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(en) France, OCL CA #363 - News from war and revolution in Myanmar (Burma): an interview with a comrade from the "Antifascist internationalist front" (AIF) (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]
Date
Tue, 10 Nov 2026 07:52:17 +0200
Preliminary Insights on Burma (or the Union of Myanmar): ---- To
comprehend the current situation in Myanmar, it is essential to examine
both the legacy of military dictatorship, the history of local social
and ethnic struggles, and the various failed attempts at
democratization. ---- Following a period of Japanese occupation during
World War II and gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1948,
Myanmar-a country with a rugged terrain that was never fully controlled
by the British-witnessed clashes between the central government and
armed ethnic movements (such as the Karen, Kachin, Shan, etc.) as well
as the communist guerrilla forces of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP).
The military, inheriting the colonial armed forces, positioned itself as
the guarantor of a fantasized national unity, given the country's ethnic
and cultural mosaic.
In 1962, General Ne Win seized power through a coup d'état and
established a military regime. The armed forces, renamed the Tatmadaw,
became the central institution of the state, controlling the economy and
administration while repression was unleashed against the opposition.
Myanmar remained internationally isolated for decades, subjected to
economic sanctions, as its population descended into poverty. This
situation persisted, with a quarter of the population still living below
the poverty line today.
In August 1988, a massive uprising erupted, known as the "8888
Uprising": millions of students, workers, and Buddhist monks took to the
streets to demand democratization. The repression was brutal.
In response to the regime, a segment of the Burmese opposition took up
arms or intensified preexisting armed struggles. Notable examples
include the Karen National Liberation Army, the Burmese Communist Party
(BCP), and the Democratic Front of Burmese Students, founded in 1988 by
student activists, which became one of the principal resistance groups.
In 1990, the junta organized elections, which were won by the National
League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi. The junta annulled
the results, maintained its grip on power, and placed Aung San Suu Kyi
under house arrest for 15 years. This failure further entrenched armed
resistance as the sole viable alternative.
In 2008, the military regime initiated political reforms and adopted a
new Constitution, which preserved the military's dominant role (it
controls 25% of parliamentary seats and retains key ministries such as
Defense and Home Affairs). Despite another electoral victory in 2015,
the NLD's power remained severely constrained.
Often framed by Western blocs as a period of "democratic transition"-in
reality, a strategy by the military to liberalize the economy-the
outcomes proved highly mixed:
* Ethnic conflicts persisted (ongoing wars against the Karen, Kachin,
Rohingya, etc.);
* Capitalist exploitation intensified: workers' rights were violated;
unions, though nominally permitted, were repressed by the NLD; wages
remained extremely low despite the short-lived establishment of a
minimum wage; foreign investments were captured by military elites,
who-competing with ethnic minorities for decades-controlled the
extraction of gas, precious stones, and natural resources;
* In 2017, the military launched a campaign of ethnic cleansing against
the Rohingya Muslim minority, forcing 700,000 people to flee to
Bangladesh, with Aung San Suu Kyi remaining largely silent.
However, following the November 2020 elections, which delivered a
landslide victory to the NLD, some generals feared constitutional
reform, prompting them to orchestrate the February 1, 2021 coup. This
putsch triggered the "Spring Revolution", a mass uprising characterized
by widespread protests and the prominent involvement of a youth
generation raised in the internet era.
From the outset, the junta crushed dissent with extreme violence: 1,500
deaths, 12,000 arrests, torture, sexual violence, and extrajudicial
executions were documented.
In response to this brutality, a segment of the population-much like in
1988-turned toward armed resistance:
* The formation of the People's Defense Forces (PDF), civilian militias
often composed of union members and student activists;
* Ethnic armed groups temporarily allied with the PDF, launching
"Operation 1027" in 2023 and seizing control of dozens of towns.
The resistance also took an organized labor dimension: the 2021 mass
strikes (textile workers, teachers, miners) succeeded in paralyzing the
economy, while labor solidarity provided financial support to various
armed groups. The junta banned 16 unions and arrested leaders, driving
activists into clandestinity or exile. The struggle initiated by workers
during the decade of liberalization thus continues today in new forms.
It would therefore be reductive to interpret the conflict solely through
an ethnic or identity-based lens.
Myanmar is currently divided into three zones:
1. Territories controlled by the junta: primarily major cities
(Naypyidaw, Mandalay, Yangon) and key road networks;
2. Areas held by ethnic armed groups (Karen, Kachin, Shan, Arakan, etc.);
3. Territories liberated by the people's resistance (PDF and allies),
where alternative local governments are attempting to organize.
To maintain its power, the military employs total war tactics: aerial
bombardments of rebel zones, economic blockades (internet blackouts,
food restrictions, resource plundering), and forced conscription (the
2024 law mandating the enlistment of young men has triggered a mass
exodus of refugees into Thailand).
To shed further light on the situation and to consider the revolution
and international solidarity within the context of Myanmar's civil war,
we present an interview with a (former) member of the Antifascist
International Front (AIF), a local internationalist political
organization, to whom we extend our deepest gratitude.
Courant Alternatif: Could you briefly introduce yourself?
H.: My name is H., I am a former political commissioner of the AIF. I am
an internationalist from Turtle Island (North America) who has returned
after spending some time in the revolution in Rojava and later the
Spring Revolution of Myanmar.
As a former member of the AIF I do not officially represent the AIF,
however I can speak on behalf of my own experience working with our
comrades on the ground. It should be noted that my perspective is that
of an internationalist who was invited to join the revolution, but I am
not a local of Myanmar that has grown up on its sacred soil, nor have I
suffered the acute oppression of the military junta that has denied free
life to the people of Myanmar. Thus, I encourage comrades to seek out
the voices of Myanmar who have lived this reality of resistance far
longer than I have. It is primarily from them that we can understand the
necessity of internationalism in this struggle. Nevertheless, I am happy
to provide an internationalist understanding of the revolution, even
with the limitations of my perspective.
THE STATE, THE ARMY, THE CLERGY
Does the central government remain strong? What is its social base in
the territories it occupies?
