A-Infos (en) France, OCL CA #361 - Points to consider regarding the rightward shift in society (Part Two) (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

We saw in the first part of this text that the growing support among the 
"working classes" for the National Rally's (RN) discourse stemmed more 
from job insecurity than from a change in "mentality": working-class 
circles, in particular, continue to value work and autonomy as they did 
when the Communist Party held sway there. The RN's success is explained 
more by the worsening conditions of economic exploitation (observable on 
a global scale) than by the party's themes-its competitors, moreover, 
are adopting them to varying degrees, especially regarding security.
The left, however, persists in waging a "cultural battle" against the 
far right and in denouncing "neoliberal" policies rather than capitalism 
itself. She also frequently tends to link the rightward shift of French 
society to the rise of the National Rally (RN) and to blame the "working 
classes": these groups vote "wrongly" or abstain, whereas they would 
vote "correctly" if they gave their votes to a "camp of change" that 
defends their interests. But that would have to be the case... because 
the orientation of social democracy, which is dominant in this camp, has 
largely demonstrated the opposite for decades*.

The commonly heard discourse about a "rightward shift in France" 
contains falsehoods that must be debunked: the rejection of others 
(linked to class contempt, racist prejudices, homophobia, etc.) is not 
exclusive to the "working classes," as it is found at all levels of the 
social hierarchy, and not only among people "on the right." It is its 
expression that varies according to social background-factors such as 
education or temperament contributing to making it more or less crude or 
refined, direct or indirect, and so on.
Furthermore, to speak of a "rightward shift in French society" is to 
reason by adopting the codes and historical references of its 
"representative democracy" (the seats occupied by the left and the right 
in the National Assembly, and the respective values attributed to these 
schools of thought).
Finally, we must not lose sight of the fact that most political 
formations have an interest in maintaining the idea of a France on the 
right, or turning in that direction: through this means, the far right, 
the right and the Macronist "extreme center" can give themselves 
democratic legitimacy; the Socialist Party (with the Greens and the 
Communist Party in its wake) can justify its betrayals and its 
"prudence"; La France insoumise (LFI) can present itself as the main 
recourse against the RN; the far left can attribute the current weak 
appeal of its "political offer" to this "rightward drift" of society - 
and the same goes for anarchists (theoretically outside the right/left 
framework, but often placed in the "ultra-left" or the "radical left").

Is the "rightward shift of society" an invention of right-wing elites?
The idea that France is shifting to the right is, however, contested by 
"left-wing" specialists.
In his article "Why the Rightward Shift in France is a Myth" [1], 
sociologist Nicolas Framont asserts that it is pure propaganda 
disseminated by right-wing media and politicians to modify behavior: 
"The bourgeoisie, having a near-monopoly on information and ideas, 
drowns us in data that tends to discourage us from resisting or fighting 
it, for lack of hope of success."

We can easily agree with him that welcoming refugees, for example, has 
become a position nowhere to be found in the "mainstream media" (they 
instead bombard their audience with polls about insecurity caused by 
"foreigners"); or with the idea that the bourgeoisie has the means to 
manufacture "public opinion"... But the bourgeoisie is not necessarily 
"right-wing" - and by criticizing only the most savage forms of the 
capitalist system and the state institution, left-wing propaganda 
(against "neoliberalism" and for a "social state") of course strengthens 
them both.

Framont bases his argument on La Droitisation française - Mythe et 
réalités: comment citoyens et électeurs divergent[[PUF, 2024.]], by 
sociologist Vincent Tiberj. For the latter, the rightward shift of 
society is "the political domination of a certain number of ideas that 
could be described as right-wing, such as the rise of economic 
liberalism, and especially of movements that would be rather 
conservative in cultural terms, whether on issues of sexual minorities, 
on issues of immigration and culturalism [2] ".

In his book, Tiberj denounces methodological shortcomings in surveys 
conducted on the rightward shift of French society. By compiling 
hundreds of studies and polls published over the past forty years, his 
findings contradict this rightward shift. According to his own results, 
the majority of French people, on the contrary, lean left in their value 
system, concerning wealth distribution, social mores, and immigration; 
homosexuality is widely accepted (from 29% in 1981 to 80-90% today); the 
percentage of French people who believe there are "too many immigrants" 
has decreased (from 69% in 1988 to 53%); and economic measures 
championed by the left, particularly those of La France Insoumise 
(retirement at 60, raising the minimum wage, taxing dividends, massive 
reopening of hospital beds, etc.), are widely supported.


