with the aim of taking control of the region. The KDP supports Israel's plan to establish a small, Israeli-controlled Kurdish state in Syria. This imperialist project, coupled with the division caused by the KDP through its policies, is causing immense damage to the process.

Following these provocations, the Syrian transitional government accused the local security forces in Heseke of being unable to control the city. Using this pretext, the transitional government is now positioning its own security forces in Heseke. As a result, the transitional government's security forces have been repeatedly moving into the Heseke area, recently involving a contingent of 600 troops.

This is just one example among many of the subtle psychological warfare tactics used to weaken the Kurdish Freedom Movement. Whenever objections are raised, the transitional government threatens to resume the war. Such a situation would be difficult for Rojava society to tolerate after the massacres and hostage-takings that occurred earlier this year. In order to guarantee long-term cultural and political freedoms, and with them the foundations of self-defense, every effort is being made to prevent the war from continuing. The only way to counter the transitional government's provocations is massive social resistance based on the population's self-organization.

Democratic integration: what does it mean?

After the imperialist forces began the genocide in Gaza on October 7, 2023, Reber Apo (Abdullah Öcalan) foresaw the grave danger that a similar war of annihilation was taking place against other oppressed peoples in the Middle East. To prevent a "Gaza-fication" of Kurdistan, he proclaimed the phase of Peace and Democratic Society, with the strategy of democratic integration.

In this context, integration does not mean assimilation, but rather the struggle to expand social self-organization on the political and legal levels. From Rêber Apo's perspective, three pillars must be pursued: Democratic Society, Democratic Politics, and Democratic Integration. The fundamental pillar of this strategy is the democratic organization of society outside the state. According to Rêber Apo, integration within the state constitutes only 10% of the strategy. The remaining 90% must focus on organizing society to prevent dependence on the state and avoid slipping into a wait-and-see position. At the same time, this strategy represents an attempt to overcome the ongoing conflict with the state and exert an active influence on state policy.

Generally speaking, however, what is currently happening in Syria is not yet democratic integration. Within the Kurdish movement, there is strong criticism of the transitional government's aggressive policies. It is clear, however, that the situation cannot be resolved on a military level alone. To prevent further massacres against society, an active transformation of the state is essential.

Mazlum Abdi has now become an advisor to Ahmed Shaara, and Ilham Ahmed will take up a post in the Syrian parliament's diplomatic service. This doesn't mean, of course, that the transitional government will accept the Kurds as a political entity. But it does open up the possibility of exerting significant influence over Syria as a whole in the long term.

From now on, diplomatic ties with the Alevis of the coast, the Druze of southern Syria, women's organizations, and the democratic forces of Syria will be strengthened. This represents a great opportunity that has opened up following integration. If all democratic forces in Syria organize and unite, radical jihadist groups will lose their influence. This is not a utopia: the struggle to achieve this goal is a necessity. Until the new Syrian constitution is adopted, the goal is to strengthen the influence of democratic forces within the structures of the transitional government to make the constitution as democratic as possible.

The role of internationalism

It's understandable that there are many doubts and confusions. A great deal of misinformation and misinterpretations circulate online, claiming the Rojava Revolution is over. Criticism of the decisions made is understandable. The Kurdish movement itself is dissatisfied with many of the decisions made. However, after the war, the political bargaining power of democratic forces in Syria has weakened. Therefore, concessions are currently being made to protect society from the continuation of the massacres.

Furthermore, the movement is embarking on a phase of analysis and self-criticism to further strengthen democratic activity and society's self-defense in the future.

However, this does not mean that the revolution or the goal of a democratic-socialist Rojava and Syria have been abandoned. Especially at this stage, it is more important than ever to stand by the people of Rojava and defend the revolution's gains together. The revolution in Rojava has been internationalist from the very beginning and will only continue to exist if it remains connected to democratic and socialist struggles around the world.

This is not the time to retreat, but to believe even more firmly in our shared principles and to support the people of Rojava. As Rêber Apo says: the fight for genuine peace is more difficult than any military confrontation.

From Chiapas to Palestine to Kurdistan - together for peace and self-determination!

* The Internationalist Commune of Rojava is a self-governing collective and ideological center founded in early 2017 in northeastern Syria (Rojava). The organization was born with the aim of welcoming, training, and integrating internationalist youth and activists from around the world into the Rojava Revolution .
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amministrazione_Autonoma_Democratica_della_Siria_del_Nord-Est

https://alternativalibertaria.org/
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