A-Infos (en) Italy, Umanita Nova: Ceuta, the border that doesn't exist (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

On July 30, 72,000 people crossed the border between Morocco and Spain 
in just a few hours. Almost all of them turned back. Where had they come 
from? And what really happened at the European border? On July 30, 2026, 
something happened that, at first glance, seemed almost impossible. Tens 
of thousands of people crossed the border between Morocco and Ceuta, the 
Spanish city on the African coast. They entered primarily by sea, 
swimming around the Tarajal breakwater, but also through other border 
crossings.

In the first hours the figures fluctuated. There was talk of 50,000 
people, then 50-60,000. On August 4, the Spanish Interior Minister 
Fernando Grande-Marlaska communicated to his European counterparts the 
figure that would remain the official one: 72,000 entries . More than 
70,000 people, he added, had already left Ceuta, the vast majority of 
them returning to Morocco.[1]

Seventy-two thousand people in a city of just over 80,000. In just a few 
hours, a number of people almost equivalent to the entire population of 
Ceuta crossed the border.

It's worth starting with this disproportion. It raises a basic question 
that, in early reports, was almost hidden behind the story of the 
"assault" on the border: where did 72,000 people come from?

Where did 72,000 people come from?
If the migrants had been predominantly from the Sahel, Sudan, Eritrea, 
or West Africa, the concentration of tens of thousands of people around 
Fnideq, the Moroccan city bordering Ceuta, would hardly have gone 
unnoticed. A movement of that scale would have left traces in the 
preceding days and weeks.

However, we find no trace of a concentration of these proportions in the 
news reports of the previous days.

The explanation emerges more clearly in the reports made after the 
crossing. RTVE, the Spanish public radio and television, wrote on August 
2 that "the majority of migrants who crossed into Ceuta this week were 
from Morocco ." Many Moroccans, after spending one or more days in the 
city, had already returned. Around the Temporary Migrant Rest Center, 
the CETI, there remained a diverse population, composed mainly of people 
from Sudan and other countries in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa.[2]

Their accounts describe journeys that have nothing to do with the sudden 
mobilization of July 30th. Some had been leaving years before, crossing 
Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, or Algeria before reaching Morocco. Others had 
already managed to enter Ceuta in the days preceding the great crossing.

Thus, two phenomena emerge that overlap for a few hours. On one hand, 
there is long-distance African migration, which has been using Morocco 
for years as a transit and waiting country on its way to Europe. On the 
other, there is something very different and numerically much larger: 
tens of thousands of Moroccans who decide to cross the border almost 
simultaneously .

We don't yet have a complete official breakdown of the 72,000 entries by 
nationality. It's worth noting. But available sources converge in 
indicating a clear Moroccan majority.

And this also allows us to understand a fact that would otherwise be 
difficult to explain: the speed of returns.

On 31 July, the Spanish government reported that 48,300 of the 
approximately 50,000 entries then counted had already returned to 
Morocco. On 4 August, when the count was brought to 72,000, 
Grande-Marlaska declared that more than 70,000 people had already left 
Ceuta.[3]

Those tens of thousands of people, therefore, had not all arrived at 
once from far away to suddenly appear at the border on July 30th. The 
vast majority were Moroccan; alongside them were people from other 
African countries, many of whom had already been living in Morocco for 
some time or had passed through it on much longer migration routes.

At this point the question changes.

It's no longer just: how did they cross the border?

It becomes: why were tens of thousands of people ready to cross it?

A voice is running on the phones
Something important had happened a few weeks earlier.

A ruling by the Spanish Supreme Court, issued on 29 June and made public 
on 8 July, had established that the specific procedure of rechazo en 
frontera , the immediate rejection foreseen for Ceuta and Melilla, could 
not be automatically applied to people who reached Ceuta by swimming 
without passing a material element of border containment.[4]

The ruling did not establish that anyone who managed to reach Ceuta 
could remain in Spain or obtain regularization. It simply meant that the 
person had to undergo the procedures required by immigration law.

On social networks, however, a complex legal decision quickly turns into 
a much simpler message: if you swim there, they can't send you back 
right away .

