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(en) France, OCL CA #355 - Behind the Apparent Militarization of the United States (ca, de, fr, it, pt, tr)[machine translation]

Date Thu, 15 Jan 2026 08:08:34 +0200


Are the United States experiencing a surge in militarization? This question arises today partly due to the ripple effect of increased military spending in Europe and beyond, and partly due to the dramatic and chaotic measures taken by Trump, from the bombing of Iran to the destruction of Venezuelan fishing boats (resulting in at least 83 deaths), and including the deployment of the National Guard to intimidate the population of cities governed by the Democratic Party. Furthermore, the arms industry has played a significant role in the American economy since World War II, so much so that Republican President (and former general) Eisenhower warned, in his farewell address in January 1961, against the growing influence of the "military-industrial complex."

The problem is therefore not new, even if anti-imperialists regularly sound the alarm, generally citing the absolute figures for the national defense budget or arms production in the United States. Before considering the influence of either on the economy, exports, or social life of the country, let's take a brief look at the historical data.

As a share of GDP, American military spending reached its post-war peak in 1953 (Korean War): 13.58%. It subsequently fluctuated between 8% and 10% during several years of the arms race; a slight dip followed by a rise to 9.42% in 1967 (Vietnam War); a continuous decline until 1978, to 4.94%; and a further increase under Reagan to 6.81% in 1982. An average of 3.89% during the 1990s (the Clinton era); a moderate increase as part of the "war on terror" from 2002 to a peak of 4.9% in 2010 (under Obama), then another notable low between 2015 and 2024, with an annual average slightly below 3.4%. By comparison, the percentage of GDP devoted to military spending in 2024 was over 7% in Russia and Saudi Arabia (the main customer of American arms in the Middle East, ahead of Israel), 8% in Algeria, nearly 9% in Israel, but also 4.2% in Poland.

What is the situation today? Trump is making a catching-up effort... but only just, since the 2026 budget is equivalent in real terms to only 3.2% of GDP (compared to approximately 3% for the previous fiscal year), given persistent inflation exacerbated by tariffs (1). Of course, this doesn't exhaust the subject, especially since the United States alone accounted for 37% of total global military spending in 2024. Moreover: "US arms exports increased by 21% between 2015-19 and 2020-24, and their share of global exports rose from 35% to 43% (2)." In this area, as in others, the continuity between Biden and Trump is worth noting.

The size of the American military budget is hardly mysterious when one considers the country's weight in the global economy and its role, since the 1940s, as the center of the capitalist empire, which presupposes the existence of military bases abroad and intervention forces. What must be grasped, rather, is its disproportionate impact on industry, basic research, employment, and social life in the United States; this is what some have called "military Keynesianism." The powerful arms industry immediately springs to mind, but without the centralization and planning instituted by the state during the Second World War and maintained in part afterward, sectors like electronics, especially semiconductors, would also not have experienced the takeoff that would secure such a lead for this supposedly liberal country. There's no need to look any further for the reasons behind the support given by so many American union leaders to the anti-Soviet crusade: fearing a return to the mass unemployment of the 1930s, they had understood during the war how beneficial nationalization and militarization could be.

"Waste, fraud, and abuse": this phrase, thrown around by the Republican Party to justify the dismantling of public services, applies nowhere more accurately than to the military procurement system up until the 1980s. Dubious bidding processes, inflated prices upon delivery, missed deadlines, inconsistent quality... It was then that the wave of deregulation and "shareholder value" swept across the United States, and the arms industry, like so many others, fell prey to the infamous corporate raiders in a spiral of acquisitions, debt, and disappearances. In addition, with the end of the USSR and the election of Bill Clinton, military orders fell by 60% between 1989 and 1997. It was estimated in 1995 that some 90,000 companies, roughly three-quarters of the sector, had vanished in the space of ten years (3). It was in this frenzy of consolidation that the behemoth Lockheed Martin was born. Even so, in 1998-1999, the big names in the sector saw their stock prices plummet and their debt downgraded to "uninvestable." They were only saved by the wars in Afghanistan and then Iraq.

The old guard challenged by young wolves
Sensitive to the problem of corrupt, bloated, and atrophied monopolies, Obama turned to the tech sector, which was generally pro-Democrat and presumed to be more efficient. As early as 2014, startups from an emerging tech-defense coalition (SpaceX, Palantir, Anduril) were winning lawsuits for contracts awarded without real competition to dominant groups, creating an unexpected opportunity for venture capital and private equity firms. Companies in this new ecosystem thrived under Biden, but, believing that the major arms manufacturers continued to win the lion's share of contracts, they agreed to pledge allegiance to Trump, thanks to the mediation of Peter Thiel (PayPal, Palantir), David Sachs (head of AI and crypto in the current administration), and J. D. Vance.