In Rennes
Tiberj concludes that the rightward shift in society is a construct of 
media and political elites: they impose and normalize certain themes in 
the public sphere. Elections clearly show a shift to the right (the 
National Rally garnered 31.37% of the vote in the 2024 European 
elections, and came out on top in the first round of the subsequent 
legislative elections), but they poorly reflect the opinions of 
"citizens" given the high rate of abstention - which has been growing 
since François Hollande's presidency (2012-2017), particularly among 
young people.

Abstention, which Tiberj places on the left, is, according to him, due 
to the discrediting of an electoral system that does not allow for the 
expression of one's opinion, as political choices are increasingly 
constrained (since 2002, the "negative vote," cast "for lack of a better 
option," has grown massively). The proportion of people who do not 
identify with any party or political leaning has increased 
significantly-also since Hollande's presidency-because of the prevailing 
conviction that they cannot be heard by those in power, and because 
there is a very strong distrust of the left (social democracy having 
sidelined economic and social issues, or its discourse on them being 
rather vague). Abstainers are therefore not simply "undecided," but 
rather people disappointed by both the political options available and 
the representative system. The fact that abstentions are primarily from 
the working class and younger generations reinforces the electoral 
weight of retirees and the upper classes, who are rarely in favor of 
redistribution and cultural openness. The National Rally's strong 
showing is therefore mainly due to a rightward shift among right-wing 
voters (particularly the Republicans' - LR) base), and, with France's 
demographic evolution, this trend will intensify, making elected 
officials even less representative and legitimate. The mobilizations 
against reforms pursued by successive governments prove that the 
population holds a much more left-leaning viewpoint than the majority of 
media and political elites (and we observe that, in these moments, the 
far right becomes invisible because it has nothing to say on these 
issues); but, despite its weak electoral legitimacy, the Macron 
administration pushes through these reforms (through the use of Article 
49.3 or agreements with the Socialist Party).

The rightward shift of society begins on... the left
While it is difficult to assert, like Tiberj, that abstainers belong 
entirely to the traditional left-wing electorate, namely the "working 
classes", it is certain that these "working classes" have had multiple 
reasons for detaching themselves from the left for half a century:
The deindustrialization of France began with the "Mitterrand years" 
(1981-1995), and the closures or relocations of companies were carried 
out all the more easily because the workers' unions did not mobilize 
against them so as not to harm the "socialist" power.

During Hollande's presidency, the left continued to support the 
"neoliberal" transformations of society (privatization, liberalization, 
increased flexibility, and precarious employment). In 2012, a report by 
the think tank Terra Nova explicitly recommended that the Socialist 
Party (PS) abandon its "historical class coalition" (the conservative 
"cultural values" of the working class being deemed incompatible with 
the left's agenda) and seek a new social base among graduates, young 
people, women, and minorities. This led to the creation of a "bourgeois 
bloc." This alliance between groups from the former right-wing bloc 
opted for a "neoliberal" economic policy geared toward the upper 
classes, while hoping that the left-wing electorate hostile to 
"neoliberalism" but not inclined to abstain or vote for the right would 
nonetheless support it.

Regarding the working-class neighborhoods of postcolonial immigration, 
the left gradually broke away: in 1984, the Socialist Party launched SOS 
Racisme to counter the protest movement in the suburbs (with its March 
for Equality and Against Racism in 1983 and its denunciation of police 
violence). Among other things, it discredited workers' strikes carried 
out by Muslim workers; After the 2015 jihadist attacks, he borrowed from 
the National Front (FN, ancestor of the RN) the idea of stripping dual 
nationals of their French nationality... and that same year he 
officially buried the right to vote for foreigners which had been in his 
program since 1981.
Hollande emphasized "societal" measures (such as "marriage for all") 
rather than social ones, and he did not hesitate to repress a good part 
of his electorate during the mobilization against the "labor law" in 
2016 - which gave rise to the slogan "P for rotten, S for bastard, down 
with the Socialist Party!".

Furthermore, the left lied about promises of social mobility through 
education: social reproduction remains very important, and it has been 
reinforced by rising unemployment and job insecurity, which has made 
family solidarity essential. Far from questioning the social hierarchy, 
the left speaks of "equal opportunities," and inequalities between male 
and female professions, or between manual and intellectual labor, remain 
deeply entrenched.

Today, the left is perceived by the "working classes" as a movement 
representing the upper classes. This image stems from the bourgeois 
background of its political personnel (including those of La France 
Insoumise, and the Greens hold the record). The SFIO and then the 
Socialist Party were led by bourgeois figures (often men of letters or 
lawyers); and while the French Communist Party deliberately 
"proletarianized" its apparatus from the 1920s onward, its current 
leaders are less likely to come from the "working classes" (moreover, 
they entered politics not by participating in union struggles, but by 
working as staff for elected officials or by pursuing studies in that 
field).