The Spanish Ministry of the Interior claimed as early as July 30 that 
"human trafficking networks" were "exploiting a judicial ruling" to 
encourage crossings, especially among young people.[5]The Moroccan 
Organization for Human Rights (OMDH), in its report on the events in 
Ceuta and Melilla, also attributes a role to the spread of false or 
distorted information on social media about the possibility of 
regularizing one's status once one reaches Spanish territory. But the 
same report also mentions economic, social and cultural factors, 
aspirations for "a better future" and a context marked by increasingly 
restrictive European policies, which limit the possibilities for regular 
migration.[6]

To stop here, however, would mean confusing the detonator with the 
explosive.

A rumor spread on TikTok, WhatsApp, or Telegram might help explain why 
thousands of people are moving on that particular day . It can't explain 
why tens of thousands of people are willing to do so.

Why cross?
On this point, the OMDH report itself becomes more interesting, because 
it at least partially abandons the security explanation. It speaks of 
economic and social conditions, of expectations, of psychological and 
cultural factors, also fueled by images of a different life that 
circulate through social networks. Above all, it speaks of young 
people's aspirations for "a better future".[6]

Perhaps July 30th tells us something that migration statistics fail to 
measure.

We usually count those who cross a border. We cannot count those who 
would be willing to cross it if they had the opportunity .

For years, a border may seem impassable. Then, for a few hours, the 
belief spreads that it has become passable. At that point, a willingness 
to move suddenly becomes visible that until the day before hadn't been 
seen in any statistics.

This does not mean that all the Moroccans who entered Ceuta intended to 
move permanently to Europe. It would be wrong to attribute a single 
migratory project to 72,000 individuals. The almost immediate return of 
the vast majority, if anything, shows how different their motivations, 
expectations and behaviours were - and does not tell us, in itself, how 
much those returns were spontaneous, induced by the conditions 
encountered in Ceuta or encouraged by pressure from the authorities.[7]

But the most politically and socially interesting fact remains: when the 
perception spread that the passage was possible, tens of thousands of 
people tried to cross the border .

A European frontier in Africa
Ceuta is a Spanish city on the African continent, separated from the 
Iberian Peninsula by the Strait of Gibraltar and surrounded by Morocco. 
Along with Melilla, it forms the two land borders between the European 
Union and Africa.

Spain considers its sovereignty over the city indisputable; Morocco 
claims it. Madrid recalls that Ceuta belonged to the Spanish Crown 
centuries before the birth of the modern Moroccan state. Even the 
official Spanish tourism website describes its history as a succession 
of civilizations-Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, Visigoths, 
Arabs, Portuguese-concluding with its integration into the Spanish Crown 
"by its own will."[8]

Rabat reads the same history and geography differently.

But determining which state can claim the oldest historical claim to 
Ceuta is not our concern here. Rather, the dispute over sovereignty 
highlights a very contemporary paradox: Spain's ability to control 
access to Ceuta depends significantly on the very state that disputes 
its sovereignty.

The physical border is Spanish. But the operational border begins in 
Morocco .

The frontier begins before the border
On July 30, the Spanish Ministry of the Interior explicitly thanked the 
Moroccan authorities for their efforts in the previous days. The 
security forces in Rabat, Madrid stated, had already prevented thousands 
of attempted crossings.

What happens two weeks later makes the mechanism even more evident.

New calls for people to reach Ceuta were circulating on social media for 
August 15th. This time, however, the mass crossing did not occur. 
Moroccan forces controlled Fnideq and the roads leading there, guarded 
the hills leading to the coast, and stopped hundreds of people before 
they could approach the border. Charges broke out and tear gas was used.

The comparison between July 30th and August 15th is instructive. It 
doesn't prove that Morocco deliberately opened the border on July 30th. 
However, it does demonstrate how crucial Moroccan control is in making 
that border passable or nearly impassable.

There's no need to wait for someone to reach the fence or jump into the 
sea. Controls can take place much earlier: on the roads, in cities, on 
the hills, preventing people from even reaching the border.

The line separating Ceuta from Morocco on the map remains in place. The 
border system, however, expands into Moroccan territory.

This is how the externalization of borders works, in its most concrete 
form .

The precedent of 2021
This is not the first time that this dependence has become visible.

