A-Infos (en) Comprehensive analyzis: The Massacre in Acteal and the Future of Mexico II (2/2)

[Ilan Shalif <gshalif@netvision.net.il>]

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FWDed: chiapas95-english@eco.utexas.edu BY Michael Flynn
<mflynn@bullatomsci.org>
Terror in Chiapas:  The Massacre in Acteal and the Future of Mexico
(Part 2)
by Alejandro Nadal
published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1998

No-change changes

In the immediate aftermath of the killings, a few people at the bottom of the
chain of command in Chenalhó were fired.
        Later, the governor of Chiapas and his staff resigned. A substitute
governor-number six since the conflict started-was hastily put in place. At
the federal level, the president asked for the resignation of the interior
secretary and nominated a new representative to the peace talks. As Gilberto
López y Rivas, spokesman for the Congressional Commission on Concordance and
Pacification, put it, "Mr. Zedillo has fired everyone he could. The next in
the chain of command to be changed is the president himself."
        In fact, Zedillo has yet to fire his defense secretary, but the point
is that many believe that the list of personnel changes has merely served to
appease domestic and foreign critics rather than to signal a fundamental
change in direction. Mac McLarty, President Bill Clinton's envoy, said in
early January that Clinton was satisfied with the prompt action taken by
Zedillo. The move was less successful with the European Parliament, however,
which warned that sanctions against Mexico might be invoked in the future.
        Similarly, the actions of Mexico's Justice Department appear to be
limited to making scapegoats of low-level officials while those in the higher
echelons of government escape unscathed. With the responsibility of federal
authorities in the organization and arming of paramilitary groups now
established, Zedillo has sent the wrong kind of message to the nation by
forcing the resignation of his interior secretary instead of arraigning him on
charges related to the crimes of the paramilitary groups.
        The cabinet changes are not likely to alter the government's strategy.
Before and after Acteal, the army continued to harass the ezln, principally by
searching and sometimes ransacking homes in towns and villages known to be
sympathetic to the Zapatistas, while leaving areas controlled by the
paramilitaries alone. All of this was in clear violation of the Law for Peace
in Chiapas.
        The army's presence and behavior in Chiapas is also a clear violation
of the Mexican Constitution. According to articles 29 and 129, any military
interference in a state must be preceded by a congressional declaration of
emergency powers. The army is explicitly forbidden by the Constitution from
carrying out ordinary police functions.
        The defense secretary has argued that the army was simply enforcing a
federal law on firearms, but that law does not authorize the army to enter
communities and homes to make warrantless searches, and it does not give the
army the right to establish military checkpoints on civilian roads or to
establish permanent bases in and around Zapatista communities. The Law for
Peace in Chiapas also prohibits these maneuvers.