Returning to an old American obsession-that everything can be solved by yet another technological breakthrough-Palantir, Anduril, and others offered cutting-edge solutions that proved disappointing in Ukraine, where the fighters preferred Chinese or locally manufactured drones, which were cheaper and more reliable. The same poor performance was seen with established suppliers, infamous among American soldiers for their helicopters that frequently crash and their assault rifles that were too heavy to carry. Meanwhile, Trump announced the "Golden Dome," a future missile defense shield estimated to cost $175 billion. Although considered just as unrealistic as Reagan's "Star Wars," it should delight the tech-defense right.

Is this essentially what the defense budget is for? In any case, Stephen Miran, a Trump supporter recently appointed to the Federal Reserve, argues for increased military spending as a surer path to reindustrialization than the measures adopted by Biden (4).

"Okay," some will object, "but what about foreign policy, the violence against America's 'enemies'?" Let us recall that Trump had to promise during his campaign that there would be no more "endless wars," so thoroughly had the population-and especially the MAGA base-suffered. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq: American aggressions filled the country with demoralized and traumatized veterans, as well as soldiers who were sometimes dangerous, as revealed by a recent study on the country's largest military base, a hotbed of drug trafficking and murder. Moreover, one of the few armed engagements under Trump II ended in a pitiful defeat... against the Houthis: "In the space of a month, the United States had exhausted the bulk of its stockpile of guided missiles and lost numerous aircraft, without having imposed air superiority on a country whose GDP per capita is six times lower than that of Haiti (5)." And what about the bombing of Iran? Courageous but not reckless, Trump only dared to do so after the Israelis had destroyed its air defenses.

Intimidation as a method of governance
This leads us to a key dimension of the "Trump method": intimidation on all fronts. Aware of the gradual erosion of America's former hegemony, the ruling team seeks to instill fear and create illusions, while retreating to the Western Hemisphere, its historical preserve (now to be closed to Chinese influence). Hence the fixation on Venezuela, which has, in fact, lasted for a quarter of a century and which currently accounts for the largest concentration of American air and naval forces since the Gulf War. As we write these lines, this looks more like another show of force aimed at extracting concessions on oil production and, if possible, a change of government, especially since invading the country would require the deployment of 50,000 troops and risk causing unmanageable chaos (including for Exxon, Chevron, and their ilk). All this at a time when Trump's hitherto unwavering supporters are beginning to abandon ship (6).

One striking aspect of this "militarization" remains to be considered: the deployment of armed forces to enforce control over the inhabitants of cities governed by Democrats and the use of the massively budgeted Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE and CBP) services as a kind of Gestapo under the orders of the White House. Deportations of foreigners since January have already exceeded 500,000, but it is not clear that they will satisfy a population preoccupied with economic insecurity and increasingly shocked by the brutality of federal agents (7).

Domination without decorum abroad, a police state at home: force has become an end in itself; no large-scale project underpins its use. If militarization exists in the United States today, it seems primarily performative. Behind it, one can discern at most the need to maintain a specific sector of the economy and the state bureaucracy, the fantasy of restoring the country's former glory, the delusion of a semi-mafia head of state and his entourage, who aspire to unlimited and unchallenged power. The massive demonstrations in June and then in October, and especially the almost daily acts of solidarity with immigrants, express a vigorous and welcome reaction. But as long as the social order that produced these disruptions remains unchallenged, it's difficult to see where this will lead.

Larry Cohen, November 24, 2025

Notes
(1) The budget reconciliation law passed in July 2025 does, however, significantly supplement this budget, and with far fewer controls on spending.

(2) Press release, SIPRI, March 10, 2025.

(3) See, on this point and what follows, Susannah Glickman, "The War Over Defense Tech," New York Review of Books, October 4, 2025. This is a far cry from the common notion of an arms industry calling the shots in the United States.

(4) Some even see it as a way to counter the "crisis of masculinity," since it would mean a shift from a feminized, service-based economy to a more masculine one structured around manufacturing...
(5) Seth Harp, *The Fort Bragg Cartel*, Penguin Random House, 2025, summarized in his article "Mission Impossible: The Sad State of the American Armed Forces," *Harper's Magazine*, September 17, 2025.

(6) Cornered, he could certainly opt for war in the hope of restoring his image. A risky gamble, but given the man, it's not out of the question.

(7) See our article in CA No. 353, "The situation in the United States", our article "United States: political revolution and chaotic reorganization at the top of capitalism", in Temps critiques No. 23, and, in the same issue of this journal, J. Wajnsztejn, "Power and decline: the fragile Trumpian synthesis".

http://oclibertaire.lautre.net/spip.php?article4581
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