In May 2021, approximately 8,000 people entered Ceuta in two days as 
Moroccan authorities eased security. The crisis erupted amid a 
diplomatic conflict sparked by the hospitalization in Spain of Brahim 
Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front. In March of the following year, 
Madrid reversed its stance on Western Sahara, endorsing the Moroccan 
autonomy plan as the basis for resolving the conflict.

This precedent makes it inevitable to also question the events of 2026. 
But questioning doesn't mean we already have the answer.

We do not have sufficient evidence to conclude that Rabat organized or 
deliberately provoked the July 30 crossing. This would be a logical leap 
that the sources collected so far do not allow.

However, we can affirm something more solid: the European border control 
system is structurally dependent on Moroccan cooperation. Part of the 
control of access to Spanish territory is exercised by Moroccan 
authorities, on Moroccan soil, before people even reach Ceuta.

On August 15th, we saw this with particular clarity: roads patrolled, 
access to Fnideq monitored, people stopped and dispersed before reaching 
the coast. On July 30th, whatever the reason, that system failed to 
prevent tens of thousands of people from crossing .

And it was then that the border showed all its fragility.

The paradox of sovereignty
At this point we can push the reasoning to the point of paradox.

Spain considers Ceuta an integral and indisputable part of its 
territory. Morocco disputes that sovereignty. Yet Madrid needs Rabat to 
effectively exercise one of the functions we associate more than any 
other with state sovereignty: controlling who can cross the border.

If Europe deems it essential for Morocco to prevent people from reaching 
Ceuta and Melilla, we might provocatively ask ourselves: why not leave 
Morocco directly in control of those borders?

This isn't a proposal about the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla. It's 
the paradox created by the European model of migration control.

Madrid claims territorial sovereignty, but a key part of the effective 
control of mobility takes place outside its territory. Morocco, 
precisely because it performs this function, in turn acquires 
negotiating power vis-à-vis Spain and the European Union.

The more Europe wants to make the border waterproof, the more it depends 
on the cooperation of those on the other side.

From Ceuta to Albania
Ceuta, from this perspective, is no exception. It is perhaps just one of 
the places where the mechanism becomes easier to see.

The Italy-Albania agreement has moved some procedures relating to 
migrants conducted in centers established by Italy on Albanian soil 
outside of Italy. The European debate on so-called return hubs goes even 
further and envisions facilities located in third countries to which 
individuals subject to repatriation orders can be transferred.

Naturally, these are legally different instruments. It would be wrong to 
confuse them. In Ceuta, controls are preempted, attempting to prevent 
people from reaching the border; in the Albanian model, some procedures 
are transferred outside the EU; with return hubs , the idea is to 
transfer people destined for repatriation there.

The times are different, but the political direction is common: to 
ensure that an ever-increasing share of migration management and control 
takes place outside the Union.

The result is another contradiction. Europe proclaims its desire to 
regain control of its borders and, to do so, entrusts part of that 
control to states and institutions outside the Union.

The European border isn't disappearing. It's expanding.

And meanwhile we die
If we look only at relations between Madrid, Rabat, and Brussels, 
however, we risk losing sight of what is actually happening on that border.

Caminando Fronteras had already documented an increase in swimming 
crossings to Ceuta before July 30. They were mostly young people, many 
minors. Some had diving suits, others used precarious flotation devices. 
They crossed at night, in fog, with strong east or west winds, even on 
moonless nights. Some remained in the water for many hours.[9]

The consequences were already visible in cemeteries on both sides. 
Bodies recovered from the sea, missing persons, families unable to reach 
Ceuta, difficulties obtaining DNA samples and identifying the dead.

Then comes July 30th and the scale of the tragedy changes.

On August 1st, Caminando Fronteras counted 84 dead, 67 on the Ceuta side 
and 17 in Fnideq, in addition to numerous missing persons. In the 
following days, the organization repeatedly updated its toll: on August 
6th it spoke of 141 victims , 78 bodies recovered on the Spanish side 
and 63 on the Moroccan side. On August 12th the number rose again, to 
145 dead .[10]

These figures must be accurately attributed to the source, as they don't 
necessarily match the official counts. But even this difference tells us 
something. Even establishing how many people died, who they are, and 
where their families are becomes part of the border problem.