The military has completely taken over the state since the 2021 coup, so
the central government at this point is really just the high command of
the Tatmadaw, which is now referred to as the junta. Domestically, the
junta relies on the old power of Bamar society[The Bamar are the
dominant ethnic group in Myanmar (about 70% of the population). The
junta relies on the historically established power structures of this
majority to maintain its control]. In an economic sense it can be said
that the junta's power is in the oligarchy that chose to stay and accept
fascism, but socially the junta's power is sourced almost entirely in
the old gerontocracy of the Buddhist clergy. This is a relationship of
classic fascist occupation, one that manipulates society where possible
under the assumption that the junta is the sole administrator, and
coerces by force where manipulation is impossible.
We can start on the economic side of this question. During the 2021
coup, Burmese companies were held at gunpoint to side with the Tatmadaw.
The oligarchy then split itself into three pieces. The largest piece
fled the country outright, one stayed to enjoy military protection in
exchange for direct military control and near-complete isolation from
the outside world, and finally the least powerful of these pieces stayed
to side with the resistance.
The Tatmadaw has used this corporate exodus as a strategy to control
vulnerable workers.
The 2021 exodus led to widespread unemployment in workers who could not
afford to leave, and the junta has since been scrambling to sweep these
workers into military roles via conscription. This also means that the
revolution is proletarian by default, as it consists largely of workers
and families who either could not afford to flee or refused to.
Beyond the oligarchy, the notable social power in this equation of
Tatmadaw domestic legitimacy is the Buddhist clergy of Myanmar. Long has
the pagoda[sacred buildings containing buddhist reliks]been planted on
the highest hills, deep into the indigenous margins of Myanmar by force.
Though some (mostly younger) elements of the Buddhist clergy have
defected to the resistance, its entrenched patriarchal elite tend to
align with the junta. Even beyond the borders of the Burmese state, the
Myanmar diaspora still has to defend itself against this force that is
hellbent on suppressing resistance to its state-vested power. If the
entrenched powers of the Buddhist clergy aligned with the resistance,
you would be hearing much more about the revolution by now.
Though the Buddhist clergy is by far the most consequential religious
actor in Myanmar, it is not to say that other clergies do not exist.
Indeed, some even benefit from the revolution. The Christian clergy, for
example, has been suppressed for many decades and finally has an
opportunity to operate publicly in liberated areas.
Though there are some explicitly religious formations in the revolution
it can be said that the Spring Revolution is broadly secular and intends
to weaken the reactionary monopoly of the Buddhist clergy.
Does the Burmese state benefit from international support?
The junta would not even exist without its dependence on fascist power
structures abroad. Since the coup there has not been a single weapon or
munition given to the resistance by any Western power, but a massive
portion of the junta's arsenal comes from Israel. Everything from the
design of its firearms to the parts of its airplanes. The Israeli state
remains one of the largest military supporters of the junta, hence why
we mention the Spring Revolution being a major front against Israeli
imperialism in southeast Asia.
From a world systems standpoint, the desperation of the Tatmadaw to
maintain its monopoly on violence has enabled a wide array of
imperialist forces to extract from Myanmar over the decades. To the
east, the Chinese state shares the Israeli state's desire for junta
domination, but has taken a more subtle economic approach in the form of
backdoor agreements and dispatching mercenaries to defend the junta. The
Russian state also holds a naval presence in the Indian Ocean that is
predicated on junta occupation in the port of Sittwe, where it shares
naval installations with the Tatmadaw. In recent times, the junta has
also enjoyed increasing favoritism of the US as the Trump regime has
lifted sanctions on the Tatmadaw and initiated cordial relations. We
also cannot forget the Indian state's normalization of the junta, which
is quite logical for the fascist Hindutva regime[hindouist supremacist
ideology of president Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party and its militia]to
pursue. Foreign power dynamics in play enabling junta occupation, and
necessitating internationalism in the revolution.
What is the central government's strategy against its enemies? Where
does it come from?
The Tatmadaw has long relied on its "four cuts" doctrine of
counterinsurgency. The four targets in this doctrine are food, funds,
information, and recruitment. In order for all these things to be
targeted at the same time, especially the first one, a massive genocidal
operation must ensue on communities that have wrested themselves from
military occupation. The behavior of the Tatmadaw is in many ways a
projection of colonial history, closely mimicking the Japanese
occupation of Burma (1942-45), which set the first standard of mass rape
and scorched earth in contemporary Burmese history that we see in the
genocide today. Many of its first operations were not against the
British Army, but against dissidents to Japanese military occupation.
Obviously this phantom of colonization lives on in the culture of the
military.
Yet even so, the core fascist tendencies of the Burmese state have
existed for centuries, dating back to the early Burmese monarchies. Its
strategy to monopolize violence has always been to accumulate power in
the lowlands then enact complete destruction of the periphery to pave a
path for military control, forcing communities to make a decision
between absolute submission and rebellion.
Who are the soldiers of the Tatmadaw?
The consequence of conscription, visible to us through scopes and drone
cameras, is poorly-trained kidnapped low resources workers sent to their
deaths in exposed columns that are frequently afflicted by guerrilla
actions. On most frontlines, the junta can move only in painfully slow
and pyrrhic advances with limited air support, dependent on a numbing
stream of meth and heroine. By all accounts I have heard from captured
junta personnel, the life of a junta soldier on the frontlines is deeply
agonizing.
Conscripts frequently defect to the resistance on all frontlines, and
many formations have programs in place to integrate junta defectors into
the revolution. I even worked with some Bamar commanders in the Chin
Brotherhood[see further]who had defected earlier in the war and
gradually earned the trust of comrades while proving their dedication to
the revolution. The backgrounds of defected junta personnel in the
revolution are quite diverse, ranging from police to aircraft crewmen.
As strange as it may sound, the revolution would actually be much weaker
without the presence of the "watermelon," the junta personnel who wear
the green military uniform on the outside yet hold a red revolutionary
heart on the inside. This "watermelon" acts as a crucial fifth column
within both the Tatmadaw and occupied society.
The junta's military power is based largely on conscription. From the
dozens of junta defectors and POWs[Prisoner of War]I met in the Chin
Hills, coming from all different regions of Myanmar, I met not a single
one who came from a bourgeois background. The class stratification of
the junta can be found clearly in its ranks. The peasantry and
proletariat are pressed into the junta's frontline roles as foot
soldiers while the officer ranks are often filled by those from the
feudal class and military-aligned bourgeoisie. The Tatmadaw is no
different from other state militaries in that it is only through the
subjugation of the land's workers that the military oligarchy can
sustain its power.