The Bourse du Travail (Labor Exchange) in Paris was kettled on June 28, 
2016. A banner on its facade read: "Whether nationalist, republican or 
socialist, let's get rid of the right wing."
The left's recipe: winning elections and the "culture battle"...
At the beginning of the last century, social democracy chose the 
electoral path to seize control of the state.
Since the "Common Program" signed in 1972 and the resulting "Union of 
the Left," the Communist Party (PCF) has also favored this approach. It 
was the leading left-wing party in France until the end of the 1970s, 
but subsequently declined, especially after the collapse of "communist" 
regimes worldwide in 1989-1991.
Despite its anti-capitalist rhetoric, La France Insoumise (LFI) does not 
distinguish itself from social democracy. It has built an electoral 
machine geared towards the presidential election and does not, strictly 
speaking, have members, only supporters gathered online; it aims to 
reform French capitalism through social redistribution measures and 
Keynesian stimulus programs, and wants to give the state a greater role 
in the economy (see box). This program is already enough to upset many 
of the supporters of the established order - hence the demonization of 
LFI by its competitors and their media allies - but it has nothing to do 
with anti-capitalism, which implies abolishing the lucrative ownership 
of capital.

The recent evolution of the left in the broadest sense stems of course, 
and above all, from the economic and political upheavals that have taken 
place on a global scale since the 1980s - notably with the unleashing of 
"neoliberalism" (under the governments of Pinochet, Thatcher and Reagan) 
which "deregulated" work, and the fall of the Berlin Wall and then of 
the "Eastern Bloc" which allowed capitalist propaganda to bury "communism".

In France, these events had major repercussions on political life. As 
historian Gérard Noiriel pointed out [3], all parties saw a collapse in 
the number of their active members and lost their ability to seize power 
by force.

Today, far-left and far-right groups seeking to replace democracy with 
"communism" or "national revolution" have virtually disappeared. LFI (La 
France Insoumise) denies belonging to the far left (rightly so, since it 
is nationalist, republican, and secular), the RN (Rassemblement 
National) does the same regarding the far right, and neither of these 
two parties explicitly aims to overthrow the Republic.

All parties are therefore operating on an electoral platform that makes 
them increasingly dependent on the media and polling institutes (their 
"popularity ratings" depend on them). As Noiriel notes, political life 
revolves around elections, and sensational news stories (disasters or 
crimes) play a crucial role. The emotional impact they generate 
increases media audiences, and therefore advertising revenue; 
consequently, it is the political commentary industry that decides how 
to interpret these events based on the electoral calendar. The death of 
the neo-fascist Quentin Deranque on February 14, 2026, received such 
significant attention because it occurred within the context of the 
upcoming municipal and presidential elections, and because LFI's 
opponents seized this opportunity to weaken the party by highlighting 
its links with the Young Guard [4].

Similarly, in a society where commodified politics relies on 
all-encompassing information, the left and right wage "cultural 
battles"-the former with the intellectual media (and universities), the 
latter with media aimed at the working class (and social networks). 
However, the left's "cultural battle" against the far right is proving 
insufficient, as support for the National Rally (RN) is growing, and an 
alliance with a faction of the Republicans (LR) could potentially lead 
to its election as President of the Republic in 2027.

Action in Millau by the collective fighting against the "labor law", May 
29, 2016, at the Socialist Party headquarters
France Unbowed criticized from its left

Rob Grams, deputy editor of Frustration magazine , recently wrote a 
lengthy review of * New People, New Left * (1). This collective work 
(2), to which figures from La France Insoumise (such as Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon and Clémence Guetté), or those situated "to the left of the 
left" (such as Nancy Fraser), contributed, focuses on the complete 
disconnect between the left and the "working classes." Its authors 
examine key episodes in the relationship between them, as well as their 
respective evolutions, with the aim of constructing a "new left" from 
what they consider a "new people," taking into account its diversity and 
sociological transformations.