Because the border doesn't just decide who can cross. It can prevent a 
mother from reaching the place where her son is buried.

Security is also a market
Helena Maleno, founder of Caminando Fronteras, finally introduces an 
element that deserves to be taken seriously: an economy has developed 
around the closing of borders .

The more immigration is portrayed as a security issue, the greater the 
demand for tools capable of controlling it. Surveillance of kilometers 
of border means purchasing technologies, building infrastructure, 
developing IT systems, employing personnel, and financing control 
mechanisms. This demand is fueled by surveillance, security, military, 
and information technology companies. When the border is outsourced, 
some of the resources allocated to control are transferred to the 
countries tasked with preventing departures or crossings.

You don't have to imagine a conspiracy to see the mechanism. It's enough 
to observe how it works.

Legal entry options are being restricted. Those who continue to need or 
desire to move seek other routes, often more difficult and dangerous. 
These crossings are in turn presented as evidence of the need to 
strengthen the border, fueling new investments in surveillance and control.

This creates a cycle in which the closure of the border contributes to 
producing precisely the conditions of risk and irregularity that are 
then invoked to justify its further strengthening.

When a person becomes an invasion
After July 30th, the vocabulary also changes rapidly.

Vox speaks of an "invasion". The same term appears in statements by 
representatives of the Partido Popular. But the crisis immediately goes 
beyond the Spanish-Moroccan border. From 1 August, the Meloni government 
temporarily reintroduces controls on connections from Spain, justifying 
the decision with the risk of secondary movements from Ceuta towards 
other European countries. Madrid protests; Rome maintains the measure, 
arguing that it will remain in force until security risks are 
eliminated.[11]

This is a significant step. A crisis on Spain's African border has also 
brought a border back into existence between two Schengen Area countries.

The parallels between the Spanish and Italian right-wing movements are 
hard to ignore. Faced with a complex migration phenomenon, political 
discourse unfolds through very similar categories: loss of control, 
threat to security, and border defense.

But calling what happened in Ceuta an "invasion" isn't just a harsher 
term. It's transforming thousands of different people into a single, 
hostile entity. The Moroccan boy who thought for a few hours he could 
cross the border, the sixteen-year-old Sudanese man who fled the war, 
the young Eritrean who has been crossing North Africa for years, have 
all disappeared. What remains is an "invading" mass.

And it is precisely this representation that makes the next step 
politically acceptable. If the mobility of people is constructed as a 
threat, the response becomes to move the place where it can be stopped 
further and further away. If one external border isn't enough, another 
is built further back. The transit country is asked to prevent people 
from arriving. And if someone still manages to enter, third countries 
are sought to resettle them.

This is how a border gradually ceases to be a place and becomes a system.

The border that doesn't exist
Perhaps this is precisely what Ceuta forces us to see.

We continue to represent the border as a line on the map. But the real 
border of Ceuta begins long before the Tarajal and continues long after.

It begins when a Moroccan patrol stops a young man on the road to 
Fnideq. It continues when that young man nevertheless manages to reach 
the sea and decides to swim. It continues when the Guardia Civil decides 
how to treat him, when a judge decides what guarantees he is entitled 
to, when the administration evaluates his request for international 
protection, and when Morocco decides whether to accept his return.

And it can continue even after death, when a family tries to find out if 
one of the bodies recovered from the sea belongs to the person they are 
looking for.

On July 30, for a few hours, this system failed to do what it was 
designed to do: prevent or control the crossing.

Seventy-two thousand people crossed the border. The vast majority were 
Moroccan and quickly returned to Morocco. A much smaller portion were 
people who had traveled extensively through Africa and who, for this 
very reason, had very different reasons for not returning.

Putting everyone under the same umbrella - migrants , illegal immigrants 
, invaders - erases precisely what we need to understand.

But for a few hours, those different stories converged at the same 
point. The belief spread that a border once considered impassable could 
be crossed. And tens of thousands of people attempted.

The political response has been to strengthen it: making that border 
more difficult to reach, intensifying cooperation with Morocco, 
installing new containment devices, increasing controls, and once again 
discussing how to move some of the management of people Europe does not 
want to welcome outside of Europe.