The future

The government has been unable to solve this conflict, which first came to
world attention on January 1, 1994. Over the past four years the conflict has
grown larger, not smaller. It has also become much more difficult to
disentangle.
        Precious time has been lost with a long sequence of mediocre
government negotiators who worried mostly about their own personal and
political agendas while the conflict slid out of control. The main objective
in all the negotiations was to disarm the Zapatistas, not to deal with what
caused their appearance in the first place.
        Within two months of coming to power, Zedillo opted for a course
proposed by hardliners, and he launched a large-scale military and police
offensive in Chiapas. He has continued to say that the peace dialogue is the
only way to go, but the deliberate sabotage of the peace talks, the actions of
the army and security forces, and more recently the government's covert
support of the paramilitaries, are constant reminders of Mr. Zedillo's initial
preference for a military solution.
        Today it seems unlikely that the negotiations will resume soon. And it
is almost unthinkable that they will resume in their old format, under the Law
for Peace in Chiapas. The government realized in late 1995 that the law was an
obstacle to its military options, and it may have decided then that the
dialogues in San Andrés had to come to a standstill.
        By overtly violating the Law for Peace in Chiapas with an
extraordinary military buildup and by taking actions against Zapatista
communities, the government tried to obliterate whatever remained of the legal
framework for the negotiations. This was a dangerous gamble. Not only was this
a clear provocation against the Zapatistas, it also undermined the
independence of the legislative branch of power.
        The notion that the Zapatistas can be easily destroyed-a popular idea
with both civilian and military hardliners-is erroneous. A rapid surgical
operation to capture or kill the Zapatista leadership is, of course, quite
possible. But it would not put an end to the war.
        It is true that the military strength of the ezln is small compared to
the army, and there are few places to hide. But official data show that the
population of the areas that strongly support the Zapatistas exceeds 1.3
million people. Perhaps 30 percent of this total (400,000 people), are serious
adherents. Their geographical distribution alone should be enough to reveal
the folly of believing that a military venture would "solve" the conflict.
        Within the political space in which the conflict is developing, there
are other problems. The ezln demonstrated in 1997 that it enjoys widespread
popular support-31 counties have what are known in Chiapas as "autonomous
councils," which are a duplication of the governing political and
administrative units in those areas. The councils are a popular response to
the corruption and inefficiency of the pri's local authorities.
        The councils are also an intelligent political rejoinder to Zedillo's
thoughtless backtracking on the agreements of San Andrés. In the process, ezln
influence has been extended in the North, in Los Altos, in the southern Sierra
Madre (Motozintla, near the border with Guatemala), the Soconusco region, and
in two important corn-producing regions, Venustiano Carranza and La Fraylesca.
If the government's war on the Zapatistas was designed to deny the rebels
political maneuverability, it has been a resounding failure.
        Everything indicates the Zedillo administration has been obsessed by
the idea of "winning" a war by decapitating the enemy, as if the indigenous
peoples in Chiapas would return meekly to the passive role widely attributed
to them by racism and ignorance of Chiapas history.
        Time is running out in Mexico. The war of counterinsurgency in Chiapas
has failed and the massacre shows how irritated and frustrated the political
and military establishment is with the current situation. In their
desperation, the hardliners will try anything.
        The government's initiative in late January promised much: Disarming
the paramilitaries, at least to a degree. Completing the official
investigation of the massacre. Restructuring the police forces in Chiapas.
Improving the administration of justice in Chiapas. And eliminating all
"non-authorized taxes," a measure presumably directed at the paramilitaries.
        Some of the specific actions sounded good, too, particularly a pledge
to "discuss the relocation of army units" in Chiapas, and the promise of
humanitarian aid to refugees and to help them return to their communities.
        But other proposed actions sounded cynical and mischievous,
particularly a promise to "eliminate duplication" in municipal government
functions. That expressed a clear intent to go after the autonomous councils,
which are central to the Zapatista movement.
        Two fundamental problems also cast doubt on the government's
initiative: First, the government's principal objections to the San Andrés
accords still stand, particularly the agreement on indigenous autonomy. This
is tantamount to continued rejection of the already signed accords. Second, in
the announcement of the initiative no reference was made to the Law for Peace
in Chiapas; in other words, the government's new initiative ignores the fact
that there is already a legal framework in place for the negotiations.
        At the end of January, hardly anything about the government's peace
initiative was clear. It may lead to something positive. Or it may be little
more than a public relations ploy by the spinmeisters in Mexico City.
        So far, President Zedillo's discourse regarding Chiapas brims with
contradictions. He does not yet appear to have a strategy for a peaceful
resolution to the conflict. In addition, the economic crisis that was revealed
as Zedillo began his term has not been resolved. Indeed, recent drops in oil
prices have worsened it. Zedillo cannot buy much more time and he does not
have a lot of leeway.
        The way in which attempts to solve the conflict in Chiapas unfold are
of historic importance to Mexico. If a military solution is ultimately
imposed, the military will gain greater power and autonomy throughout Mexico,
and whatever remains of the rule of law will vanish. In spite of the 1997
elections, the country's transition to democracy will be aborted.
        If, on the other hand, a just and viable solution can be attained
through a rational negotiating process, then the transition to the democracy
that Mexico needs could become a reality.

