A-Infos (en) Italy, FAI, Umanita Nova #22-26 - The oppression of internal war grows. Iran: The unstable truce and the restructuring of regional power (ca, de, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

The interim agreement signed in June 2026 between the United States and 
Iran does not represent a structural solution to the Middle East crisis, 
but rather the entry into a different phase of the conflict, marked by 
greater political and security complexity. The bilateral memorandum of 
understanding, based on a sixty-day interim truce, the easing of some 
economic sanctions, and the partial reopening of trade routes in the 
Persian Gulf, was born as a tactical solution to an escalation that 
threatened to overwhelm global markets and international energy 
security. However, its architecture presents a fundamental 
contradiction: while the agreement calls for a cessation of hostilities 
in Lebanon, the militarily active actor against the Shiite militias is 
not Washington but Israel, whose security doctrine is unlikely to be 
reconciled with the constraints of a bilateral agreement perceived as 
favorable to Tehran.

To understand the reopening of the conflict between Iran and the Western 
bloc, it is necessary to trace the historical trajectory of the 
Israeli-Iranian conflict after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Since then, 
Tel Aviv's constant goal has been to keep Iran in a state of internal 
weakness and geopolitical isolation, deemed more compatible with Israeli 
national security. At the same time, the Israeli right's management of 
the Palestinian front, particularly under the leadership of Benjamin 
Netanyahu and the Likud, has responded to a logic of political 
fragmentation: for years, Israeli governments tolerated Hamas's control 
of the Gaza Strip, thus weakening the Palestinian National Authority in 
Ramallah and hindering any concrete prospect of a two-state solution. 
Keeping Hamas active in Gaza meant maintaining a permanent state of 
emergency, useful both internally and as a justification for Western 
partners.

The attack of October 7, 2023, however, marked the breaking point of 
this doctrine. Israel gradually abandoned simple containment and shifted 
to a strategy of dismantling Iran's proximity network, targeting Hamas 
in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and more generally Tehran's strategic 
depth. During this phase, the United States accompanied and supported 
this trajectory through years of sanctions, economic pressure, and 
aggressive campaigns under the pretext of nuclear containment, 
effectively providing constant geopolitical leverage to the Israeli 
stance. Direct war between Israel, the United States, and Iran then 
erupted in early 2026, with the elimination of key figures in the 
Iranian leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and the 
frontline of national defense and security.

Khamenei's demise and the decapitation of the military leadership have 
profoundly altered the structure of Iranian governance, accelerating the 
shift from a hierarchical, pyramidal model to a more horizontal, 
security-focused configuration. Historically, the Supreme Leader 
represented the absolute balance of power within the system, arbitrating 
tensions between the clergy, political institutions, and the security 
apparatus. In the absence of such a central figure, power was 
distributed among a network of parallel commands, more autonomous and 
less subject to civilian control. The succession of Mujtaba Khamenei met 
with strong theological and political reservations, but this very 
weakness made the new leader increasingly dependent on the military 
apparatus of the Pasdaran, which assumed the role of custodian and 
direct control of the state's decision-making centers.

Meanwhile, the reformist presidency of Masoud Pezeshkian has remained 
effectively paralyzed. Elected on the promise of introducing economic 
reforms and limiting the repressive apparatus, Pezeshkian has been 
excluded from crucial decisions on national security and foreign policy, 
now monopolized by an informal military council linked to the IRGC. On 
the ground, this transition has translated into a decentralized 
confrontation doctrine, in which local commanders of naval and missile 
forces operate according to pre-established protocols and with 
considerable autonomy, responding to attacks and targeting maritime 
traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, even in the absence of direct orders 
from the capital. This structure has rendered American diplomatic 
pressure ineffective, prompting Donald Trump to publicly declare that he 
does not know who really leads Iran, but it has also allowed the regime 
to better absorb the effects of targeted offensives.

The start of talks was hampered by a deep climate of mutual distrust. 
Tehran demanded immediate guarantees regarding the withdrawal of its 
naval forces from the Gulf, the unfreezing of financial assets abroad, 
and the inclusion of the truce on the Lebanese front. Mediation 
nevertheless led to the signing, on June 17, 2026, of a transitional 
memorandum that guaranteed Iran significant economic concessions in 
exchange for a temporary commitment not to exceed the military threshold 
in the development of its nuclear program. However, the text does not 
address the dismantling of Iran's missile arsenal or the reduction of 
conventional forces, drawing criticism from Israel and fueling the idea 
that the truce was effectively a financial lifeline for a regime 
otherwise on the verge of default. Domestically, however, the agreement 
had an even more significant effect: it strengthened the bond between 
the religious leadership, the military, and the economy controlled by 
the Pasdaran. The IRGC dominates much of Iran's productive and financial 
structure, controlling banks, shipping companies, port infrastructure, 
and gray market oil trafficking. In a system where foreign investment 
must be conducted through joint ventures with local partners, and where 
many strategic businesses are controlled by military foundations or 
holding companies, financial flows resulting from the easing of 
restrictions almost inevitably end up in the hands of the security 
apparatus. The truce has thus further strengthened the 
religious-military blockade around Mujtaba Khamenei, while the merchant 
bourgeoisie, affected by the partial reopening of trade and the thawing 
of some activities in the Gulf, has reduced its hostility toward the regime.

But tactical successes in negotiations have not translated into any 
relief for Iranian civil society. On the contrary, the shift in power 
towards ultra-security has coincided with a harsh intensification of 
internal repression. In 2025, Iran saw a dramatic surge in executions, 
with over 2,000 death sentences carried out, while in 2026, open war 
with Israel and the United States provided the regime with a pretext to 
justify preventive arrests, repression of dissent, and criminalization 
of suspected collaboration. The protests that erupted between late 2025 
and early 2026 were brutally suppressed, amid a near-total information 
blackout and a widespread presence of foreign security forces and Shiite 
militias. Estimates of civilian casualties are extremely high, 
testifying to the severity of a repressive apparatus that has now become 
a standard instrument of government.

At the end of the day, the 2026 truce does not resolve the conflict but 
confirms the stalemate of all the main players in the Middle East 
crisis. The United States regains economic and maritime maneuvering 
margins, but without truly undermining Iran's strategic resolve. Israel, 
despite having dealt severe blows to Tehran's external structures, finds 
itself faced with a more rigid, more security-minded Iranian leadership, 
less susceptible to pressure. The entire game thus continues to be 
played out at the expense of civilian populations: in Iran, under the 
weight of state terror and political hangings; in Gaza and Lebanon, 
under the destructive effects of a war measured not only by the balance 
of power, but by the number of lives lost.

JR

https://umanitanova.org/cresce-loppressione-della-guerra-interna-iran-la-tregua-instabile-e-la-ristrutturazione-del-potere-regionale/
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