We can continue on this path. We can move the border further south, 
entrust its control to other governments, increase surveillance tools, 
and build new places to detain those who still manage to cross.

But Ceuta leaves on the table a question that comes before all these 
solutions.

If to defend a border we must continually extend it beyond the border 
itself, to the point of transforming entire countries into containment 
territories, what are we really defending?

Totò Caggese

Notes and sources
Photo of migrants on Trampolín beach with a riot policeman - RTVE

[1]Ministerio del Interior, press releases of 3 and 4 August 2026. On 3 
August Grande-Marlaska still indicated an estimate of 50-60,000 entries; 
the following day, speaking at the extraordinary meeting of EU Interior 
Ministers, he set the figure at 72,000 , specifying that over 70,000 
people had already left Ceuta.

[2]RTVE Noticias, Marta Rey Maté, Los subsaharianos que entraron a Ceuta 
huyendo del hambre y la war: «No es que quiera quedarme, es que lo 
necesimo» , 2 August 2026, updated on 3 August. The report explicitly 
distinguishes the Moroccan «gran mayoría» from people coming mainly from 
Sudan and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel 
concentrated around the CETI.

[3]El País , live coverage of the Ceuta crisis, 31 July-1 August 2026; 
Ministerio del Interior, 4 August 2026. The different counts published 
in the first few days reflect the progressive consolidation of the 
official figure, later set at 72,000.

[4]Supreme Court, Fifth Section of the Administrative Court, ruling STS 
814/2026, 29 June 2026, published on 8 July 2026 on the scope of the 
tenth additional provision of the Foreign Law and on the applicability 
of the rechazo en frontera to swimming entries into Ceuta.

[5]Ministerio del Interior, press release of 30 July 2026. The ministry 
attributed the dissemination of an instrumental reading of the sentence 
to human trafficking networks and at the same time thanked the Moroccan 
authorities for having prevented thousands of attempted entries in the 
previous days.

[6]Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains (OMDH), report on recent 
crossing attempts towards Ceuta and Melilla, August 2026. In addition to 
digital disinformation, the organisation refers to economic, social, 
psychological and cultural factors, criticises the tightening of 
European migration policies and calls for safe, orderly and regular 
migration routes.

[7]Amnistía Internacional España, Amnistía Internacional pide 
información a España sobre la respuesta a la llegada masiva de personas 
a Ceuta y denuncia posibles devoluciones sumarias , 13 August 2026. The 
organization has asked the Spanish authorities for information on the 
approximately 70,000 people reported as having returned to Morocco, 
including the distinction between voluntary and forced returns and the 
procedural guarantees applied. Amnesty also calls for any voluntary 
return to be based on the free and informed consent of the person, 
without any coercion.

[8]Official Spanish tourism portal, page dedicated to Ceuta. The wording 
is interesting above all as a Spanish institutional representation of 
the history and sovereignty of the city, not as a neutral source on the 
territorial dispute.

[9]Caminando Fronteras, Ceuta ciudad frontera: principio y fin de muchas 
vidas , 16 May 2026. The organization documents the crossings through 
the fence and by swimming, the significant presence of young people and 
minors and the difficulties of families in identifying dead or missing 
people.

[10]Caminando Fronteras, Pain in the Ceuta border , August 3, 2026; 
Alberto Mesas, interview with Helena Maleno, El Salto , August 6, 2026, 
updated August 10; Caminando Fronteras update reported August 12, 2026. 
The organization's tally goes from 84 confirmed victims on August 1 to 
141 reported in the following days, up to 145 victims registered as of 
August 11: 78 bodies recovered in Ceuta and 67 in Moroccan territory . 
This is Caminando Fronteras' count, to be distinguished from the 
official counts of the Spanish and Moroccan authorities.

[1 1]Italian Ministry of the Interior, Hearing of the Minister of the 
Interior Matteo Piantedosi on the reintroduction of border controls 
between Italy and Spain , Parliamentary Committee for the Control of the 
Implementation of the Schengen Agreement, 13 August 2026. The minister 
attributed the temporary reintroduction of controls to the risk of 
secondary movements following entries from Ceuta.

https://umanitanova.org/ceuta-la-frontiera-che-non-ce/
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