Is regaining control of the entire territory still an option for it?
It is worth mentioning that the Tatmadaw has never actually had 100%
geographic control of Myanmar. Since World War Two, there have
consistently been pockets of resistance throughout the region
maintaining autonomous ground. So far the military has failed to achieve
its goal of complete domination of Myanmar, and now the Spring
Revolution has made this endeavor even more unlikely.
You explicitly refer to the Burmese military regime as fascist. Is there
a historical lineage between this regime and historical fascism? Does a
theoretical corpus (possibly modeled on Indian Hindutva) provide a clear
ideological framework to its practices?
There is a direct link between the Tatmadaw as a governing body and the
Axis states of World War Two, which effectively wielded the Tatmadaw as
a successor to British occupation. While the Japanese Empire lost its
Burmese colony in the end, its political influence in the Tatmadaw endured.
In compliance with the Berlin Pact, Japanese imperialists trained the
leaders of the Burma Independence Army (which became the Tatmadaw) in
political education and military governance. Some leaders would deviate
from this education while others did not, but the ideological basis for
the modern Tatmadaw was formalized in this process. The Japanese
Empire's monarchist imperialism spoke a familiar language to Myanmar's
Buddhist nationalist currents which had long been shaped by monarchy,
and its political role in the early Tatmadaw enabled military occupation
extending far beyond just the Japanese Empire.
Although they emerged as separate ultranationalist formations in
opposition to the British Raj, the Tatmadaw's ideological connection to
the Indian state's Hindutva paradigm is not negligible. Clerical
militarism dates back to the Burmese kingdoms, but its modern
incarnation can be traced to Myanmar's status as a subject of the
British Raj, where the Burmese colony was subordinate to Indian
administration and its subjects pressed into interaction with Indian
nationalist movements. There is no question that the rise of modern
Hindutva coincided with the rise of modern Buddhist supremacy in
Myanmar, and many of their early leaders interacted. The Burmese
nationalist movement regularly sent delegates to attend sessions of the
Indian National Congress in the 1930s.
The human-to-human interaction of Indians and Burmans also cannot be
ignored in this reality, as both societies hold an adjacent history with
lots of interconnection. Hindutva settler-colonialism and related
philosophies acted as political justification for the waves of forced
Indian migration into Myanmar preceding the Ne Win regime. Similar to
the Indian state's approach to Kashmir today, Hindutva historically
viewed Myanmar as a subordinate colony that Hindus had a duty to
populate. There is no question that the Buddhist supremacist movement of
Myanmar holds a parallel vision for non-Buddhist regions within Myanmar.
So, this colonial interaction and projection between Indian and Burmese
nationalisms certainly holds a piece in the puzzle of modern fascism in
Myanmar. Much like the Hindutva of India, the Tatmadaw is also a clear
projection of the behavior of previous colonial forces.
While this history of fascist state relations is important to analyze,
the Tatmadaw's relations with the zionist entity have a much more
immediate impact on the revolution. Little material from the Japanese
and British occupations remains in the hands of the Tatmadaw, but
material from Israeli military aid is omnipresent. Israel is the
existing fascist state that has succeeded the Berlin Pact as the
Tatmadaw's premier political partner.
THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
What is the status of the so-called "democratic" opposition in the country?
Because Aung San Suu Kyi and the liberal bloc have received the most
Western media attention, it is sometimes assumed that the liberal bloc
is the entire revolution. So adopting this false narrative from Western
media does a major disservice to solidarity.
Today's liberal bloc in Myanmar, formed under Aung San Suu Kyi's
National League for Democracy (NLD) and now taking the form of the
National Unity Government (NUG) in exile represents a rather small
component of the revolution that tends to get blown out of proportion.
The NUG has reached many urban Bamar workers in the lowlands but tends
to be less present in the marginalized periphery of Myanmar, therefore
many of its People's Defense Force (PDF) armed wings tend to be
comprised of urban Bamar workers.
The reformist line of the NUG tends to contradict the autonomous
paradigms of the so-called EAOs[Ethnic armed organizations], who
generally seek a complete overhaul over the Burmese state with
advancement of indigenous autonomy. Despite having the most resources in
the revolution, the NUG has little influence in many areas. In the Chin
Hills the NUG is completely absent, for instance.
Still, can the "democratic opposition" be seen as an ally?
The "democratic opposition" knows how to communicate with global
liberalism, and there are some things that revolutionaries can take from
that, whether it be more sources of funding or certain ports of entry
that cause less problems because of the NUG's diplomacy. Certainly there
are some NGOs[non-governmental organization]out there waiting to dump
their money into something, and it is only the NUG that can effectively
communicate with them. If the resources of the Western bourgeoisie can
be funneled into the revolution this way while the NUG's power remains
limited, why not?
The priority at this phase of the revolution is to defeat the junta with
a united front. Nonetheless, the NUG still has plenty of political
contradictions with other formations that prevent it from adopting a
vanguard role in the revolution.
We have also seen the NUG's ability to revise itself and compromise with
radical and indigenous formations. It can either revise its paradigm to
follow the natural path of the revolution away from statehood, or it can
reproduce state dominance and provoke the immediate wrath of
revolutionary society. It cannot do both.
The people of Myanmar have made it clear that there is no unitary
nation-state solution in their homeland. If it were otherwise, we would
not be seeing hundreds of community-organized defense forces emerging
from the peripheral currents of society with their own dialectic demands
for liberation. The militarized state brings them genocidal occupation,
the unitary republic brought them coups and fascism, the monarchy
brought them feudal enslavement. The revolution aims to move past all of
these state models for the future of the region, and in this process it
can only destroy the state entirely.
Several years ago, Aung San Suu Kyi became a favorite of the western
bourgeois media. What exactly was her role, what social base did she
represent, and could her (forced?) alignment with the regime - before
the 2021 coup - have been foreseen?
Daughter of Burmese independence leader Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi was
born with political influence, and would use it during the 8888 Uprising
era to organize a wave of urban Bamar anti-military populism alongside
the liberal oligarchy. As the Burmese state teetered on the cusp of
civil governance during the reformist Thein Sein regime (2011-2016), Suu
Kyi was appointed by the liberal oligarchy to lead the Burmese state
past military rule after her release from house arrest. During five
years of administration, she gradually succumbed to the pressure of the
dissatisfied military class, expanding appeasements to the Tatmadaw
until the NLD was finally toppled and herself imprisoned in the 2021
coup led by General Min Aung Hlaing.
