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(en) Italy, FAI, Umanita Nova #26-26 - This Is Not a War (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]
Date
Mon, 28 Sep 2026 07:47:20 +0300
Crosetto has announced the deployment of warships to the Bab el-Mandeb
Strait, drawing Italy ever deeper into a global conflict. There is an
urgent need to provide a clear response to warmongering
policies-opposing new military expeditions and calling for the
withdrawal of all missions abroad. It is difficult at this moment to
predict what will happen in the coming days or what actions will
actually follow Defense Minister Crosetto's statements. Certainly, the
advance of the Houthi Supreme Political Council's troops in Yemen has
rapidly altered the situation, exposing the difficulties and
vulnerabilities of Saudi Arabia and its allies, including Italy.
The situation is complex to assess. To understand current events, it is
helpful to summarize a few key facts. A civil war has been underway in
Yemen since 2014, when the Houthi Supreme Political Council-a Zaydi Shia
force with long-standing ties to Iran-captured the capital, Sana'a. This
marked the beginning of a protracted conflict: first against forces
loyal to the regime of President Hadi (backed by the US and Saudi
Arabia), and subsequently-following the collapse of peace talks after
Hadi's departure in 2022-against the Presidential Leadership Council,
which remains the only Yemeni government recognized by the so-called
international community. Amidst Israel's war in Gaza (which began in
2023) and the broader conflict involving Iran, the US, and Israel
(ongoing since last March), the Houthis have repeatedly intervened in
support of their allies. In recent months, the standoff between the US
and Iran over control of the Strait of Hormuz has lent new strategic
importance to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Since last
March, Saudi Arabia has decided to shift a significant portion of its
oil traffic to the East-West Petroline pipeline-which runs from the
Abqaiq fields in the Persian Gulf to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea
and had previously been underutilized-and has begun operating it at full
capacity. Since then, attacks have intensified along the 1,201-kilometer
route, which cuts across the Arabian Peninsula and comprises 13 pumping
stations. The infrastructure's vulnerability to sabotage and military
strikes compounds an already complex situation; indeed, due to facility
limitations, even in peacetime, this solution would not have enabled
Saudi Arabia to supply the same quantity and quality of oil as shipments
via the Strait of Hormuz, thereby calling into question its role as a
global oil supplier. Starting September 3, the Houthis launched an
offensive, seizing control of nearly the entire western coast of
Yemen-and effectively the Bab el-Mandeb Strait-by occupying the key
islands in this strategic waterway. Following drone attacks on the
pipeline, Saudi Arabia shut down the entire line on September 11 for
safety reasons. In the days that followed, Houthi forces advanced
further within Yemen, while drone strikes against Saudi Arabia
continued. It was against this backdrop that Crosetto announced the
deployment of warships to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on the afternoon of
September 17 at the "Risorsa Mare" (Marine Resources) Forum in La
Spezia, an event attended by numerous representatives from the
government, the armed forces, and the shipping, freight forwarding, and
port sectors. Crosetto stated that Italy was prepared to send the ships
on its own and that Italian "bureaucracy" would not conflict with
European procedures-a clear reference to internal issues within the
European mission, Aspides. A few hours later, during the night of
September 17-18, Houthi forces struck the King Fahd Air Base in Taif,
Saudi Arabia, near Mecca. One of the four Italian Eurofighters deployed
at the base as part of the "Task Force Air Arabia" mission was destroyed
in the attack. According to news agency reports, the base houses 300
Italian military personnel alongside troops from Saudi Arabia, the
United States, and other nations. Italian troops have been present in
the region for some time, but this specific mission has been underway
since the second half of March; overall, it involves the deployment of
300 personnel, four Eurofighters, an airborne early warning aircraft,
and two C-130J transport planes. The mission has largely flown under the
radar, partly due to new authorization procedures for overseas military
operations; these no longer require specifying the exact country or area
of deployment for expeditionary forces, but instead frame missions
within broader parameters, allowing for the redeployment of personnel
and assets across wide geographical regions.
As previously noted in these pages-particularly regarding the formation
of a rapid intervention force-the new procedure is better suited to a
context of global warfare, granting the government significant room for
maneuver. Consequently, the management and restructuring of these
missions increasingly resemble the conduct of a military campaign.
In addition to Task Force Air Arabia, Task Force Land Cerbero is also
deployed in the Gulf region; it comprises 260 troops, SAMP/T
anti-missile units, advanced radar systems, and air defense systems
capable of countering small- and medium-sized drones.
At present, there is no news of a Council of Ministers meeting, nor has
an address to Parliament by Minister Crosetto been announced; for now,
we are dealing only with statements he made before the "masters of the
sea" in the militarized city of La Spezia. Indeed, the only tangible
outcome-at least to our knowledge-is the escort provided by the frigate
*Bergamini* to the *Jolly Oro* container ship (owned by the Ignazio
Messina company) as it sails toward Suez. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has
drastically cut oil exports, and the US appears to be struggling-or has
at least decided against direct intervention so far-limiting itself to
supporting Saudi Arabia, which is currently bombing Houthi targets.
Whatever developments unfold in the coming hours, the words Crosetto
spoke over the weekend-following the attack that struck Italian
aircraft-seem paradoxical: "We are not at war." This statement, which he
has been repeating since last March, is unfortunately belied by the
reality on the ground. For while Rome may not have formally declared war
on the government in Sana'a, Italian troops are present throughout the
region, supporting nations deeply involved in this conflict. This is not
to mention the weapons and equipment that reached Saudi Arabia-either
via Italy or directly from it-fueling the civil war in Yemen all these
years. Suffice it to say that this was the very issue that sparked the
2019 campaign by dockworker groups against arms shipments at the port of
Genoa-a protest that subsequently spread to other ports.
Furthermore, Italian troops are deployed as part of Operation Aspides
and anti-piracy missions between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean;
crucially, however, they are also present on the opposite side of the
Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through missions in Somalia and a military base in
Djibouti. A significant portion of Italy's military reach, as well as
its economic and political interests, is focused on this region. In such
a context, committing to safeguard "freedom of navigation"-naturally,
only for major shipowners and financial groups-is not much different
from declaring war.
Dario Antonelli
https://umanitanova.org/questa-non-e-una-guerra/
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