The fog of war

Although the president inaugurated it only last summer, the new road leading
to Acteal is marked by potholes, treacherous curves, and places where the
asphalt has caved in. It is not difficult to understand why the road is in
such bad shape. The heavy military transports that constantly use it are just
too much for its flimsy construction.
        As I leave Acteal and climb from the ravine toward the road, funeral
services start at the 45 graves down below. One of the catechists sings a sad
lament in Tzotzil, and I awkwardly search for my tape recorder. The sight of
cheap pink and green plastic sandals in the mud where the carnage took place
is still fresh in my mind's eye. And the biting cold reminds me and probably
everyone in Acteal of the tension and dangers ahead.
        With deceitful quiet, the night and the thick fog descend on the camp,
relaying a disturbing message of urgency, reminding everyone that already the
small, little-noticed war in Chiapas is changing Mexico.


Trashing the "Law for Peace" (sidebar)

After failing to capture the head of the Zapatistas in February 1995, the
Mexican government gave in to domestic and international pressure and began
negotiating with the Zapatista rebels. In March of that year, Congress
approved the "Law for Peace in Chiapas" (the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation,
and a Dignified Peace in Chiapas), which recognized the Zapatista National
Liberation Army (ezln) as a "group of Mexican citizens, in their majority
indigenous people, who expressed their nonconformity in an armed movement in
January 1, 1994."
        The law implicitly acknowledges that just causes led to the uprising.
The law also established that the ezln and its negotiators would not be
molested by the authorities during negotiations, and that only the
Congressional Commission on Concordance and Pacification and the
non-governmental National Mediation Commission could declare the negotiations
to be broken.
        A unique feature of the peace process was the direct participation of
a variety of civilian advisers in the negotiations. The government was taken
by surprise during the first round of talks when its own advisers rallied to
the Zapatista cause, leading to the "Agreements of San Andrés" in February
1996. The cornerstone of these agreements is the right of indigenous peoples
to autonomous rule.
        In response to the Zapatista's success in the first round, a number of
factors undermined the second round. Every meeting in the second round of
talks coincided with acts of violence. Zapatista sympathizers were constantly
harassed; violent deaths occurred every week. Acts of provocation increased
whenever negotiations in the village of San Andrés were due to take place.
Meanwhile, government officials began backing off from the agreements made in
the first round.
        The government delegation failed to present any meaningful positions
in the second round of talks. When the talks became a monologue, the Zapatista
delegation announced that it was suspending negotiations until the government
ended the growing military presence in Chiapas and complied fully with the
agreements.
        Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo continues to say that he will honor
the agreements, but he adds that transforming their promises into legal texts
requires "technical" changes. In late January, the Zedillo government said it
would abandon most of its "objections" to the agreements. But the remaining
objections are fundamental, particularly those related to autonomy for
indigenous peoples.


Alejandro Nadal is a professor of economics at El Colegio de Mexico in Mexico
City and is a member of the Bulletin's Board of Directors. In 1996, he served
as an economic adviser to the Zapatista negotiating team.


The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
6042 S. Kimbark Avenue
Chicago, IL  60637

phone: (773) 834-1846
fax: (773) 702-0725
email: mflynn@bullatomsci.org

www.bullatomsci.org




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Alejandro Nadal is a professor of economics at El Colegio de Mexico in Mexico
City and is a member of the Bulletin's Board of Directors. In 1996, he served
as an economic adviser to the Zapatista negotiating team.

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
6042 S. Kimbark Avenue
Chicago, IL  60637

phone: (773) 834-1846
fax: (773) 702-0725
email: mflynn@bullatomsci.org

www.bullatomsci.org






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To unsubscribe from this list send a message containing the words
unsubscribe chiapas95-english to majordomo@eco.utexas.edu.


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