It is hard to say whether her ethically questionable statements leading
up the coup were genuine or not. It is also hard to say how much power
she had in the state to begin with. Either way, the current phase of the
Rohingya genocide began under her administration while she had no
answers for the resurgent power lust of Tatmadaw generals. Suu Kyi came
to power by riding the popular push for "democratization" after decades
of military regime, but she chose the liberal path of appeasement with
the Tatmadaw in the end, instead of standing on the principle of
politics without militarization that allowed her election in the first
place.
While a recognizable face with her Nobel adornments gifted by the
Western liberal order, she is not universally endorsed among
revolutionaries in Myanmar. To most of the revolutionaries I worked
with, she is a fading face in a large ocean of popular resistance.
Burmese society knows better than anyone else that her reformist methods
were ineffective, and many revolutionaries there will tell you as much.
This is why there are rifles in the hands of Burmese workers instead of
ballots today.
It can be said that Suu Kyi's significance to someone defending the
periphery of Myanmar is generally less than to those defending the urban
center, because she represents a populism of the Bamar lowlands, not the
indigenous countryside.
And yet, most Western commentators tend to focus their attention on her
leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, instead of dealing with the ongoing revolution...
The West has largely abandoned the topic of the Spring Revolution
because Western ruling classes have realized that the revolution does
not actually defend Western principles. At its core, the Spring
Revolution does not fight for a liberal ruling class that can speak
softly to Western states. Nobody I met in the revolution is interested
in returning to a weak liberal republic that makes compromises with
fascism. Comrades may be fighting for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi
from prison, but are they fighting for the state she was elected in? My
experience with comrades in the revolution and continued work with the
diaspora have proven to me that this is generally not the case.
SOCIAL FORCES
What are the various forces at play in Myanmar, what are their
relationships, and what political agendas do they pursue?
We could sit here all day and discuss what organizations subscribe to
what paradigm and so on, but there is a genocidal force brutalizing a
society that is in self-defense. This must be emphasized first and
foremost, because that is what is most urgent in this political
equation. The fight against genocide takes the form of a messy and
complex united front in Myanmar. There is nothing neat for the academic
eye that comes with this reality, and that includes this conveniently
vague idea of the "democratic opposition." So I find it necessary to
approach the social element of this reality rather than giving some
laundry list of a thousand acronyms attached to vague descriptions as
Western academia often does. No revolution can be meaningfully
understood that way.
I think it is also safe to say that this entire revolution is predicated
on the youth. Without the sacrifices of Gen Z, the resistance in Myanmar
would not have taken the shape of the revolution we see now. Yet at the
same time, the resistance to these power structures of the Burmese
lowlands has existed for many centuries and has carried on through
intergenerational struggle. The Burmese state has taken different shapes
and forms, but the settler-colonial paradigm of Burmese fascism has
remained protected by this shell throughout. So the Gen Z of Myanmar
take the militant struggle of their ancestors and deepen it
substantially. This phase of the resistance demands a complete overhaul
of the Burmese political system and a youth-driven understanding of
political life. We are talking about thousands of different communities
fighting for autonomy against not only the junta but the entire Burmese
state.
What about explicit socialists or leftists forces?
Especially in the lowlands, it would be naive to neglect the deep
history of socialist militancy in Myanmar when we ask the question of
"who," as this culture is also responsible for the armed struggle
against the junta that we see today. The Communist Party of Burma (CPB)
generally holds the most space when we are talking about socialist
history in Myanmar, as its historical presence is quite visibly rooted
in revolutionary culture across the country. The party has fought an
87-year-old protracted people's war in Myanmar that continues today (the
longest in Asian communist history), being a major actor in every
defense against imperialist occupation since the British Raj and later
the defense against the fascist military. A bloody internal struggle
between pro-Maoist and pro-Soviet tendencies eventually resulted in the
Maoist line prevailing, and in return its cadres were able to seek
refuge in China, whose state has since turned on the CPB in favor of the
junta. Because the Chinese state is an enemy of the Spring Revolution,
the CPB has been forced to reorganize itself while developing a fully
independent paradigm that is driven only by the support of revolutionary
society.
While it remains the largest explicitly socialist formation in Myanmar,
the CPB is by no means alone in its defense of a socialist line. Many
other radical formations such as the Buffalo Soldier Freedom Force and
Bamar People's Liberation Army also defend explicitly socialist
paradigms, all comprising an integral bloc of the united front. The list
of formations in the socialist bloc alone is too long to even include
here. Another contributing factor to revolutionary culture in Myanmar is
that a significant portion of regional mass organizations and so-called
ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) currently fighting the junta began as
communist party splinters, some maintaining an explicitly socialist line
and others deviating from it. But again, explicit socialism does not
always directly align with indigenous liberation in Myanmar, nor always
with women's liberation. If only things were so simple.
While many of us internationals that have worked in the AIF are inspired
by the martyrs of the communist party and the revolutionary culture that
they have fomented across Myanmar, we also know that the CPB's line does
not represent every proletarian community in Myanmar, the Chin Hills
being one of these places. It has been criticized that the national
vanguard model inherently favors the existing industrial Bamar hegemony
of the state while making liberation in the indigenous margins of
Myanmar less of a priority. On this matter of national approach, the CPB
suffers a similar shortcoming as the liberal bloc. It is also hard for
local women to approach the party as an example of women's liberation,
as it struggles to relinquish its entrenched patriarchal command
structure led largely by older men cadre. Local women of WITCH intend to
confront these old politics by establishing a fully autonomous women's
formation of their own.
Movements of the lowlands tend to be well-versed in the socialism of
industry, but do not hold much experience beyond the industrial core,
where indigenous formations defend their own communities and mass
movements hardly exist. This is a common limitation of Burmese mass
movements, and also why the Spring Revolution cannot be understood in
the language of mass politics alone.