Grams's judgment of their analyses is quite harsh:
"* New People, New Left offers often solid empirical diagnoses of the 
evolution of the working class, the interweaving of relations of 
domination, and the importance of concrete struggles,[but]the conceptual 
and strategic conclusions drawn from them appear out of step with these 
observations. For[while acknowledging]the fragmentation of the 
wage-earning class, the distrust of institutions, the richness of 
autonomous mobilizations, and the limitations of trade unionism and 
traditional parties,[its authors]continue to make electoral conquest-and 
in particular the presidential election-the insurmountable horizon of 
any political strategy. (...)
* The working classes (...) appear less as political subjects in the 
making than as an electoral base to be reconquered." More broadly, the 
substitution of "the people" for class, the focus on "networks" rather 
than on relations of production, or the emphasis on "resistance to 
neoliberalism" rather than a break with capitalism, reflect the 
theoretical shift that attempts to validate this strategic orientation a 
priori. Far from constituting a refounding, this "new left" thus seems 
to oscillate between a genuine renewal of certain diagnoses and a 
perpetuation, in updated forms, of the classic limitations of social 
democracy. (...)
*  "New people, new left" illuminates less the paths to transcending 
capitalism than it reveals, implicitly, the contradictions of a strategy 
that claims to be based on it without ever truly providing the means to 
do so.

Box Notes
1. "  The people or the class? The strategic ambiguities of La France 
insoumise  ", posted on Frustration magazine on March 31, 2026.
2. Published by the La Boétie Institute and released by Amsterdam 
Editions in 2025, it was coordinated by sociologist Julien Talpin and 
contains 21 contributions.

... but a recipe that is contested on the left
Faced with such a finding, the choice to intervene solely on the 
cultural field is questioned within the French left - and it is also 
debated in other countries, as shown by The Matrix of Social Classes - 
Social Theory after the "cultural turn" by the American sociologist 
Vivek Chibber [5].

In the 1980s in the United States, Marxist academics developed a theory 
that attributed the "consent of the subaltern classes" to capitalism, 
and therefore the "political stabilization" of this system, not to the 
social structure (the "infrastructure"), but to culture, language, and 
identity (the "superstructure"). The dominant class would not simply 
express or coordinate the interests of the "subaltern classes": it would 
shape their interests and needs through the media, educational 
structures, religion, and so on.

Chibber recalls that the theory of these academics gave them a leading 
role, "because, lacking a social base, left-wing or far-left 
organizations were quick to join them to wage their 'cultural battle': 
through words, the media and the return of 'grand narratives', it was 
possible to convince people to join the camp that aligned with their 
class interests, for example."

Chibber considers this choice "excessive and ineffective" because 
"hegemony also relies, and perhaps primarily, on material forces, 
tangible structures [6] ." According to him, consent and ideology (whose 
importance has been demonstrated by theorists Max Horkheimer, Theodor 
Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Antonio Gramsci) should not be neglected, 
but consent and ideology play a secondary role in the working class's 
adherence to the system of economic exploitation. What prevails is the 
resignation fostered by "asymmetrical material relations." In the 
"neoliberal" era, the "subaltern classes" have experienced a persistent 
decline in their standard of living and a deterioration of their working 
conditions in many countries, but despite the profound discontent this 
situation arouses among them (as well as the growing gap between capital 
owners and the rest of the population), workers' resistance has 
diminished. This phenomenon stems from a lack of perspective and the 
belief that capitalism is insurmountable. "Workers submit to capitalism 
not because they consider it legitimate or just, but because they see no 
real possibility of changing it"; and, contrary to what Marx argued, 
their resistance is first and foremost on an individual basis, as this 
approach is less risky and politically costly than collective action.

In other words, the exploited may resign themselves to accepting 
capitalism for two reasons: the material impossibility of escaping it 
(their structural position forcing them to sell their labor power), and 
the existence of obstacles to their formation into a class capable of 
destroying capitalism through collective action-what Karl Marx, in 
Capital, calls the "deafening pressure of economic relations." Thus, 
Chibber emphasizes, workers' consent is not obtained through ideological 
indoctrination, but through "the pressure of circumstances": workers 
rationalize "the pressures exerted upon them as being in the natural 
order of things-it's painful, we hate it, but we can't change it."

Faced with the success of the far right among the "subaltern classes," 
Chibber nevertheless asks in his work: "How can we understand that 
consent and resignation have taken this offensive form of manifest 
adherence to reactionary or fascist movements? And, above all, how can 
we fight them?"

Vanina

(The end will be in the next issue.)


Leading the procession in Lyon on September 15, 2016
* The photos illustrating this article were taken during the 
mobilization against the "labor law" of 2016.

Notes
[1] On Frustration magazine , March 17, 2025.

[2] Cairn.info, January 1, 2025.

[3] "The death of Quentin Deranque was exploited by the RN to pursue its 
strategy of 'de-demonization'", Le Monde , February 27, 2026.

[4] Members of this anti-fascist organization were charged with 
"involuntary manslaughter" after Deranque's death

[5] Released in the United States in 2022, by Agone in 2026.

[6] This quote and the following ones are taken from the article "The 
cultural battle is not enough", by Vivek Chibber, published in Le Monde 
diplomatique in February 2026.

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