When we try to understand what internationalism means in Myanmar, it is
also important to understand what socialism means in Myanmar, because
herein lies a plurality of antifascist paradigms that has contributed so
much to local revolutionary culture visibly and invisibly, explicitly
and inexplicitly, that every imperialist force holds a stake in
suppressing. Yet, the influence of socialism has been frequently
subjected to fascist identity warfare. There came a point after
Myanmar's independence where socialist identity was so popular in
Burmese society that fascists felt obligated to co-opt it as a label and
manipulate it toward the normalization of military rule. Much like the
NSDAP of Nazi Germany, this is what the Ne Win regime did to maintain
its power after toppling the social democratic U Nu government in a 1962
coup, abusing socialist aesthetic under the state militarist "Burmese
Way To Socialism" doctrine as a veil of occupation until the 8888
Uprising forced Burmese fascism to reorganize itself. Of course, we know
that socialism is not simply an identity or an aesthetic, but rather a
dialectical struggle for self-organized liberation that has prefigured
much of the Spring Revolution. This reality is not something that any
fascist can hide from.
So you would say that ethnic communities play a crucial role in the
ongoing struggles?
All in all, the existence of hundreds of different indigenous armed
groups fighting against a centuries-old genocide kind of speaks for
itself. This is not something that happened spontaneously, it is the
result of centuries of indigenous grievances against the Burmese state.
Because Myanmar is comprised of so many different indigenous communities
that do not feel represented by the state, nor even the national concept
of Myanmar, revolutionary society in the region has made it pretty clear
that there is no nation-state solution.
What role does the issue of land ownership and land reclamation play?
The topic of "the peasantry" in Myanmar is one that begets a serious
challenge to Western class analysis. While "peasantry" may be delineated
more clearly in the lowlands where industrial capitalism dominates the
labor pool, class distinction becomes more nuanced in areas of the
margin like the Chin Hills. There are many villages belonging to local
tribes where class separation on an economic basis is almost
nonexistent. In other areas, there is clearly a residual feudal system
with a visible landed gentry and peasant workers. It is generally the
areas that have lost the most tribal influence that tend to take a more
classist form. While it may be assumed that most indigenous workers
beyond the lowlands of Myanmar fall into the "peasant" category, as they
hold the least resources and maintain the land most directly, this is
not an adequate descriptor of the many areas and peoples of Myanmar that
are, in fact, classless.
Across the international front, the Zapatista motto of "tierra y
libertad" does not escape us, and it certainly forms the basis of
indigenous struggle in Myanmar. Land exists at the sacred core of
resistance. Where there is a power structure attempting to seize or
destroy the earth, there is a social fabric connected to that soil which
defends itself. Men with rifles come and go, but it is always women who
keep the village alive. Even in many villages that appear completely
abandoned and destroyed at first glance, one stumbles upon living
gardens, and within them there are women who refuse to leave. Without
their determination to nurture the land, there would be little left to
defend.
Everywhere in the Chin Hills there are indigenous people living and
working on their land without answering to any real governing system,
and they are faced with the option to fight the fascist junta occupation
or die. Usually whatever resistance formation is closest to their locale
is the one that they must interact with to survive, let alone continue
living on their land. In this regard, political distinction becomes a
luxury to those in the immediate path of genocide. It also means that
each resistance formation holds social multitudes, as they encompass all
elements of local society.
What is the military junta's relationship with the rural society?
In some hilltop villages I worked in, local comrades would point
downhill to the previous locations of the village, explaining that the
village had ascended over the course of many years to make it less
accessible to the Burmese military. The elusive hornbill, ubiquitous in
the political imagery of the Chin Hills, is hardly ever seen in the
flesh. The bird, which dwells in the jungle canopy over a sea of
landmines, must dodge both hunters and the encroaching frontlines in its
daily flight. It has thus flown to the most remote reaches of the hills,
as far away from the fascist military as possible. The hornbill's
survival has grown increasingly challenging with the state's destruction
of the land, yet it remains alive in its ecosystem, as does Chin society.
Yet so much land grabbing has actually backfired for the Tatmadaw by
setting conditions ripe for revolution. Uprooted workers of the land and
tribespeople have nowhere to go but the resistance, thus landless people
are integral to the revolution.
One of the striking aspects of the war in Burma is the profusion of
forces opposing the regime. Are there coordinating bodies among some of
these forces, particularly among different guerrilla groups?
Diplomatic communication between revolutionary organizations is integral
to the success of the revolution. On a tactical level, this takes the
form of inter-regional coordination to take advantage of the junta's
weak spots. One thing I remember being discussed was the coordination of
militant actions between organizations in different regions of Myanmar
to overload the junta's air force. Because of coordinated actions
placing a strain on the air force's capacity, junta pilots have suffered
from low morale and suicides while under immense pressure from their
superiors.
In the Chin Hills the two major bodies are the aforementioned Chin
Brotherhood, whose main armed wing is the Chin People's Army, and the
Chinland Council, whose main armed wing is the Chin National Army. Both
of these bodies comprise of numerous militant formations with unified
representation under their respective umbrellas, so that inter-regional
coordination is more organized. In most resistance zones across Myanmar
there is a profusion of local formations connected to regional
coordinating bodies, some organized more politically than others.
Even with inter-regional coordination, unified initiative across such a
pluralistic revolution is not a simple task. Some disputes between
resistance formations have escalated into violence. That said, violent
clashes between resistance formations is becoming an increasingly rare
occurrence as the momentum toward diplomacy strengthens and the
conditions of the junta's counter-offensive grow more challenging.
Recently there have been more efforts to create inter-regional bodies,
such as the Spring Revolution Alliance established in December 2025,
which formally assembled 19 different resistance organizations across
Myanmar into a common coordination effort. We have been seeing more
coalitions like this taking shape as the revolution's older coalitions
become increasingly obsolete to the current conditions. The Three
Brotherhood Alliance[Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance
Army and Ta'ang National Liberation Army], once the strongest coalition
in the revolution for instance, has become largely gutted due to the
shifting objectives of its member parties.
Were there any agreements on common political objectives?
As a political commissioner for AIF, something that became clear to me
about political deliberation in Myanmar is that it is difficult for
local movements to sustain meaningful long-term political dialogue when
genocide is in full motion. As the frontlines approach, the war effort
shifts entirely to self-defense, and political communication quickly
becomes little more than an ephemeral luxury. Discussion near the
frontlines is frequently interrupted by sudden calls to intercept the
enemy, if not by enemy activity itself. This is especially the case for
the dry season, when enemy mobility is at its height. Come monsoon
season, priorities tend to change a bit as the enemy gets bogged down
and cannot move as much.
One thing that can be broadly said of the Spring Revolution in a
political sense is that it is a massive united front against the junta
which comprises of all different elements of indigenous and proletarian
society, simultaneously an indigenous revolt against nation-statehood
and a popular revolt against fascism. Aside from the common aim of
defeating the junta, there are few things that can be said, familiar to
Western analysis, that apply to all these elements. The Spring
Revolution holds a social scale that is unprecedented in this epoch of
revolutionary history. Even Rojava, as pluralistic as its revolutionary
society is, actually does not even come close the sheer social magnitude
of the Spring Revolution.
THE ANTI-FASCIST INTERNATIONALIST FRONT
Could you briefly present the AIF?
The AIF is the first revolutionary internationalist formation in
Myanmar, and it is the first formation of its kind in the 21st century
that exists outside of Kurdistan. It also marks the first time in this
era that internationalists have developed an autonomous militant
formation without an adjacent superstructure. The AIF is thus, in my
opinion, quite a historical achievement that experiences a lot of new
struggle to learn and build from. This is where its role begins in many
ways, as a pathfinder of internationalism.
Before the AIF there were some scattered war tourists and state military
veterans who embedded with local formations in a military capacity, but
the AIF gives a much clearer direction to foreign participation in the
militant setting. The only other active formation started by foreigners
in Myanmar is the Free Burma Rangers, with whom the AIF is tactically
allied against the junta, but its background and responsibilities are
quite different.
It is no secret that the AIF is inspired by the internationalist
experience of the Kurdish revolution and follows its three pillars of
women's liberation, ecology, and democracy. The AIF does not, however,
intend to duplicate its structures, nor is it subordinate to anyone in
the Kurdish liberation movement. The AIF is a structure of many firsts,
and it does not operate simply based on familiarities. Its role is
guided by the needs of the revolution determined by the people of
Myanmar, not by the personal whim of foreigners.
The work of AIF is shared by both international and local comrades in
the unit, so it would be misleading to categorize the AIF as an
exclusively international formation. Though it was initiated by
international comrades, the AIF has assumed an increasingly localized
role with the participation of local comrades. For example, the recent
formation of the autonomous Women Internationalists of the Chin Hills
(WITCH) would not have been possible without the initiative of local women.
How does the AIF view its role within Burma, both in military terms and
in relation to the local population?
International comrades bring tools and skills learned from struggles
across the international front and share them with the resistance
against fascism in Myanmar. That is to say, the AIF intends to
participate in the revolution as a formation that can plant new seeds of
opportunity with the collective experience of different revolutionary
backgrounds, but only by learning and struggling with local comrades as
a direct component of their resistance. There is a fine line between
internationalist praxis with full guidance of the locale, and
neocolonial praxis with full separation from the locale. By society
allowing us to embed in the resistance, we each hold a crucial
responsibility to deconstruct colonial history in one other so that it
is not reproduced.
One tool for this is tekmîl (report), a daily process of open criticism
and self-criticism that has been adopted from the Kurdish liberation
movement's paradigm of Democratic Modernity. Like any other
revolutionary formation in the world, the AIF is not immune to
shortcomings, so tekmîl is a crucial mechanism to allow the structure to
adjust itself effectively. We can only learn from the historical
mistakes of internationalism, such as the lack of democratic mechanisms
in the International Brigades of Spain, which contributed to their collapse.
Another mechanism for the dynamic process of understanding the AIF's
role is political program, which the political commissioner is
responsible for organizing regularly. Political program is generally
centered around in-depth education and discussion, and can be coupled
with anything from films to literature. The aim is generally for our
comrades to reach a meaningful understanding of themselves and their
responsibilities through self-reflection and collective deconstruction.
Patriarchy and colonialism tend to be big ones, as these are power
systems connected to everything we struggle against as internationalists.
With all this in mind, it is important to note that the role of AIF is
not exclusively militant. Our comrades foster connections to deepen
solidarity with other democratic forces in self-defense, such as the
Kurdish women's movement. By bridging this connection, the AIF aims to
create more opportunities for the revolution both in a political and
militant sense. Practically this involves a broad range of military
training and operation from drone to sniper, politically this involves
offering an autonomous formation for local women in the resistance, and
diplomatically this involves frequent communication with a range of
revolutionary movements.
So, all this is to say, the role of AIF is not a fixed entity. It
fluctuates according to the needs of the revolution. If comrades need
specialized training, the AIF offers specialized training. If comrades
need combat support, the AIF provides combat support. If comrades need
supplies, the AIF becomes a logistical force. Women requested an
autonomous formation, and women in the AIF provided this. Comrades
wanted more cooperation with revolutionaries outside of Myanmar, and the
AIF has been able to offer this as well.
As internationalists, we are nothing without the immortal network that
internationalist martyrs have forged. We do not see ourselves as
particularly special in some way. Those of us from abroad are just some
workers that are deeply impatient for revolutionary change, and we do
what we can to fight fascism. It is really as simple as that. We are not
heroes nor are we celebrities, we are workers on an international front
of workers defending themselves. So our work in Myanmar is a
continuation of what many of us have already been struggling for.
What are the AIF's ties to the residents of the regions where it
operates, and what is the group's relationship with other guerrilla
groups present in Burma?
The AIF has worked primarily alongside revolutionaries of the Chin
Brotherhood, but is not confined to one location or organization. The
AIF works directly with the resistance elements of society and does not
cooperate with any state.
Many of us have not been able to interact as much in civil society as we
have in military society, as the AIF is a military structure with
constant frontline responsibilities. A common point of criticism raised
for the AIF's military priorities, as urgent as they may be, is that
they have limited the scope of our work within local society. There have
been talks of developing an internationalist civil structure on the
ground for the purpose of deepening this work when capacity allows. We
will see if the conditions of the revolution allow this to become a reality.
Nonetheless, it can be said that this lack of civil work in the AIF has
been one of the bigger criticisms held within the unit, because it also
limits our understanding of what we are defending. Knowing military
society is not the same as knowing the grandmothers who keep the village
alive, it is not the same as knowing the village elders and griots[oral
historian]who defend the ancient social fabric of their locale, it is
not the same as knowing the nascent democratic structures on a basis of
political struggle. Even in a revolution of guerrillas, where all
elements of society are far more connected than would be in any state
military, the separation of a distinct male-dominant military class remains.
Did you personally linked to locals?
Because most of my time in Myanmar was spent on military bases, it was
not until I started leaving that I was able to spend more meaningful
time in civil society. It was then that I realized how much trust we had
actually built with local tribes without directly interacting with them.
On my way out, exhausted and emotionally beaten, I was brought
unexpectedly to a gathering of hundreds of tribal representatives for
Falam region who thanked me profusely and invited me to some feasts.
There was clear mutual appreciation, but there was also a bit of
confusion as to why we were there. I was asked a core question that
everyone has a right to ask internationalists: "why have you come here
to fight the junta?"
I mentioned that the struggles of the international front are deeply
interconnected, that the freedom of other communities is directly
connected to our own, and that there are responsibilities that local
revolutionaries had requested of us. I made it clear that when
internationals leave the Hills it is not the end of our struggle against
the junta, and that our responsibilities continue no matter where we are
on the international front. Still, after so many years of transactional
and colonial dynamic from foreigners in the Chin Hills, there is no
single explanation you can give that really alleviates this confusion.
The best way to do so is in action and conduct.
What specificities do you see in the Chin Hills area?
It is the only region of Myanmar that explicitly socialist and
socialist-adjacent formations have not historically operated in. We have
approached this lack of collective socialist presence in the Chin Hills
not as a setback but as an opportunity, on one hand for us to understand
what revolutionary politics without a vanguard looks like, and also how
to support the nascent development of the new women's movement in a
place that has not seen one. We do not believe that a revolutionary
alternative is achieved by simply being present as revolutionary
internationalists and giving ourselves a title. Again, internationalism
is in how we act and conduct ourselves, not in how we define ourselves.
On this topic, many of us find it to be a deeply colonial mindset to
expect an indigenous society to define itself as socialist or any other
term that fits neatly into mainstream urban left language. Chin society
does not need the labels, because it has known the communal basis of
them for millennia. It is industrial society that has been forced to
relearn communality with new paradigms that are easier for comrades in
the Global North to understand. So really it is not our place to expect
this language in Myanmar outside the industrialized lowlands where
explicitly socialist movements have a much deeper presence.
Indigenous struggle often does not fit cleanly into modern assumptions
of leftism or socialism, and we are completely fine with that. We are
the ones who need to learn from indigenous struggle, not vice versa.
What about religion in the Chin Hills?
The presence of Christianity in the Chin Hills is quite visible,
however, and dates back to British colonization. The American
missionaries who had been able to work there have largely departed the
region, too scared to stay when the clouds grew stormy.
Yet, I found Chin Christianity to be among the least dogmatic of
Christian communities I have ever known. People roll cigarettes with
pages from the Bible. Porn is watched openly, often collectively.
Sexuality is not really a taboo topic. Folks get piss drunk on the daily
with Bible in hand. It is a Christianity that exists according to Chin
society, and not vice versa.
Nonetheless, it would be dishonest to say that nobody in the Chin Hills
is concerned about our politics. There are some elements of Chin society
(generally online) that are inspired by the aesthetic of American
evangelical Christian nationalism. There are some in this
Facebook-active crowd who have been concerned about the AIF's politics,
probably afraid that we would spread some demonic sacrilegious thought
in the revolution and damage the clergy after hearing some outrageous
soundbites about "antifa" from Fox News or American megachurch pastors
on YouTube. Particularly around the time of Charlie Kirk's
assassination, I remember a moment where a small handful of Christian
nationalists were skeptical of our politics, but our comrades in the
Chin Brotherhood swiftly reassured them that we do not have any plans to
assassinate clergy members, or whatever Fox News-derived hysteria that
was on their mind. Whenever skeptical rumors have floated around about
"antifa," Chin Brotherhood leadership has been quick to dispel them,
knowing their own role as an antifascist formation to which other
antifascists are allied. It is a bit comical to reminisce.
How does the AIF act in regard of the cultural practices of the local
population?
Perhaps to the surprise of Christian dogmatists and Western leftists
alike, most of us have actually attended church and prayed with local
comrades in the Chin Hills. Some of our international members have been
Christian themselves and adherents of liberation theology, others (such
as myself) have joined Sunday service and prayed with local comrades in
solidarity. The AIF may be a secular formation, but none of our comrades
are dogmatic nuts that press theory discourse every time they are
introduced to someone. That is simply not how effective internationalist
praxis works.
I would say the biggest contradiction the AIF has had in society has not
been so political, rather it has been our approach to the omnipresence
of alcohol. The unit does not allow alcohol consumption, but most local
organizations do. For us it is simply a matter of militancy and
vigilance in one of the most volatile frontline environments on the
planet, but for local organizations alcoholism is generally approached
as a social tradition that has become widely accepted.
Because alcohol is so widespread in everyday life, on base and off base,
it is a rather strange sight to see comrades who refuse to partake. The
contradiction of disallowing alcohol consumption in our trainings has
led to some incidents with local comrades where we had to hold serious
internal discussions in AIF, like the question of what degree our
authority on alcohol is actual harm reduction and to what degree do we
reproduce colonial behavior in that process? At first, some of our
comrades were reprimanding the presence of alcohol. This approach was
criticized, and after internal discussion we collectively decided that
reprimand was a patriarchal and ineffective way of approaching this
contradiction. Instead, practicing care ethics in understanding our
comrades face-to-face, having one-on-one discussions for both
internationals and locals to reflect a bit deeper from a place of
empathy, is what we found to be far more effective in mitigating the
harm of alcoholism around us.
It is connected to a question as old as internationalism itself: how do
you approach collective standards in a structure of widely differing
backgrounds and expectations? We can deliberate all day about broad
theory contradictions and political trajectory, but really it is
everyday dilemmas like this that are most crucial to the development of
praxis. Struggling with the immediate social environment and our
relation to it as internationalists is the only way we can grapple with
daily life at its least abstract. This is just as pertinent to the AIF
as it is any other internationalist formation. If our praxis is not
informed by daily contradiction, then who are we really?
Does the AIF decide its military strategies independently, or does it
always coordinate with other armed groups (which may be more familiar
with local issues)?
Though the AIF is an autonomous unit not subordinate to any
organization, the work would not be effective without deference to the
necessities of local comrades. There has never been an AIF operation
that has not been coordinated directly with local comrades, and I doubt
there ever will be. Suggestions are given by local command, to which the
AIF can then decide what is an appropriate course of action for the unit.
Women's elements of the AIF went even further in this autonomous
militancy to develop WITCH (Women Internationalists of the Chin Hills),
the first autonomous women's formation in the Chin Hills. This formation
is not subordinate to any men comrades, local or international. The
birth of WITCH has been perhaps the most significant political
accomplishment of our comrades thus far, as it guarantees an autonomous
space for women comrades in the revolution while operating separately
from the male dominance of military society.
For the first time in the modern history of Myanmar we see a particular
urgency in the direction of women's liberation and a visible culture
that is eager to foster a militant women's movement. Revolutionary women
in Myanmar have made it clear that they refuse to be occupied by the
patriarchal state, resisting a militarized power system that attempts to
demonize them. For example, it is a common superstition in the Tatmadaw
and the state-backed Buddhist clergy that a man is cursed if he walks
under the longyi garment of a woman. Since the coup, women have hung
their longyi garments over the heads of Tatmadaw columns marching
through. WITCH is only one seed in the broader struggle of a militant
women's movement that is breathing some of its first breaths.
Approximately how many fighters does the AIF have in its ranks? Does it
include locals among its members, and if so, how does recruitment take
place?
The numbers fluctuate regularly, hence I cannot give a concrete
statistic for that. The complete formation is generally around the size
of a platoon[20 to 30 people], including comrades who are on temporary
rotation with AIF and then return to their units. Local comrades are
certainly active members of AIF, and at times even comprise a majority
of the unit.
Generally local comrades will request to do work with AIF or are
encouraged to by their organizations. After some training, it is
determined who is a good fit for the unit among those who are most
motivated. This process tends to take a while, as it requires discussion
with local organizations, then some months of training, then more
discussion with local organizations if a comrade is ready to join. So
membership in AIF is never involuntary. The work is highly specialized
and requires not just consent but immense dedication from every comrade
involved.
Are there links between the AIF and other similar groups elsewhere in
the world, and if so, what is the nature of these links?
The AIF has established communication with a number of revolutionary
forces in the world, especially the Kurdish liberation movement. With
our collective experience comes the responsibility of fostering
internationalist connectivity, and we have done so by initiating new
interactions mainly between revolutionary elements in Myanmar and Kurdistan.
FINAL SIDE INFORMATION / FOCUS
How can people support the AIF from afar?
Lending eyes, ears, and voice for the revolution is a global necessity.
For those who wish to keep up with the work of the AIF, the unit can be
found on its socials (@aifmyanmar). Comrades are also welcome to support
the AIF by holding events in their locale.
It is worth noting that the AIF is completely self-funded, which is why
you see frequent fundraising campaigns. The success or failure of
fundraising determines the tools and resources at the disposal of the
AIF. The AIF does not lobby ruling classes, nor does it sell fancy
portraits of Aung San Suu Kyi. Its funding is based entirely in
solidarity. Aside from the limited resources that the revolution
provides, AIF personnel are completely on their own with logistics, and
they are fine with that. The intention of being a unit of autarky is to
take as little as possible from the revolution while contributing as
much as possible with what we can create ourselves.
While it certainly takes some amount of privilege to have a valid
passport and travel, most of our international comrades are working
class people that have made significant personal sacrifices to come to
Myanmar. We still do not have enough of a budget to finance travel for
comrades, and many of us return to our home regions economically
unstable. This struggle is all worth it in the end, as long as it means
that our lives are utilized by global revolutionary society to defend
dignity. Nonetheless, any support from comrades and allies is welcome.
For any gracious comrades who wish to support the structure in this
process, the AIF can receive funds through the following:
PAYPAL: @AIFMYANMAR
VENMO: @AIFMYANMAR
CASHAPP: $AIFMYANMAR
Please keep "note" section empty or nondescript.
For anyone who wishes to coordinate events or has specific questions,
feel free to send a secure message to our comrades in the Myanmar
Partisans Committee:
intlpartisans@proton.me
Aung ya mie! (Until victory!)
***
What reading material would you recommend for comrades who aren't very
familiar with the struggles in Myanmar?
For a local perspective on this, I recommend listening to Burmese
revolutionary Alex's interview on It Could Happen Here podcast from 2022
titled "How to Build a Revolution: Myanmar, Part Three." This is a topic
that necessitates learning from local comrades, as I can only give a
limited perspective.
For a Burmese perspective on this, I can recommend "Alive With
Resistance: Diasporic Reflections on the Revolt in Myanmar" a 2021
interview with Burmese scholar Geoff Aung on libcom.org. While the
interview was made just after the coup in 2021, it gives appropriate
context for this question that I am less equipped to give as a
foreigner. The "Myanmar" section on The Anarchist Library has a range of
local perspectives on this as well. I can also recommend Thurein Mon's
essays on Marxist.com as well as Hein Htet Kyaw's more critical essays
on libcom.org. For a local woman's perspective I suggest the 2023
interview with comrade Leisa of Buffalo Soldier Freedom Force titled
"The Rebellion is built on Hope," also on libcom.org.
On the matter of women's liberation in the revolution I can refer
friends to the works of women comrades in WITCH, such as "Lessons From
The Hills" by Rachel Ram Len Mawi (2025) and the latest "Sone Ma A'Poi:
The Witch Team" (2026) by WITCH. These pieces are crucial to
understanding the experience of internationalism in Myanmar.
Interview conducted by Zyg and Toun, originally published in Courant
Alternatif (CA), the newspaper of the Libertarian Communist Organization
(OCL)
P.-S.
L'entretien, version longue, est disponible aux formats texte et
brochure sur Paris Luttes info:
https://paris-luttes.info/actualites-de-la-guerre-et-de-la-21256
You can also find an extended version of this interview, in a text or
printable booklet on the website Paris Luttes info:
https://paris-luttes.info/actualites-de-la-guerre-et-de-la-21256
https://www.oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4781
_________________________________________
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